It's January 2007 in Iraq

The 'Surge Strategy': Political Arguments and Military Realities

By George Friedman

U.S. President George W. Bush is preparing a new strategy for Iraq. According to reports being leaked to the media, the primary option being considered is a "surge strategy," in which U.S. troop levels in Iraq would be increased, particularly in the Baghdad region. The numbers of additional troops that would deploy -- or that would not be rotated home -- are unclear, but appear to be in the low tens of thousands. This "surge" strategy is interesting in that it runs counter to general expectations after the midterm elections in November, when it appeared that the president was tied to a phased withdrawal plan. Instead, Bush seems to have decided to attempt to break out of the military gridlock in which the United States finds itself. Therefore, the questions now are why the president is considering this strategy and whether it will work.

As we have discussed previously, the United States appears to have four strategic options in Iraq:

1. Massively increase the number of troops in Iraq, attempting to break the back of both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias and create room for a political settlement.

2. Begin a withdrawal process that allows the Iraqis to shape the politics of the country as they will -- and that leaves a huge opportunity for Iran to fill the vacuum.

3. Abandon attempts to provide security for Iraq but retain forces there, in a redeployed posture, with the goal of blocking any potential Iranian moves toward the Arabian Peninsula.

4. Attempt to reach a political accommodation with Tehran that concedes Iraq to the Iranian sphere of influence, in order to provide guarantees against Iranian expansion southward. This diplomatic option is compatible with all others.

Each of these options has strengths and weakness. The first option, the surge, rests on the assumption that the United States has enough troops available to make a difference on the ground in Iraq; it also would decrease the strategic reserve for dealing with other crises around the world. The phased withdrawal option eliminates the need for Iraqi Shia and Iran to engage in political discussion -- since, given time, U.S. forces would depart from Iraq and the Shia would be the dominant force. The blocking strategy puts the United States in the position of protecting Saudi Arabia (a Sunni kingdom that doesn't want to appear to be seeking such protection) against Iran -- a Shiite state that could, in that situation, choose the time and place for initiating conflict. In other words, this option would put U.S. forces on a strategic defensive in hostile areas. The fourth option, diplomacy, assumes some basis for a U.S.-Iranian understanding and a mechanism for enforcing agreements. In short, there are no good choices -- only a series of bad ones. But, for the United States, doing nothing is also a choice, and the current posture is untenable.

The president appears to have chosen a variation on the troop surge. But it is a variation with an important difference. He has not proposed a surge that would increase the number of troops in Iraq by an order of magnitude. Indeed, he cannot propose that, inasmuch as he does not have several hundred thousand troops standing by -- and to the extent that forces are standing by, he cannot afford to strip the strategic reserve completely. It is a big world, and other crises can emerge suddenly. The surge the president is proposing appears to be on the order of around 10,000 troops -- and certainly no more than 20,000. Even at the upper limit, that is not so much a surge as a modest increase. It is, however, the best that can be done under the circumstances.

The Political Logic

The president's logic appears to be as follows:

While it is impossible to double the size of the force in Iraq -- for reasons of manpower, logistics and politics -- it is possible to massively increase the force available in the key area of Iraq: Baghdad. If this increase were to include a reshuffling of forces already in-country in a way that would double the number deployed to Baghdad, it might be possible to achieve a strategic victory there, thus setting the stage for a political settlement that would favor American interests.

Behind this thinking is a psychological assumption. Over the past year, it has become conventional wisdom that the U.S. strategy in Iraq has failed and that it is simply a matter of time until U.S. forces withdraw. Under these circumstances, the United States has been marginalized in Iraq. No one expects Washington to be able to threaten the interests of various parties, and no one expects meaningful American guarantees. The Iraqis do not see the United States as being a long-term player in Iraq, or as relevant to the current political crisis there. Iran, Iraq's powerful Shiite neighbor, seems much more relevant and important. But the Sunnis, not viewing the Americans as a long-term factor in Iraq, cannot turn to the United States for protection even if they fear the Iranians and the Iraqi Shia. The conventional wisdom is that the United States has failed, knows it has failed and is out of options.

Unless the Americans are prepared to simply walk away, the assumptions of the players in and around Iraq must change. From Bush's standpoint, the United States must demonstrate that it does have options, and that the president's hands are not tied politically in Washington. If he can demonstrate that he can still shape U.S. policy, that the United States has the ability to increase forces in Iraq -- confounding expectations -- and that it can achieve victories, at least on the local level, the psychology in Iraq and Iran will change and the United States will at least be able to participate in shaping Iraq's political future instead of being simply a bystander. If the president can increase the forces in Iraq and not be blocked by the Democrats, then the assumption that the Republicans' political defeat in November cripples Bush's power on the larger stage would be dispelled. Therefore, surge the forces.

The Military Perspective

The plan has come under sharp attack, however -- particularly from the Army and apparently from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The plan is primarily political in nature: It would use U.S. forces as a lever to achieve a psychological shift and create a particular political environment. Viewed from a strictly military standpoint, however, it makes no sense. Now, war is about politics, but from the Joint Chiefs' standpoint, the military weakness of the plan obviates potential political benefits. The generals appear to have made the following criticisms:

The size of the surge cannot achieve any meaningful military result. Even a surge of hundreds of thousands of troops would not guarantee success in a counterinsurgency operation. This surge is too little, too late.

The United States already has surged forces into Baghdad, and the operation was regarded as a failure. Counterinsurgency operations in an urban setting are difficult, and the Americans are dealing with multiple Shiite militias, Sunni insurgents, criminal groups and hostile neighborhoods in the capital. Achieving military success here is unlikely, and the strategy would lead to casualties without victory.

Surging fresh troops into Baghdad would create major command-and-control problems. The entire structure of areas of responsibility, intelligence distribution and tasking, chains of command and so on would have to be shifted in a very short period of time for the president's strategy to work. Transitioning new troops -- who are not familiar with the area for which they would be responsible -- into a counterinsurgency operation in a city of about 5 million would create endless opportunities for confusion, fratricide and failure. A "surge" connotes "fast," and this transition should not be undertaken quickly.

The U.S. Army in particular is stretched to the limit. Failure to massively increase the size of the Army has meant that the force that existed in 2003 has had to carry the load of this war through multiple deployments. The president's strategy necessarily would increase the duration of several deployments for Army and Marine forces. Between concerns about morale and retention, maintaining equipment in the theater and simple effectiveness after long periods of deployment, the United States is at the limits of what it can do. Surging forces in an operation that is unlikely to succeed creates failure throughout the military system. No increase in U.S. forces generally, if committed to now, would impact the system for months or even years.

There is little or no reserve available in practical terms. A 10-division military force, deployed the way it is, means that five divisions are in Iraq at any given time, and the other five are either recovering or preparing to go there. The United States is already vulnerable should other crises crop up in the world, and a surge into Iraq now would simply exacerbate that condition.

What we have here, therefore, is a divergence between political reality and military reality.

The Upshot

Politically, the Americans cannot leave Iraq unless Washington is prepared to allow Iran to assume dominance in Iraq and the region. That is politically unacceptable. A redeployment under the current circumstances would create a hostage force in Iraq, rather than a powerful regional strike force. The United States must redefine the politics of the region before it can redeploy. To do this, it must use the forces available in one last try -- regardless of the condition of the forces or even the improbability of success -- to shift the psychology of the other players. Too much is at stake not to take the risk.

Militarily, even a temporary success in Baghdad is doubtful -- and if it can be achieved, the gains would be temporary. They also would come at substantial cost to the force structure and the American strategic posture. Any political success in Iraq would be vitiated by the military cost. Indeed, the Iraqis and Iranians have a sophisticated understanding of U.S. military capability and will understand that the Americans cannot sustain a "surged" posture (and likely would pursue their own strategies on the basis of that understanding). Thus, the U.S. operation at best would lead to a transitory military improvement; at worst, it would inflict substantial casualties on U.S. forces while actually weakening the U.S. military position overall.

If the military argument wins, then the United States must select from options two through four. Politically, this means that Iraq would become a Shiite state under the heavy influence of Iran. If the political argument wins, it means the United States will continue with military operations that are unlikely to achieve their desired ends. Neither option is palatable. The president now must choose between them.

He appears to have chosen a high-risk military operation in hopes of retrieving the United States' political position. Given what has been risked, this is not an irrational point of view, even if it is a tough position to take. It is possible that the surge would lead to perceptions that the United States is an unpredictable player that retains unexpected options, and that discounting it prematurely is unwise. The strategy could bring some Shia to the table as a hedge, or perhaps even lead to a political solution in Iraq. Even if the probability of this happening is low, the cost is bearable -- and given what has already been invested, from Bush's standpoint, it is a necessary move.

Of course, the problem every gambler has when he is losing is the fear that if he leaves the table, he will lose his chance at recouping his losses. Every gambler, when he is down, faces the temptation of taking his dwindling chips and trying to recoup. He figures that it's worth the risk. And it could be. He could get lucky. But more frequently, he compounds his earlier losses by losing the money for his cab ride home.

We can divine the president's reasoning. Nothing succeeds like success and, indeed, he might pull the winning card. If the strategy fails, the United States will have added to its military weakness somewhat, but not catastrophically. But the question is this: Will the president be in a position to get up from the table if this surge fails, or will he keep pulling chips out of his pocket in the hope that he can recoup?

That is the question this strategy does not answer.

The administration also intends to nominate Navy Adm. William J. Fallon to head the Central Command, replacing Gen. John P. Abizaid as the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East. Some military officials consider Fallon an unusual choice, because he is a naval officer in charge of the Pacific Command with limited experience in the Middle East and would be in charge of two ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

...

The U.S. military is increasingly resigned to the probability that Bush will deploy a relatively small number of additional troops -- between one and five brigades -- in part because he has few other dramatic options available to signal U.S. determination in Iraq, officials said. But the Joint Chiefs have not given up making the case that the potential dangers outweigh the benefits for several reasons, officials said.

There are already signs that a limited U.S. escalation, even when complemented by new political and economic steps, may not satisfy either supporters or critics of a surge. Pentagon officials and military experts say far more troops are needed to make a real difference, but the United States would have to remobilize reserves, extend current tours of duty and accelerate planned deployments just to come up with 20,000 troops, U.S. officials say. And such a surge would strap the military for other potential crises, they add.

Etc. Oh, and how cute this is:

As many as 50,000 Iraqis may be fleeing their homes each month in a bid to escape the violence that's tearing the country apart. But less than one percent would be welcome in the United States under its current quota system.

...

The NYT reporters say the U.S. administration has only recently realised how dangerous Baghdad is for local employees. Iraqis' lives are endangered by association with the superpower, but they are given the cold shoulder when they try to escape rising violence.

An interpreter named only as Amar in the newspaper report, who's missing a finger, an eye and part of his skull after a bomb attack, says he hasn't found any sympathy for his asylum bid. "They said they have nothing for Iraqis... We feel just like stupid trash."

the right wing response to this so far has been really hilarious. anyways, keep posting good stuff from crazies land, i can't get enough of it.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6237607.stm

http://apnews.myway.com/article/20070108/D8MH66Q00.html

Now ask yourself, as all of them are asking themselves, why is this so? For what? For whom? When and where will it end?

Now remember: they can't end this. But we can. Add your pebble to the pile. Email your representative. It won't take many words to say what needs to be said.

your suggestion seemed like a good idea to me, so i went ahead and wrote mine, voiced my objection and asked him to not vote for any potential troop surge.

on his house website, he writes that the iraqis are now in control of their country with saddam gone, and that our elimination of the terrorists in iraq is crucial to our freedom. so i also did my best to correct him on both of these claims.

how likely is a house rep to actually read a letter from a constituent, anyway?

But we'll see.

- You are a constituent. That means you vote in his district. Right there you have gained a lot of traction, since most correspondence to a rep's office is from non-constituents. They do listen to voters in their district.

- You used your own words. That counts for a lot. A huge amount of correspondence is generated by cheap, bulk methods (e.g. "sign this web petition", "forward this pre-written email", "mail this pre-written postcard"). When someone takes the time to really write, it stands out.

- You took the time to address the rep's own stated position and used a reasoned approach. The importance of this is not that you will reason the rep out of his stated position by the astounding force of your intellect, but that you are a well-spoken voter at large in his district who could influence other people who vote.

If your letter is exceptionally persuasive and well-written, the staff member probably will hand it to his rep and urge him to read it, but that is a rare scenario. More likely, the staff member will just weight your letter fairly heavily when reporting the sentiment of the voters.

If someone would be so giving as to c&p this shit onto here, i'd be grateful.

Turns out the gamer guy is a unemployed English grad and metalhead who had to relocate to Syria.

I react almost dully to all the deaths now. And I wish I didn't.

Hang a map of Baghdad on one wall. A map of Iraq on another. Have the president stand between them with a laser pointer. Let him show where the sectarian fighting in the city is occurring, let him detail where US troops are currently deployed. Then he can explain the new plan: Where the extra troops would go, what they would do, where the new checkpoints would be placed, how the city would be cleared, how it would be held

Based on a just-completed White House background briefing, it looks like the President’s new Iraq strategy to be unveiled tonight looks promising.

The Administration recognizes a lot of what has gone wrong, for example, that is was unrealistic to assume that political progress could be made while the security situation remained so ghastly. The new emphasis is on security first. Five new American brigades will be sent to Baghdad to work with new Iraqi brigades securing the capital block by block. Unclear whether this will be sufficient force. Rules of engagement also to change so that there will be no more areas off limits to American forces.

The President also plans to ask for a larger army – a little late and so necessary! It will be interesting to see how the Democrats in Congress handle that one. All that talk of supporting the troops. . .

Possible problem areas: the strategy still depends heavily on Maliki’s bona fides. They believe his heart is the right place but he has suffered from lack of “capabilities.” That’s a gamble. There is also a “regional” component to the new strategy that seems to rely on another push for Israeli/Palestinian cooperation (Rice is traveling to Middle East within the week). That sounds like Baker/Hamilton bunk, but let’s see what she says.

Still, most of it sounds exactly right.

Uh-huh.

Sounds like we're planning to beat whack-a-mole with a slightly bigger hammer. Ye gods. What's that word we weren't supposed to say? Oh, yeah...

QUAQMIRE

Nothing like getting the blood hot & flowing for Grand Drama.

Shiite businesses in detroit are being vandalized.

It's fucking DETROIT, people. Of all the shit you have to worry about on a daily basis, you want to start fucking with other people over all this?

I'm wondering how far out in the suburbs(e.g. Dearborn) this shit goes.

Almost two years ago, at the exact same time some self-anointed experts and opiners like this one proclaimed "We're Winning", I made this post about a childhood friend of mine serving in Iraq who warned of the low troop morale and the "FUBAR clusterfuck" we were in. He was spot-on as it turned out, and an infinitely better source than those dubious "the media isn't showing the schools we've been painting" missives trumpeted by the usual suspects. He's now out of the Army, but stays in touch with friends still serving in Iraq. Recently he told me that troop morale is at rock-bottom now, lower than ever, and dejection is turning ominously into anger.

The mention about the media canard is interesting because Malkin's back from Iraq and is sounding a little, dare I say, sobered -- or at least more obviously clutching at straws:

Yes, there is danger and chaos and unspeakable bloodshed in parts of Baghdad. Sectarian violence--compounded by everyday street crime and tribal conflict--is rampant. Corruption, incompetence, and apathy infect the Iraqi government. You've gotten endless news coverage of all that. But there are also pockets of success and signs of hope amid utter despair. I'll give you more details of our embed unit after we get home. We have much to report and will be publishing a multi-part video and audio series, blog posts, and op-eds on security conditions, media malpractice, and the big picture on the war next week. Having met, watched, and interviewed a broad cross-section of our troops during our brief but fruitful travels, my faith in the U.S. military has never been stronger-- but I will not sugarcoat my skepticism and doubts about decisions being made in Washington.

Ledeen, meanwhile...well, just read it.

i love when people make vietnam comparisons approvingly. because, you know, those cambodia incursions turned out so well.

======

Now DD takes a look at the escalation in force, which includes the dispatching of five brigades to Baghdad.

Does it make sense? Or is it more a dumb penny-packet drib-and-drabs approach, the kind the Fuhrer/OKW might have come up with when it was all downhill in WWII, everything lost.

The brigade as a task force is part of the modern American army's modular approach to war. Take the tools out of the toolbox and put them together in a mix to solve the military problem posed. If the problem is unsolvable, that is not addressed.

The brigade is the smallest US military unit capable of being self-sustaining. There are three or more brigades in the standard division in the US military. The Baghdad escalation takes from five different American divisions, apparently, to achieve Bush's aims.

Normally, if army's wish to preserve the esprit de corps of units and work their organizational unity to the fullest, one dispatches divisions. In the Bush plan one could dispatch one or two divisions to Baghdad and achieve the same thing, instead of pulling apart units from various formations now at home in the United States (or in the case of the tabbed airborne brigade, in Kuwait) and -- perhaps -- playing to the local homefront interests that at least some of a division, based at a city somewhere in the US, will remain behind.

However, the current US military philosophy in Iraq uses brigades as individual task forces, presumably to stiffen the Iraqi "army" and do the block-by-block fighting when even that fails. As it does.
=====

The rest, some window-dressing, is here.

http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/01/10/bush.hussein/index.html

YOUSE GUYS ABUSE PRISONERS TOO SEE WHAT I DID THERE?

http://d.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/p/ap/20070111/capt.sa10401112336.playboy_military_sa104.jpg?x=238&y=345&sig=4qgSMcC37y3ubDgqjwTcNg--

http://d.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/p/ap/20070111/capt.sa10101112333.playboy_military_sa101.jpg?x=247&y=345&sig=FOkvECTyK7BTRk.PqWj9Tw--

I'm surprised it took this long for Tricia Helfer to make it in there.

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/admin/ads/banman.asp?Task=Click&ZoneID=208&CampaignID=508&AdvertiserID=203&BannerID=1076&SiteID=1&RandomNumber=4762

"the Iraqi government will spend 10 billion dollars of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs"

am i the only person who thought holy toledo they HAVE ten billion dollars?? shows what i know. i mean, how much money did saddam leave behind? are they still selling oil now? i confess i have no idea how much of that country is still up and running.

"under L. Paul Bremer, the CPA head, corporate taxes were slashed, a flat-tax on income was established, rules allowing multinationals to pull all of their profits from the country and a series of other provisions were enacted. These were then integrated into the Iraqi Constitution and remain in effect today.

Among the provisions in the Constitution, unlike those of most oil producers, is a requirement that the government "develop oil and gas wealth … relying on the most modern techniques of market principles and encouraging investment." The provision mandates that foreign companies would receive a major stake in Iraq's oil for the first time in the 30 years since the sector was nationalized in 1975."

http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/43045/

Guess which side actually worked out.

"Herbert Docena, a researcher with the NGO Focus on the Global South, wrote that an early draft of the constitution negotiated by Iraqis envisioned a "Scandinavian-style welfare system in the Arabian desert, with Iraq's vast oil wealth to be spent upholding every Iraqi's right to education, health care, housing, and other social services." "Social justice," the draft declared, "is the basis of building society."

What happened between that earlier draft and the constitution that Iraqis would eventually ratify? According to Docena:

While [U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay] Khalilzad and his team of U.S. and British diplomats were all over the scene, some members of Iraq's constitutional committee were reduced to bystanders. One Shiite member grumbled, "We haven't played much of a role in drafting the constitution. We feel that we have been neglected." A Sunni negotiator concluded: "This constitution was cooked up in an American kitchen not an Iraqi one."

Washington Post story on the 'dissenters' from 2003 being rerecruited is blackly amusing (and as has been noted in various spots, the last few paragraphs are the kicker -- the return of Chalabi! again!). Bush's isolation is noted here but of course 'We're going forward.' (As it is there's yet no clear sense of what the Democrats will agree on in response.) When it comes to implementation there might be a problem, though...and then there's the plan to expand the rebuilding teams.

Belgravia's ripping into Fred Kagan is worth a read, especially for the link to this hilarity from the AEI dorks.

And the death continues.

The official video of the hangings showed Hussein's half-brother lying headless below the gallows, his severed head several yards away, The Associated Press reported.

Iraqi authorities, eager to prove that the decapitation of Barzan Hassan was an accident, showed the video to a group of journalists, according to a government official.

Hassan, the former chief of Hussein's secret police, and Awad Bandar, the chief judge under the former regime, were hanged side by side about 3 a.m. Monday (7 p.m. Sunday ET), said Basam Ridha, the spokesman for Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's office. (Watch crowds in Sadr City celebrate the hangings )

They were executed for their roles in the killings of 148 men and boys after a 1982 assassination attempt in Dujail, Iraq.

Iraqi Sunnis reacted with anger to the hanging and decapitation, and some Shiites also expressed shock at the way the hanging was done, according to wire reports. (Full story)

Monday's executions were carried out with dignity and respect and without the shouted Shiite chants and taunting from guards, witnesses and executioners that marred the hanging of Saddam Hussein, Ridha said.

Everyone in the room was required to sign an agreement promising not to engage in such behavior, he said.

"It was not like a very pretty scene." said Ridha, who was one of the witnesses. But he called the apparently accidental decapitation "an act of God."

The video will not be released to the public, Ridha said. He said Iraqi authorities wanted to make sure that "the media understood that the beheading was accidental." (Read how hanging is supposed to work)

Government spokesman Ali Dabbagh said in accordance with Iraqi law, no audio was played during the screening for a group of journalists, which did not include CNN.

The government released a silent video of Hussein's December 30 execution. The video ended before the actual hanging.

However, unauthorized mobile phone video showed Hussein's hanging and included audio of Shiite guards taunting the Sunni ex-dictator on the scaffold.

That video sparked widespread outrage and criticism that the execution was a sectarian lynching.

'Very apologetic'
Describing Monday's execution, Ridha said the two men, dressed in orange prisoner uniforms, "looked very surprised" that they were actually going to be hanged.

They "were very apologetic," asking that they not be put to death, he said. "They asked God for forgiveness," he said.

Orange hoods were placed over their heads, unlike Hussein, who asked not to be given a hood when he was hanged on the same gallows on December 30, Ridha said.

The trap doors underneath both men were dropped at the same time, he said.

Hassan and Bandar are to be buried near Hussein in Owja, Iraq -- the former Iraqi dictator's hometown outside Tikrit.

The two were sentenced to death in November.

Their death sentences were upheld by an Iraqi appeals court in December but delayed amid the controversy surrounding Hussein's December 30 execution.

like every major conflict since World War II – to a mythical "limited war," where there is no real use of American might, and where our enemies are allowed to use civilians as shields and churches as places of refuge, armed with the knowledge that we would rather let them escape and kill more troops and civilians another day, than risk the collateral damage or injured feelings that actually taking the fight to the enemy and seeking battlefield victory could result in.

that's the thing, echoing back to the talk we did on the speech w/ the endless bloodthirsty call for "more" or in this case, "real use of American might." This wording which shields its opponents and deludes its proponents from what it actually is. Yay war crimes, hearts & minds, we're burning down their cities for their own good, etc.

Congress Can't Stop Troop Boost in Iraq, Bush Says

Which is why I think the psychanalysis bits are key, since it's like we're no longer in this thing for oil or political reasons, we're still there and doing the exact same thing that's already failed entirely due to the President's petulant psychology.

There are so many fields in which true proficiency is hard to come by nowadays. Let us hope that all the money we US taxpayers are spending on training in Iraq will raise the overall level of professionalism amongst Iraqi government workers

Love how the comments on the RedState article Ned linked to above end with an unchallenged call to "Kent State" the war protesters.

http://redstate.com/blogs/jeff_emanuel/2007/jan/14/presidents_address_and_plan_short_on_both_bark_and_bite

-- scott seward (skotro...) (webmail), January 16th, 2007 10:13 AM. (scott seward)

"The majority of those killed are female students who were on their way home," Reuters news agency quoted a university official as saying.

ffs

----

Rhetoric and Reality: The View from Iran

By George Friedman

The Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.

The United States has encountered serious problems in creating the coalition government. The Iranians have been primarily responsible for that. With the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June, when it appeared that the Sunnis would enter the political process fully, the Iranians used their influence with various Iraqi Shiite factions to disrupt that process by launching attacks on Sunnis and generally destabilizing the situation. Certainly, Sunnis contributed to this, but for much of the past year, it has been the Shia, supported by Iran, that have been the primary destabilizing force.

So long as the Iranians continue to follow this policy, the U.S. strategy cannot succeed. The difficulty of the American plan is that it requires the political participation of three main ethnic groups that are themselves politically fragmented. Virtually any substantial group can block the success of the strategy by undermining the political process. The Iranians, however, appear to be in a more powerful position than the Americans. So long as they continue to support Shiite groups within Iraq, they will be able to block the U.S. plan. Over time, the theory goes, the Americans will recognize the hopelessness of the undertaking and withdraw, leaving Iran to pick up the pieces. In the meantime, the Iranians will increasingly be able to dominate the Shiite community and consolidate their hold over southern Iraq. The game appears to go to Iran.

Americans are extremely sensitive to the difficulties the United States faces in Iraq. Every nation-state has a defining characteristic, and that of the United States is manic-depression, cycling between insanely optimistic plans and total despair. This national characteristic tends to blind Americans to the situation on the other side of the hill. Certainly, the Bush administration vastly underestimated the difficulties of occupying Iraq -- that was the manic phase. But at this point, it could be argued that the administration again is not looking over the other side of the hill at the difficulties the Iranians might be having. And it is useful to consider the world from the Iranian point of view.

The Foundation of Foreign Policy

It is important to distinguish between the rhetoric and the reality of Iranian foreign policy. As a general principle, this should be done with all countries. As in business, rhetoric is used to shape perceptions and attempt to control the behavior of others. It does not necessarily reveal one's true intentions or, more important, one's capabilities. In the classic case of U.S. foreign policy, Franklin Roosevelt publicly insisted that the United States did not intend to get into World War II while U.S. and British officials were planning to do just that. On the other side of the equation, the United States, during the 1950s, kept asserting that its goal was to liberate Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, when in fact it had no plans, capabilities or expectations of doing so. This does not mean the claims were made frivolously -- both Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles had good reasons for posturing as they did -- but it does mean that rhetoric is not a reliable indicator of actions. Thus, the purple prose of the Iranian leadership cannot be taken at face value.

To get past the rhetoric, let's begin by considering Iran's objective geopolitical position.

Historically, Iran has faced three enemies. Its oldest enemy was to the west: the Arab/Sunni threat, against which it has struggled for millennia. Russia, to the north, emerged as a threat in the late 19th century, occupying northern Iran during and after World War II. The third enemy has worn different faces but has been a recurring threat since the time of Alexander the Great: a distant power that has intruded into Persian affairs. This distant foreign power -- which has at times been embodied by both the British and the Americans -- has posed the greatest threat to Iran. And when the element of a distant power is combined with one of the other two traditional enemies, the result is a great global or regional power whose orbit or influence Iran cannot escape. To put that into real terms, Iran can manage, for example, the chaos called Afghanistan, but it cannot manage a global power that is active in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously.

For the moment, Russia is contained. There is a buffer zone of states between Iran and Russia that, at present, prevents Russian probes. But what Iran fears is a united Iraq under the influence or control of a global power like the United States. In 1980, the long western border of Iran was attacked by Iraq, with only marginal support from other states, and the effect on Iran was devastating. Iran harbors a rational fear of attack from that direction, which -- if coupled with American power -- could threaten Iranian survival.

Therefore, Iran sees the American plan to create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad as a direct threat to its national interests. Now, the Iranians supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; they wanted to see their archenemy, former President Saddam Hussein, deposed. But they did not want to see him replaced by a pro-American regime. Rather, the Iranians wanted one of two outcomes: the creation of a pro-Iranian government dominated by Iraqi Shia (under Iran's control), or the fragmentation of Iraq. A fragmented Iraq would have two virtues. It would prove no danger to Iran, and Iran likely would control or heavily influence southern Iraq, thus projecting its power from there throughout the Persian Gulf.

Viewed this way, Iran's behavior in Iraq is understandable. A stable Iraq under U.S. influence represents a direct threat to Iran, while a fragmented or pro-Iranian Iraq does not. Therefore, the Iranians will do whatever they can to undermine U.S. attempts to create a government in Baghdad. Tehran can use its influence to block a government, but it cannot -- on its own -- create a pro-Iranian one. Therefore, Iran's strategy is to play spoiler and wait for the United States to tire of the unending conflict. Once the Americans leave, the Iranians can pick up the chips on the table. Whether it takes 10 years or 30, the Iranians assume that, in the end, they will win. None of the Arab countries in the region has the power to withstand Iran, and the Turks are unlikely to get into the game.

The Unknown Variables

Logic would seem to favor the Iranians. But in the past, the Iranians have tried to be clever with great powers and, rather than trapping them, have wound up being trapped themselves. Sometimes they have simply missed other dimensions of the situation. For example, when the revolutionaries overthrew the Shah and created the Islamic Republic, the Iranians focused on the threat from the Americans, and another threat from the Soviets and their covert allies in Iran. But they took their eyes off Iraq -- and that miscalculation not only cost them huge casualties and a decade of economic decay, but broke the self-confidence of the Iranian regime.

The Iranians also have miscalculated on the United States. When the Islamic Revolution occurred, the governing assumption -- not only in Iran but also in many parts of the world, including the United States -- was that the United States was a declining power. It had, after all, been defeated in Vietnam and was experiencing declining U.S. military power and severe economic problems. But the Iranians massively miscalculated with regard to the U.S. position: In the end, the United States surged and it was the Soviets who collapsed.

The Iranians do not have a sterling record in managing great powers, and especially in predicting the behavior of the United States. In large and small ways, they have miscalculated on what the United States would do and how it would do it. Therefore, like the Americans, the Iranians are deeply divided. There are those who regard the United States as a bumbling fool, all set to fail in Iraq. There are others who remember equally confident forecasts about other American disasters, and who see the United States as ruthless, cunning and utterly dangerous.

These sentiments, then, divide into two policy factions. On the one side, there are those who see Bush's surge strategy as an empty bluff. They point out that there is no surge, only a gradual buildup of troops, and that the number of troops being added is insignificant. They point to political divisions in Washington and argue that the time is ripe for Iran to go for it all. They want to force a civil war in Iraq, to at least dominate the southern region and take advantage of American weakness to project power in the Persian Gulf.

The other side wonders whether the Americans are as weak as they appear, and also argues that exploiting a success in Iraq would be more dangerous and difficult than it appears. The United States has substantial forces in Iraq, and the response to Shiite uprisings along the western shore of the Persian Gulf would be difficult to predict. The response to any probe into Saudi Arabia certainly would be violent.

We are not referring here to ideological factions, nor to radicals and moderates. Rather, these are two competing visions of the United States. One side wants to exploit American weakness; the other side argues that experience shows that American weakness can reverse itself unexpectedly and trap Iran in a difficult and painful position. It is not a debate about ends or internal dissatisfaction with the regime. Rather, it is a contest between audacity and caution.

The Historical View

Over time -- and this is not apparent from Iranian rhetoric -- caution has tended to prevail. Except during the 1980s, when they supported an aggressive Hezbollah, the Iranians have been quite measured in their international actions. Following the war with Iraq, they avoided overt moves -- and they even were circumspect after the fall of the Soviet Union, when opportunities presented themselves to Iran's north. After 9/11, the Iranians were careful not to provoke the United States: They offered landing rights for damaged U.S. aircraft and helped recruit Shiite tribes for the American effort against the Taliban. The rhetoric alternated between intense and vitriolic; the actions were more cautious. Even with the Iranian nuclear project, the rhetoric has been far more intense than the level of development seems to warrant.

Rhetoric influences perceptions, and perceptions can drive responses. Therefore, the rhetoric should not be discounted as a driving factor in the geopolitical system. But the real debate in Iran is over what to do about Iraq. No one in Iran wants a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and blocking the emergence of such a government has a general consensus. But how far to go in trying to divide Iraq, creating a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad and projecting power in the region is a matter of intense debate. In fact, cautious behavior combined with extreme rhetoric still appears to be the default position in Tehran, with more adventurous arguments struggling to gain acceptance.

The United States, for its part, is divided between the desire to try one more turn at the table to win it all and the fear that it is becoming hopelessly trapped. Iran is divided between a belief that the time to strike is now and a fear that counting the United States out is always premature. This is an engine that can, in due course, drive negotiations. Iran might be "evil" and the United States might be "Satan," but at the end of the day, international affairs involving major powers are governed not by rhetoric but by national interest. The common ground between the United States and Iran is that neither is certain it can achieve its real strategic interests. The Americans doubt they can create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and Iran is not certain the United States is as weak as it appears to be.

Fear and uncertainty are the foundations of international agreement, while hope and confidence fuel war. In the end, a fractured Iraq -- an entity incapable of harming Iran, but still providing an effective buffer between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula -- is emerging as the most viable available option.

I was just starting to form an idea -- and I wonder what you and other politically savvy ilxors think of it -- that the real political/strategic benefit Bush hopes to achieve by this almost meaningless (except to our beleaguered troops) "surge" is that it buys him more time to stay bogged down in Iraq in order to hold the line against Iran. It's like "Not only am I not withdrawing, I'm sending more troops, so fuck you American political climate I don't care what you think."

I also wonder if the Bushadmin isn't hoping that if it holds the line against Iran long enough, it can outlast Ahmadinejad. I'm suddenly seeing headlines about widespread disapproval on Ahmadinejad's economic policy (produce, real estate prices going through the roof, etc.) and about possible disapproval from the supreme leader. Yeah, just wait it out, and btw Fidel sends his regards.

http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/01/irans_loyalty_t_1.php

Little reported as yet (but I heard it on BBC radio as well), possible secret letter from Ahmadinejad to US offering cooperation on Iraq stabilization and severing of ties to Hezbollah and Hamas. That would be quite something! US is allegedly taking the "we-don't-talk-to-evil" stance. But I can already see a few possible ways to read this situation

1) Fake letter, ploy by US to cause trouble btw Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran

2) Real leter, but ploy by Ahmadinejad knowing the U.S. won't take him up on it. Unlikely though, since it was a "secret letter" - knowing Ahmadinejad he'd probably just make insincere offers on television if propaganda were his aim

3) Perhaps most frightening - genuine letter but US refuses the offer, either out of ideologically-driven stupidity or, even worse, out of more sinister political designs on Iran

Just give us the nukes!

More interesting, though, is Malkin's story of her Baghdad visit. Some typical talking points get vented, but there's a fair amount of talk noting that total rosiness needs to be dumped out of the window -- overdue but better late than never. A good paragraph:

The troops I met scoff at peace activists’ efforts to “bring them home now.” But they are just as critical of the Bush administration and Pentagon’s missteps—from holding Iraqi elections too early, to senselessly breaking up their brigade combat team, to drawing down forces and withdrawing last year in Baghdad and Fallujah, to failing to hold cities after clearing them of insurgents. They speak candidly and critically of Shiite militia infiltration of some Iraqi police and Iraqi Army units and corruption in government ministries, but they want you to know about the unseen good news, too.

Essentially a lot of this mea-culpaing on the part of Malkin et al is in line with the (in some cases suspiciously quick) new willingness for the right-leaners to admit they've been played by the Administration and their own bias. And of course that darned mainstream media gets plenty of blame still. But I'll take some self-realization over none.

I've heard stranger. Speaking in terms of realpolitik -- something which the White House is absolutely terrible at conveying in any sort of practical sense beyond ham-handed implication -- it seems a logical conclusion.

All I know for sure is that when people's actions don't make sense, you're not hearing the real story. And the "surge" strategy does not make sense.

Um, Ahmadinejad came to power more than two years after we entered Iraq.

Rhetoric getting ahead of facts... you know what I mean! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_of_evil

To me that seems to be the biggest, most obvious shortcoming of the Cheney doctrine - bully everyone as much as possible and then get all surprised when they react.

What is the Cheney doctrine? Something along the lines of "We're the US, bitch, we do what we please."

(now hearing gangsta rap album recorded from Bush administration's POV)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_Doctrine

Man, I just shake my head every time I read this. It's like Bush and his football buddies are yelling "The best defense is a good offense!" and snapping each other with towels in the White House.

In having destroyed the Iraq we had effectively helped to build up in the first place to counterbalance Iran, we are now forced to remain there in its place.

What I fear is the adminstration's plans to ensure we won't withdraw from the region after they're out of office. At this point that gang is obssessed with their legacy and with getting the Bush Doctrine written into the history books. I know it sounds paranoid, but they're way beyond 75 klicks above the Do Lung bridge...

American officers tried to persuade the Iraqi soldiers to leave the slum area for better cover, but the Iraqis refused to risk crossing a lane that was being raked by machine-gun fire. “It’s their show,” said Lt. David Stroud, adding that the Americans have orders to defer to the Iraqis in cases like this.

In this surreal setting, about 20 American soldiers were forced at one point to pull themselves one by one up a canted tin roof by a dangling rubber hose and then shimmy along a ledge to another hut. The soldiers were stunned when a small child suddenly walked out of a darkened doorway and an old man started wheezing and crying somewhere inside.

Ultimately the group made it back to the high rises and escaped the sniper in the alley by throwing out the smoke bombs and sprinting to safety. Even though two Iraqis were struck by gunfire, many of the rest could not stop shouting and guffawing with amusement as they ran through the smoke.

One Iraqi soldier in the alley pointed his rifle at an American reporter and pulled the trigger. There was only a click: the weapon had no ammunition. The soldier laughed at his joke.

64 US soldiers dead this month so far. Almost 1500 Iraqi deaths.

Meanwhile, al-Maliki threatened a Sunni lawmaker with arrest during a broadcasted session of Parliament.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html?em&ex=1169960400&en=a409cbba07641b13&ei=5087%0A

The lawmakers had their shouting match while sitting beneath a banner with a phrase from the Koran that extols the importance of a civil debate in making good decisions.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070126/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush

Contrary to public statements by the U.S. military, four U.S. soldiers did not die repelling a sneak attack at the governor’s office in the Shiite holy city of Karbala last week. New information obtained by The Associated Press shows they were abducted and found dead or dying as far as 25 miles away.

The brazen assault, 50 miles south of Baghdad on Jan. 20, was conducted by nine to 12 militants posing as an American security team. They traveled in black GMC Suburban vehicles — the type used by U.S. government convoys — had American weapons, wore new U.S. military combat fatigues and spoke English.

In a written statement, the U.S. command reported at the time that five soldiers were killed while “repelling the attack.” Now, two senior U.S. military officials as well as Iraqi officials say four of the five were captured and taken from the governor’s compound alive. Three of them were found dead and one mortally wounded later that evening in locations as far as 25 miles east of the governor’s office.

anyhoo, Fox News is going to be airing the cut footage from the series, specifically about the bullshit Sandy Berger bits conjured out of thin air.

Still, that thing cost $40 million?!

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/middleeast/26cnd-prexy.html?em&ex=1169960400&en=092e3c48d429fe31&ei=5087%0A

The New York Times

January 26, 2007
Bush Backs Force Against Iranians in Iraq
By DAVID STOUT

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 -- American soldiers will do what they must to protect themselves from Iranian agents operating inside Iraq, the White House said today, following a report that President Bush had authorized the killing of Iranian agents.

“If our troops get actionable intelligence that agents are going to cause our troops or Iraqi citizens harm, they’re going to take whatever force protections that are necessary,” said Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman for the National Security Council.

The president himself told reporters today that, “It just makes sense that if somebody is trying to harm our troops or stop us from achieving our goal, or killing innocent citizens in Iraq, that we will stop them.”

He made the comment at a White House appearance with Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, who was confirmed by the Senate today as the new commander in Iraq.

“And so, yeah, we’re going to continue to protect ourselves in Iraq,” Mr. Bush went on, “and at the same time work to solve our problems with Iran diplomatically. And I believe we can succeed.”

The president remarks were in response to an article in The Washington Post today that said the White House had authorized the United States military to kill or capture Iranian operatives in Iraq as part of an aggressive new strategy against Iran.

But Mr. Bush said any notion that the United States wants to widen its military campaign beyond the borders of Iraq “simply is not accurate.” The president and his top aides have said several times in recent weeks that there are no plans to pursue Iranian agents into Iran.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates echoed Mr. Bush’s remarks today. “Our forces are authorized to go after those who are trying to kill them,” Mr. Gates said at a Pentagon briefing. “And if you’re in Iraq and trying to kill our troops, then you should consider yourself a target.”

Two weeks ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that President Bush had issued an order several months before authorizing a broad military offensive against Iranian operatives inside Iraq. She said that Iran had provided components for roadside bombs and training for thousands of Shiite militia fighters, mostly in Iran.

“There has been a decision to go after these networks,” she said in an interview with The New York Times, referring to Iranian operatives working inside Iraq.

The Post article today provided additional details of that effort, reporting that the Bush administration had authorized the American military to kill or capture Iranian operatives inside Iraq as part of a strategy to weaken Tehran’s influence in the Middle East and to give up its nuclear ambitions.

As the day wore on, Bush administration officials tried to dispel the impression that there was anything new in the strategy against Iran. Rather, they said, the use of lethal force against Iranian agents had never been ruled out.

The Post said lethal force against Iranians was not known to have been used to date. But the newspaper did say that dozens of suspected Iranian agents had been detained over the past year for three to four days at a time under a “catch and release” policy intended to avoid escalating tensions with Iran.

Mr. Gates, who took office in December, said he was under the impression that The Post report contained “a number of inaccuracies,” although he was not specific. And when he was asked whether the “kill-or-capture authority” applied to Iranians meddling in Iraq’s political or economic affairs, he replied, “What we’re looking for are people who are trying to kill us.”

In particular, Mr. Gates said, American forces were going after “these networks” that bring deadly homemade bombs, or “improvised explosive devices,” into Iraq “that are causing 70 percent of our casualties.”

Asked whether the administration had embarked on “a much larger” anti-Iran strategy, Mr. Gates replied, “No, I don’t think so.”

Mr. Johndroe of the National Security Council took issue with The Post’s description of the administration’s approach as “catch and release.” President Bush bluntly warned Iran on Jan. 10 to stop meddling in Iraqi affairs. The next day, American troops backed by helicopters and armored vehicles raided an Iranian diplomatic office in Erbil, Iraq, in the middle of the night and detained a half-dozen Iranians working inside. Shortly afterward, an additional American aircraft carrier was deployed off Iran’s coast.

The Iranian government said the raid violated international law. The American military said in a statement that documents and equipment removed from the office “will be examined to determine the extent of the alleged illegal or terrorist activity,” and that “appropriate action” would be taken regarding the detainees.

The White House has long accused Iran of providing weapons and training to Shiite forces in Iraq with the aim of keeping the United States bogged down in the war and teaching Washington a bitter lesson about the perils of regime change and nation-building.

In his 2002 State of the Union address, Mr. Bush described Iran as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iraq and North Korea, and administration officials have said Iran is the single greatest threat in the Middle East.

Asked why he was sticking to his plan to increase the number of troops in Iraq despite flagging Congressional support, Mr. Bush said: “One of the things I’ve found in Congress is that most people recognize that failure would be a disaster for the United States. And in that I’m the decision maker, I had to come up with a way forward that precluded disaster. In other words, I had to think about what’s likely to work.”

As for Iran, Mr. Bush said the Iranian people were not America’s enemy. “Our problem is with the government that takes actions that end up isolating your people, ends up denying the Iranian people their true place in the world,” he said.

Two leading Democratic senators had expressed concerns about the Bush administration’s approach to Iran even before The Post report.

A week ago, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the new chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said that White House efforts to portray Iran as a growing threat are uncomfortably reminiscent of rhetoric about Iraq before the American invasion of 2003.

Mr. Rockefeller said the administration was building a case against Tehran even as American intelligence agencies still know little about either Iran’s internal dynamics or its intentions in the Middle East.

And Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, recently issued a sharp warning to the administration about the raids against Iranians in Iraq. Although the White House has said there are no plans to pursue Iranian agents into their own country, Mr. Biden said any cross-border operations “will generate a constitutional confrontation here in the Senate.”

Next week, the Senate is to debate a resolution endorsed by the Foreign Relations Committee denouncing the president’s plan to send more troops to Baghdad.

Mr. Gates said any such resolution “emboldens the enemy.” He said he was sure that was not the intention of its supporters, “but that’s the effect.”

Senator Reid of Nevada, the Democratic majority leader, said he backed a “kill or capture” policy toward Iranians operating in Iraq.

“We want the American troops protected in Iraq,” he said in a question-answer session at the Capitol. “Whatever it takes to protect them is something we’re certainly interested in. But for the president to escalate this conflict outside Iraq is something he has to come back and ask us permission to do.”

Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Mark Mazzetti contributed.

Meantime, remember the dead.

In 2004, eager to get on with his career and family life, Freeman moved into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), a pool of trained soldiers not assigned to any unit, to serve out the rest of his eight-year mandatory obligation.

He was in California with a civilian job, a 1-year-old son named Gunnar and another baby on the way in the fall of 2005 when a shortage of officers prompted a large call-up by the IRR of West Point graduates from the classes of 1998 and later -- many of whom had only a few months of service left.

"He was an augmentee, who happened to be called up to fill a slot," said Sgt. 1st Class Joseph Edmond, a full-time staff member at the 412th Civil Affairs Battalion in Whitehall, Ohio, which Freeman was called to join. "It's almost to fill a void," he said, commenting on the Army's deepening manpower shortage, especially in the reserve, which requires it to cobble together units with people from across the country.

Charlotte Freeman, Freeman's wife, recalled her husband's shock upon receiving an Army telegram ordering him back to active duty. "He walked into the house and was totally white," she said yesterday. "He had moved on" from the Army.

These monthly threads have tended to reflect political and strategic concerns so I'm interested in what the balance of coverage is, particularly on the TV.

I can understand why there is a difference in coverage. US soldiers are dying daily and this is news that can't really be ignored.

The death toll of American troops and Iraqi civilians is a constant staple of US TV news, both on local and the nationals like CNN. There's the occasional human interest story about how events are affecting the Iraqi population, but US TV news stations don't provide enough coverage to sufficiently communicate how chaotic and desperate life in Iraq is. This is par for the course when it comes to coverage of wartorn countries, whether it's Lebanon, Sudan, or Iraq. National Public Radio generally does a better job with this.

Getting back to our normal strategic and political concerns, this morning on NPR an analyst was talking about Iraq turning into a full-blown proxy war; Iran expands support of Shiite militias, and surrounding Sunni governments continue funnelling arms and funds to the Iraqi Sunnis to offset Iranian influence. One of his points was, in the back of their minds Shiites know the American presence is temporary whereas Iran isn't going anywhere.

One of the outcomes I've been expecting since the US extracted permission to go after Shiite militias from al-Maliki: Shiites offering up some splinter groups (see the Najaf action a few days ago) as a sign of "progress" to the Americans. Such actions aren't going to change the larger Shiite-Sunni conflict. If al-Sadr starts using US troops to go after renegades in his own party, it would only stabilize his power & influence yet forestall any real progress.

The Najaf operation continues the theme in recent coverage of how ineffectual the Iraqi army is, with US forces doing all the heavy lifting.

Still, would that keep them from taking Iran's money and arms? And some have very strong ties to Iran - the Badr Organization is on the Iranian payroll, they even fought on Iran's side during their war with Iraq!

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Quarterly Report

Some highlights:

Early last year, SIGIR identified 2006 as the Year of Transition in Iraq Reconstruction. Throughout 2006, SIGIR tracked progress on a range of issues that challenged the success of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq, including:
• helping the Iraqis fight corruption
• improving security, especially infrastructure
security
• building the governance capacities of the
Iraqi ministries and provincial governments
• ensuring the sustainability of completed
IRRF programs and projects
• increasing the participation of international
donors
• strengthening coordination among U.S.
reconstruction agencies

SIGIR observed limited progress on each of
these issues:

1. Corruption continues to plague Iraq. Anticorruption institutions in Iraq are fragmented, and there does not appear to be an internal Iraqi consensus about how these institutions should interact. SIGIR’s 2006 audit of U.S. support to anticorruption efforts in Iraq presented a series of recommendations, some of which remain unresolved.

2. Infrastructure security remains vulnerable. Electric lines are attacked regularly, and the northern pipelines are largely inoperable because of interdiction. Iraqi repair crews are frequently unable to work because of repeated attacks. SIGIR’s 2006 audit of infrastructure security efforts emphasized the need for greater focus in this area.

3. The capacity of Iraq’s ministries to execute their capital budgets remains weak. Overcoming this weakness is essential to future progress on reconstruction. A recent SIGIR review of ministry capacity development found that much still needs to be done to improve U.S. support for GOI capacity development.

4. The sustainability of completed IRRF projects remains a concern. Although U.S. reconstruction officials have implemented a program to promote project sustainability, a recent SIGIR review indicates weakness in Iraq’s management of this program.

5. Multilateral support for Iraq reconstruction has yet to be realized. The International Compact for Iraq (the Compact) is expected to advance this essential effort, but it has not yet been officially implemented. For the Compact to succeed, the UN, the World Bank, Iraq’s regional neighbors, and the international donor community must engage more aggressively in supporting Iraq’s recovery.

6. Inconsistent coordination among the many U.S. agencies supporting Iraq’s reconstruction has hampered the effective execution of the U.S. reconstruction program. The newly appointed U.S. coordinator for economic transition may help remediate these problems. SIGIR is conducting reviews of the evolving roles and responsibilities of U.S. agencies as internal reorganizations take place. As the reconstruction program in Iraq progresses into 2007, the process of transitioning the management of the program to Iraqi control will accelerate. Ensuring the program’s successful transition hinges on making effective progress on each of the foregoing issues.

ugh. I always get the impression those aren't very representative.

That's good to know, 'cause we're sucking at goal #1. How's #2 going?

http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/01/31/iraq.main/index.html

Isn't this kind of thinking how we GOT into iraq?

oh look, they're hiring!