This question was prompted by an LA Times commentary Terror Threat May Be Mostly a Big Bluff by USC professor Bart Kosko. (Link requires registration.) He argues that the relatively low number of deaths caused by terrorism can be interpreted as negative evidence for the conclusion that terrorism may be a weaker threat than imagined.
Another example is election polling. Say that polling showed a correlation between polling results and voter participation, as suggested here, or voter confidence, as discussed here.
Another example is having minority candidates on ballots.
Do you think it is right for policy makers to use this type of information? Would you put any limits on formulating policy based upon the odds for achieving the greatest public good? Or is there something wrong with the way I framed this question?
― youn, Monday, 20 September 2004 03:24 (twenty-one years ago)
am i understanding this question correctly, then?
― Eisbär (llamasfur), Monday, 20 September 2004 03:34 (twenty-one years ago)
that's really a political question, isn't it? that turns on a policymaker's philosophical beliefs, as well as society's political mechanics. any way, it comes down to particular issues -- "greatest good for the greatest number" may be sound for some policies (e.g., national defense or budgetary priorities), and not sound for others (e.g., how to rectify past injustices to a discrete minority of a population, or an individual).
― Eisbär (llamasfur), Monday, 20 September 2004 03:38 (twenty-one years ago)
This is certainly true. However, policy with regards to the war on terror is very definitely not driven by figures. Most of the reports now coming out of think tanks, government and military analysis pools on terrorist threats are notable for -not- using figures or any method for determining probability and likelihood in the analysis of threat and formulation of policy for said threat.
In other words, they're completely unscientific although they may appear so to the layman.
For example, the government is tossing money to a couple of small pretty much useless biopharmaceutical firms to develop a vaccine that would immunize an individual against ricin. But there is no practical need for such a thing. No citizens will want it and the only way it will be possible to get people to take it, if it can be made, is toeither mandate it as part of duty -- as in a requisite for being in the military, or by instituting a prefab panic. Statistics and probabilities on poisoning by ricin have nothing to do with this policy.
― George Smith, Monday, 20 September 2004 14:10 (twenty-one years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Monday, 20 September 2004 14:19 (twenty-one years ago)
― dave225 (Dave225), Monday, 20 September 2004 14:23 (twenty-one years ago)
― Kevin Gilchrist (Mr Fusion), Monday, 20 September 2004 14:25 (twenty-one years ago)
Terror assessments would be more interesting if at least the people writing them would attempt to lie with statistics. But the rigor is much less than that, just relying on statements delivered by "authorities."
Generally, there is a formula that is followed. (1) Hypothesize a threat or capability on the part of the terrorists that is plausible. It doesn't have to be probable -- just remotely plausible.
(2) Collect apocrypha from the media using Lex-Nex; season with circle-jerk citations on the same subject written by other organizations or agencies in the exact same business.
(3)By the end of the report, states that what was merely a hypothesis at the beginning is now probably and imminent, or use a "not a matter of if, but when" statement.
― George Smith, Monday, 20 September 2004 14:50 (twenty-one years ago)
― Martin Skidmore (Martin Skidmore), Monday, 20 September 2004 15:51 (twenty-one years ago)
― amateur!!st, Monday, 20 September 2004 15:53 (twenty-one years ago)
Knowledgeable application of stats and formulae to support educated policy guessmaking is great, it's how things should be done. Those who aren't familiar with great books like How To Lie With Statistics (from when, 60 years ago now?) are the ones who give the practice a bad name.
Crimefighting with statistical models applied to the geography of an urban area has done wonders for several major cities in the US. But trying to make the same methods work for rare, catastrophic things like espionage or massive terrorist attacks is exactly the WRONG thing to do and it's stupid and dumb and it makes me hate people.
― TOMBOT, Monday, 20 September 2004 16:12 (twenty-one years ago)
― MindInRewind (Barry Bruner), Monday, 20 September 2004 16:16 (twenty-one years ago)
So what you get are assessment which claim great ease in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction based upon capabilities worked out by the US military over decades during the Cold War. And with no expense spared or restrictions from the real world appliedwhich may not even be close to being the case with terrorist organizations. The general tone of such assessments then becomes very paranoid and apocalyptic.
The way to assess capability is to actually talk to terrorists or get inside their organization and determine what their know how may be, not their desire, which is what is more often mapped. The analytic function within the military and intelligence infrastructure is currently very bad at this.
― George Smith, Monday, 20 September 2004 16:23 (twenty-one years ago)
No. There is no magic method. It requires a collection of many intellectual skills and good human -- not technical -- intelligence methods.
― George Smith, Monday, 20 September 2004 16:25 (twenty-one years ago)
― youn, Tuesday, 21 September 2004 02:30 (twenty-one years ago)
― MindInRewind (Barry Bruner), Tuesday, 21 September 2004 02:35 (twenty-one years ago)