It's August 2006 in Iraq

http://www.villagevoice.com/film/0631,atkinson,74042,20.html

Mr Patey wrote: "The prospect of a low intensity civil war and a de facto division of Iraq is probably more likely at this stage than a successful and substantial transition to a stable democracy.

"Even the lowered expectation of President Bush for Iraq - a government that can sustain itself, defend itself and govern itself and is an ally in the war on terror - must remain in doubt."

Talking about the Shia militias blamed for many killings, Mr Patey added: "If we are to avoid a descent into civil war and anarchy then preventing the Jaish al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army) from developing into a state within a state, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon, will be a priority."

The top U.S. commander in the Middle East told a Senate panel today that the recent wave of sectarian violence in Iraq threatens to push the country toward an all-out civil war.

Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, commander of the U.S. Central Command, also said U.S. forces could take more casualties as they carry out a new plan to reinforce Baghdad, and he cast doubt on earlier predictions that the U.S. troop level in Iraq could be drawn down this year.

However, quote of the frickin' year towards the end right here:

Pace said the U.S. armed forces can continue to help provide security to allow the Iraqi government to govern and provide economic opportunity to its citizens, but that "the weight of that opportunity rests with the Iraqi people."

Pace added, "We can provide support, we can help provide security, but they must now decide about their sectarian violence." He said Iraq's rival Shiite and Sunni Muslims "are going to have to love their children more than they hate each other."

I BELIEVE THAT CHILDREN ARE OUR FUTURE
TEACH THEM WELL AND LET THEM LEAD THE WAY

It is, writes ABC’s Jonathan Karl in the WSJ this morning, “a profoundly pessimistic account of the American war effort and the bitter fruit it has yielded. Mr. Ajami himself still believes in the rightness of the effort — he is not one of those commentators who supported the war and now repents. He holds out some hope for Iraq and for the American project that he so desperately wants to succeed.

“But that is what makes his account so devastating. Here a friend of the war effort writes movingly about how Iraq's cruel history and incomprehensible sectarian hatreds have conspired with American ignorance to doom a war he considers a noble one.”

...

Mr. Ajami has high praise for the selfless, intelligent and dedicated U.S. soldiers and Marines he has met on his trips to Iraq. But he faults the American civilian leadership for being insufficiently imperialistic, going into Iraq in a half-hearted way — so unprepared, so unsure, so isolated and so eager to leave. One of the more impressive Iraqi politicians he encounters describes the three types of Americans who swept into Iraq after the fall of Saddam as part of the Coalition Provisional Authority. There were the "wet behind the ears young people," the "worn-out bureaucrats" and the "half-baked ideologues."

...

It is not that Mr. Ajami had naïve hopes for the American initiative in Iraq. In the Foreign Affairs article he wrote before the war, he urged an American effort to reform the Arab world, but he also warned that Iraq should not be burdened with great expectations. "This is the Arab world, after all, and Americans do not know it with such intimacy. Iraq could disappoint its American liberators. There has been heartbreak in Iraq, and vengeance and retribution could sour Americans on this latest sphere of influence in the Muslim world." On that count, Mr. Ajami has proved to be disturbingly prescient.

Like I said, forward to any blind hawks you know -- friends, family, whatever. My tolerance for their willful idiocy on this subject has long since frayed, and they need to hear it from someone they can't dismiss like they do anyone else they don't want to listen to.

The Bush administration insists Iraq is a long way from civil war, but the contingency planning has already begun inside the White House and the Pentagon. President Bush will move U.S. troops out of Iraq if the country descends into civil war, according to one senior Bush aide who declined to be named while talking about internal strategy. "If there's a full-blown civil war, the president isn't going to allow our forces to be caught in the crossfire," the aide said. "But institutionally, the government of Iraq isn't breaking down. It's still a unity government." Bush's position on a pullout of U.S. troops emerged in response to news-week's questions about Sen. John Warner, chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Warner warned last week that the president might require a new vote from Congress to allow troops to stay in Iraq in what he called "all-out civil war." But the senior Bush aide said the White House would need no prompting from Congress to get troops out "if the Iraqi government broke down completely along sectarian lines."

Over at NROville, this is seen as 'how to lose Iraq.' That it was already probably lost appears to be unheard of.

Bombings, Robbery in Baghdad Kill 23

U.S.-Backed Operation Targets Shiite Slum; Iraqi Premier Issues Apology, Saying Excessive Measures Were Used in Sadr City Raid (Over in NROville, McCarthy gets hives, Rubin frets elsewhere.)

Belgravia pulls out a bit from Ricks' book that is pretty telling.

Balloon Juice considers "Your Civil War Checklist"

Back in NROworld, Kurtz despairs not once but twice.

Meantime an asylum is missing its inmates, aka the BlackFive crowd are starting to spiral into fantasy to offset suicide.

But let's never forget the only voice that matters:

"You know, I hear people say, well, civil war this, civil war that," said Bush, who will travel Thursday to Wisconsin, home of one of the Democratic Party's most fervent war critics, Sen. Russell D. Feingold.

"The Iraqi people decided against civil war when they went to the ballot box. And a unity government is working to respond to the will of the people. And frankly, it's quite a remarkable achievement on the political front, and the security front is where there have been troubles."

Ah yes.

HH: Can we stop for just a second?

TR: Sure.

HH: Civilian control. There aren't both sides here. The Army, and every uniform in the United States, is supposed to salute or quit, aren't they?

TR: Yes.

HH: And so, there aren't two sides. If you don't like the OSD, it's not for you to undermine them. And what you describe here, and I think this has been overlooked, but I think this is the key to this book, is an Army in rebellion against its civilian leadership.

TR: I am a big fan of civilian leadership, as you know from my first book.

HH: Yup, yup.

TR: And it is key. I mean, when people say to me why didn't these guys just tell the Bush administration no, I'd say because it would have been immoral, illegal and wrong. When civilians give you the order, you salute smartly. The problem was, you used the word professional, and that's a key word here. The military felt that their best professional advice was being ignored. And here were guys who had spent their careers rebuilding the Army after Vietnam. And suddenly, they saw the mistakes of Vietnam being repeated, and it terrified and worried them.

HH: Thomas Ricks, where are those people, other than the couple...Tony Zinni, obviously, but he wasn't in at this time. He was out. Where is...you quote Maddis, Myers, Pace, Franks, Sanchez. Where is a senior leader of the Iraq war period, in saying what you say?

TR: They're saying it to me constantly.

HH: Off the record?

TR: They can't have their names attached, because that would be seen as an act of professional insubordination.

HH: But telling you that for not for attribution is an act of professional insubordination as well. It's undermining the civilian leadership that is supposed to be the touchstone of the American military.

TR: And here, actually, I agree with you. You're touching on a key theme in my second book, A Soldier's Duty, which is what do you do when your duty to your subordinates you feel is at odds with your duty to your superiors, when you think the interests of your soldiers are not being served by your superiors. Do you take care of your soldiers? Is that your primary duty? Or do you salute smartly and execute your orders? And I'll tell you, it eats out the guts of a lot of these officers.

HH: Okay, a second take on this, Thomas Ricks. A cadre of Clinton-era senior brass, who did not see it coming, it being the Islamist world war, got bitter and angry at having been passed over and pushed aside by the 9/11, post-9/11 Pentagon, and they have spent the next five years doing their best to undermine this administration, using reporters like you who are good, to carry out that story, and amplify every mistake, and there are many, and to downgrade every success, and there are many, in a continued war against the people who tossed them out, and perhaps against their own conscience for not having seen it coming. Your response?

TR: Convenient, cute, but much too pat and not attached to the reality, as that most of these guys are deeply non-partisan. Those that are partisan tend to be Republicans. And speaking to a reporter like me about this, you can just see their guts twisting as they do it.

...

TR: I asked one officer why are you talking to me about these things, and he looked down at his hands, and he said because I have the blood of American troops on my hands. And I said what do you mean? And he said because when I said to Rumsfeld we need that division, and Rumsfeld said no, I gave up. I compromised. And he said U.S. troops died because of that. And he said that's why I'm talking to you.

HH: And you can't name him, though?

TR: No.

HH: Well, you'll pardon me, Tom, Mr. Ricks.

TR: And he was practically crying as he spoke to me about this.

HH: Yeah, I'm just not going to buy that. If you've got blood on your hands of American soldiers, every officer I have ever known would not be so cowardly as not to use their name. And I've known a lot of officers, as you have. And so, I'm just not buying that. In fact, and now, this raises...I'm going to try to put this gently, because I do respect your work tremendously. Why should anyone believe you, given the number of anonymous sources here, and given the politicized nature of this debate? I'm not doubting that people told you this. I'm just doubting that we have a picture upon which we can rely, because it's all anonymous sources.

TR: Well, it's a perfectly good question. I'm happy to respond to it. First of all, the majority of sources in the book are named, and with some very courageous officers, going on the record about their views. I mean, look through the book. When I did the article on the 4th Infantry Division that we drew out of the book for the Washington Post, I think out of probably dozens of sources, there was only one anonymous one. The second thing is, to go back to your Clinton-era cadre question, most of the evidence in the book, the documentary evidence, comes from inside today's military, and it's not from politicized, Clinton-era generals. It's from colonels and majors and lieutenant colonels doing their jobs, sometimes as investigators, sometimes as commanders doing reports, in which they describe what happened in Iraq. Most of the evidence in this book is from today's military in the course of executing their professional duties. It's internal reports. It's looking at the mistakes that were made. It's Army war college studies. It's professional work. It is not partisan, it is not a bunch of burn-out generals. It is the military trying to do the best it can in an extremely difficult situation. And to disregard it and slap it aside, if you'll excuse me, I think is aiding and abetting the enemy.

They have a new constitution, a new government and a new military. But faced with incessant sectarian bloodshed, Iraqis for the first time have begun openly discussing whether the only way to stop the violence is to remake the country they have just built.

Leaders of Iraq's powerful Shiite Muslim political bloc have begun aggressively promoting a radical plan to partition the country as a way of separating the warring sects. Some Iraqis are even talking about dividing the capital, with the Tigris River as a kind of Berlin Wall.

Shiites have long advocated some sort of autonomy in the south on par with the Kurds' 15-year-old enclave in the north, with its own defense forces and control over oil exploration. And the new constitution does allow provinces to team up into federal regions. But the latest effort, promulgated by Cabinet ministers, clerics and columnists, marks the first time they've advocated regional partition as a way of stemming violence.

"Federalism will cut off all parts of the country that are incubating terrorism from those that are upgrading and improving," said Khudair Khuzaie, the Shiite education minister. "We will do it just like Kurdistan. We will put soldiers along the frontiers."

...

Critics scoff at the idea that any geographical partitioning of Sunni and Shiites will make the country any safer than it is now. In fact, some observers warn that cutting up the country's Arab provinces into separate religious cantons would be as cataclysmic as the partition of Pakistan and India in 1947.

Although growing numbers of Iraqis acknowledge that their country is in the throes of an undeclared civil war, a partition would "actually lead to increasing violence and sectarian displacement," said Hussein Athab, a political scientist and former lawmaker in Basra.

Critics of partitioning note that rival Shiite militias with ties to political parties in government not only appear to be responsible for as much of Iraq's violence as Sunni insurgents, but have been known to turn their guns on each other.

"They're always talking about reconciliation and rejecting violence, but in truth they're not serious," Wajuih said. "Whenever there is a security escalation or violence, they bring the issue of federalism up again."

One Western diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity, suggested that the Shiites were using the prospect of a southern mini-state to gain other political concessions from Sunnis, "a threat that they wouldn't want to have to exercise" because tearing the country asunder would be so traumatic.

A U.S. Embassy spokesperson declined to comment publicly on an issue so volatile.

----

Break Point: What Went Wrong
By George Friedman

On May 23, we published a Geopolitical Intelligence Report titled "Break Point." In that article, we wrote: "It is now nearly Memorial Day. The violence in Iraq will surge, but by July 4 there either will be clear signs that the Sunnis are controlling the insurgency -- or there won't. If they are controlling the insurgency, the United States will begin withdrawing troops in earnest. If they are not controlling the insurgency, the United States will begin withdrawing troops in earnest. Regardless of whether the [political settlement] holds, the U.S. war in Iraq is going to end: U.S. troops either will not be needed, or will not be useful. Thus, we are at a break point -- at least for the Americans."

In our view, the fundamental question was whether the Sunnis would buy into the political process in Iraq. We expected a sign, and we got it in June, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed -- in our view, through intelligence provided by the Sunni leadership. The same night al-Zarqawi was killed, the Iraqis announced the completion of the Cabinet: As part of a deal that finalized the three security positions (defense, interior and national security), the defense ministry went to a Sunni. The United States followed that move by announcing a drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq, starting with two brigades. All that was needed was a similar signal of buy-in from the Shia -- meaning they would place controls on the Shiite militias that were attacking Sunnis. The break point seemed very much to favor a political resolution in Iraq.

It never happened. The Shia, instead of reciprocating the Sunni and American gestures, went into a deep internal crisis. Shiite groups in Basra battled over oil fields. They fought in Baghdad. We expected that the mainstream militias under the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) would gain control of the dissidents and then turn to political deal-making. Instead, the internal Shiite struggle resolved itself in a way we did not expect: Rather than reciprocating with a meaningful political gesture, the Shia intensified their attacks on the Sunnis. The Sunnis, clearly expecting this phase to end, held back -- and then cut loose with their own retaliations. The result was, rather than a political settlement, civil war. The break point had broken away from a resolution.

Part of the explanation is undoubtedly to be found in Iraq itself. The prospect of a centralized government, even if dominated by the majority Shia, does not seem to have been as attractive to Iraqi Shia as absolute regional control, which would guarantee them all of the revenues from the southern oil fields, rather than just most. That is why SCIRI leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim has been pushing for the creation of a federal zone in the south, similar to that established for the Kurdistan region in the north. The growing closeness between the United States and some Sunnis undoubtedly left the Shia feeling uneasy. The Sunnis may have made a down payment by delivering up al-Zarqawi, but it was far from clear that they would be in a position to make further payments. The Shia reciprocated partially by offering an amnesty for militants, but they also linked the dissolution of sectarian militias to the future role of Baathists in the government, which they seek to prevent. Clearly, there were factions within the Shiite community that were pulling in different directions.

But there was also another factor that appears to have been more decisive: Iran. It is apparent that Iran not only made a decision not to support a political settlement in Iraq, but a broader decision to support Hezbollah in its war with Israel. In a larger sense, Iran decided to simultaneously confront the United States and its ally Israel on multiple fronts -- and to use that as a means of challenging Sunnis and, particularly, Sunni Arab states.

The Iranian Logic

This is actually a significant shift in Iran's national strategy. Iran had been relatively cooperative with the United States between 2001 and 2004 -- supporting the United States in Afghanistan in a variety of ways and encouraging Washington to depose Saddam Hussein. This relationship was not without tensions during those years, but it was far from confrontational. Similarly, Iran had always had tensions with the Sunni world, but until last year or so, as we can see in Iraq, these had not been venomous.

Two key things have to be borne in mind to begin to understand this shift. First, until the emergence of al Qaeda, the Islamic Republic of Iran had seen itself -- and had been seen by others -- as being the vanguard of the Islamist renaissance. It was Iran that had confronted the United States, and it was Iran's creation, Hezbollah, that had pioneered suicide bombings, hostage-takings and the like in Lebanon and around the world. But on Sept. 11, 2001, al Qaeda -- a Sunni group -- had surged ahead of Iran as the embodiment of radical Islam. Indeed, it had left Iran in the role of appearing to be a collaborator with the United States. Iran had no use for al Qaeda but did not want to surrender its position to the Sunni entity.

The second factor that must be considered is Iran's goal in Iraq. The Iranians, who hated Hussein as a result of the eight-year war and dearly wanted him destroyed, had supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq. And they had helped the United States with intelligence prior to the war. Indeed, it could be argued that Iran had provided exactly the intelligence that would provoke the U.S. attack in a way most advantageous to Iran -- by indicating that the occupation of Iraq would not be as difficult as might be imagined, particularly if the United States destroyed the Baath Party and all of its institutions. U.S. leaders were hearing what they wanted to hear anyway, but Iran made certain they heard this much more clearly.

Iran had a simple goal: to dominate a post-war Iraq. Iran's Shiite allies in Iraq comprised the majority, the Shia had not resisted the American invasion and the Iranians had provided appropriate support. Therefore, they expected that they would inherit Iraq -- at least in the sense that it would fall into Tehran's sphere of influence. For their part, the Americans thought they could impose a regime in Iraq regardless of Iran's wishes, and they had no desire to create an Iranian surrogate in Baghdad. Therefore, though they may have encouraged Iranian beliefs, the goal of the Americans was to create a coalition government that would include all factions. The Shia could be the dominant group, but they would not hold absolute power -- and, indeed, the United States manipulated Iraqi Shia to split them further.

We had believed that the Iranians would, in the end, accept a neutral Iraq with a coalition government that guaranteed Iran's interests. There is a chance that this might be true in the end, but the Iranians clearly decided to force a final confrontation with the United States. Tehran used its influence among some Iraqi groups to reject the Sunni overture symbolized in al-Zarqawi's death and to instead press forward with attacks against the Sunni community. It goes beyond this, inasmuch as Iran also has been forging closer ties with some Sunni groups, who are responding to Iranian money and a sense of the inevitability of Iran's ascent in the region.

Iran could have had two thoughts on its mind in pressing the sectarian offensive. The first was that the United States, lacking forces to contain a civil war, would be forced to withdraw, or at least to reduce its presence in populated areas, if a civil war broke out. This would leave the majority Shia in a position to impose their own government -- and, in fact, place pro-Iranian Shia, who had led the battle, in a dominant position among the Shiite community.

The second thought could have been that even if U.S. forces did not withdraw, Iran would be better off with a partitioned Iraq -- in which the various regions were at war with each other, or at least focused on each other, and incapable of posing a strategic threat to Iran. Moreover, if partition meant that Iran dominated the southern part of Iraq, then the strategic route to the western littoral of the Persian Gulf would be wide open, with no Arab army in a position to resist the Iranians. Their dream of dominating the Persian Gulf would still be in reach, while the security of their western border would be guaranteed. So, if U.S. forces did not withdraw from Iraq, Iran would still be able not only to impose a penalty on the Americans but also to pursue its own strategic interests.

This line of thinking also extends to pressures that Iran now is exerting against Saudi Arabia, which has again become a key ally of the United States. For example, a member of the Iranian Majlis recently called for Muslim states to enact political and economic sanctions against Saudi Arabia -- which has condemned Hezbollah's actions in the war against Israel. In the larger scheme, it was apparent to the Iranians that they could not achieve their goals in Iraq without directly challenging Saudi interests -- and that meant mounting a general challenge to Sunnis. A partial challenge would make no sense: It would create hostility and conflict without a conclusive outcome. Thus, the Iranians decided to broaden their challenge.

The Significance of Hezbollah

Hezbollah is a Shiite movement that was created by Iran out of its own needs for a Tehran-controlled, anti-Israel force. Hezbollah was extremely active through the 1980s and had exercised economic and political power in Lebanon in the 1990s, as a representative of Shiite interests. In this, Hezbollah had collaborated with Syria -- a predominantly Sunni country run by a minority Shiite sect, the Alawites -- as well as Iran. Iran and Syria are enormously different countries, with many different interests. Syria's interest was the domination and economic exploitation of Lebanon. But when the United States forced the Syrians out of Lebanon -- following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in February 2005 -- any interest Syria had in restraining Hezbollah disappeared. Meanwhile, as Iran shifted its strategy, its interest in reactivating Hezbollah -- which had been somewhat dormant in relation to Israel -- increased.

Hezbollah's interest in being reactivated in this way was less clear. Hezbollah's leaders had aged well: Violent and radical in the 1980s, they had become Lebanese businessmen in the 1990s. They became part of the establishment. But they still were who they were, and the younger generation of Hezbollah members was even more radical. Hezbollah militants had been operating in southern Lebanon for years and, however relatively restrained they might have been, they clearly had prepared for conventional war against the Israelis.

With the current conflict, Hezbollah now has achieved an important milestone: It has fought better and longer than any other Arab army against Israel. The Egyptians and Syrians launched brilliant attacks in 1973, but their forces were shattered before the war ended. Hezbollah has fought and clearly has not been shattered. Whether, in the end, it wins or loses, Hezbollah will have achieved a massive improvement of its standing in the Muslim world by slugging it out with Israel in a conventional war. If, at the end of this war, Hezbollah remains intact as a fighting force -- regardless of the outcome of the campaign in southern Lebanon -- its prestige will be enormous.

Within the region, this outcome would shift focus way from the Sunni Hamas or secular Fatah to the Shiite Hezbollah. If this happens simultaneously with the United States losing complete control of the situation in Iraq, the entire balance of power in the region would be perceived to have shifted away from the U.S.-Israeli coalition (the appearance is different from reality, but it is still far from trivial) -- and the leadership of the Islamist renaissance would have shifted away from the Sunnis to the Shia, at least in the Middle East.

Outcomes

It is not clear that the Iranians expected all of this to have gone quite as well as it has. In the early days of the war, when the Saudis and other Arabs were condemning Hezbollah and it appeared that Israel was going to launch one of its classic lightning campaigns in Lebanon, Tehran seemed to back away -- calling for a cease-fire and indicating it was prepared to negotiate on issues like uranium enrichment. Then international criticism shifted to Israel, and Israeli forces seemed bogged down. Iran's rhetoric shifted. Now the Saudis are back to condemning Hezbollah, and the Iranians appear more confident than ever. >From their point of view, they have achieved substantial psychological success based on real military achievements. They have the United States on the defensive in Iraq, and the Israelis are having to fight hard to make any headway in Lebanon.

The Israelis have few options. They can continue to fight until they break Hezbollah -- a process that will be long and costly, but can be achieved. But they then risk Hezbollah shifting to guerrilla war unless their forces immediately withdraw from Lebanon. Alternatively, they can negotiate a cease-fire that inevitably would leave at least part of Hezbollah's forces intact, its prestige and power in Lebanon enhanced and Iran elevated as a power within the region and the Muslim world. Because the Israelis are not going anywhere, they have to choose from a limited menu.

The United States, on the other hand, is facing a situation in Iraq that has broken decisively against it. However hopeful the situation might have been the night al-Zarqawi died, the decision by Iran's allies in Iraq to pursue civil war rather than a coalition government has put the United States into a militarily untenable position. It does not have sufficient forces to prevent a civil war. It can undertake the defense of the Sunnis, but only at the cost of further polarization with the Shia. The United States' military options are severely limited, and therefore, withdrawal becomes even more difficult. The only possibility is a negotiated settlement -- and at this point, Iran doesn't need to negotiate. Unless Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, firmly demands a truce, the sectarian fighting will continue -- and at the moment, it is not even clear that al-Sistani could get a truce if he wanted one.

While the United States was focused on the chimera of an Iranian nuclear bomb -- a possibility that, assuming everything we have heard is true, remains years away from becoming reality -- Iran has moved to redefine the region. At the very least, civil war in Lebanon (where Christians and Sunnis might resist Hezbollah) could match civil war in Iraq, with the Israelis and Americans trapped in undesirable roles.

The break point has come and gone. The United States now must make an enormously difficult decision. If it simply withdraws forces from Iraq, it leaves the Arabian Peninsula open to Iran and loses all psychological advantage it gained with the invasion of Iraq. If American forces stay in Iraq, it will be as a purely symbolic gesture, without any hope for imposing a solution. If this were 2004, the United States might have the stomach for a massive infusion of forces -- an attempt to force a favorable resolution. But this is 2006, and the moment for that has passed. The United States now has no good choices; its best bet was blown up by Iran. Going to war with Iran is not an option. In Lebanon, we have just seen the value of air campaigns pursued in isolation, and the United States does not have a force capable of occupying and pacifying Iran.

As sometimes happens, obvious conclusions must be drawn.

The Baghdad morgue took in 1,815 bodies during July, news services quoted the facility's assistant manager, Abdul Razzaq al-Obeidi, as saying. The previous month's tally was 1,595. Obeidi estimated that as many as 90 percent of the total died violent deaths.

...

On Tuesday, the U.S. military announced the start of the second phase of a U.S.-Iraqi crackdown aimed at securing Baghdad known as Operation Forward Together. A key element of the new phase is the transfer of thousands of U.S. troops to Baghdad from elsewhere in Iraq, but the military's top spokesman told reporters Wednesday that force of arms alone cannot bring peace to the capital.

"The key thing about this operation is that . . . it counts on the Iraqi citizens," said Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell. "They have to be involved. The Iraqi people have to want this to work. If they are not involved, if they're not willing to commit, if they're not willing to be a part of the solution, then there is no solution."

Cautioning that "military force alone cannot achieve peace, it can only set the conditions to allow for peace to take hold and to grow," Caldwell said that an essential part of the heightened security effort is the Iraqi government's program aimed at national reconciliation.

Iraqi officials have made similar assertions in recent weeks. On Monday, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki expressed displeasure at a U.S.-Iraqi raid on Baghdad's Sadr City neighborhood, saying it employed excessive force -- including fire from U.S. aircraft -- that could doom reconciliation efforts.

Caldwell said the raid, conducted before dawn on Monday, was an "Iraqi-run operation" intended to apprehend a suspected death-squad leader. "I think everybody understands that the intent was to go in, apprehend the individual in question and come out," he said.

"Nobody intended to have to use force unless absolutely necessary. The Iraqi security forces . . . came under such intense, heavy fire from elements there that they had to use some air support in order to extract themselves safely," he said.

[On Thursday, a British parliamentary group said that Britain's troops in Iraq are overstretched, ill-equipped and underpaid, and that the strain of fighting two big wars at once threatens the forces' effectiveness, according to the Reuters news agency.

[In a strongly worded report, the cross-party Defense Committee accused the government of failing to act quickly enough to provide better armored vehicles and an adequate number of helicopters and said troops were being rotated into Iraq and Afghanistan without getting their normal rest. Reuters cited Defense Secretary Des Browne as responding that the military was "stretched, but not overstretched."]

Etc. etc.

The U.S. military said Tuesday that a series of four vehicle bombs killed 63 Iraqis and wounded 140 Sunday night, reversing its initial claims that the deaths were the result of an accidental gas explosion in an apartment building.

Then there's this:

Mortar attacks that erupted last month between Sunni and Shiite villages around Khan Bani Sad are part of a complex power struggle in the demographically mixed province of Diyala, a contested area stretching from Baghdad to Iran. Sunni fighters are trying to push Shiite families out of the region, while Shiite militiamen from Baghdad are moving in aggressively to attack Sunnis and expand their turf, the officials say.

U.S. commanders had planned on withdrawing hundreds of American troops from this province, but instead this month they ordered an increase in troop levels to help stem the spread of sectarian violence. The Iraqi army has grown more capable in Diyala, and took over a large portion of the province last month. But the decision to add American troops underscored the limitations of their Iraqi counterparts, particularly the police, who must overcome mistrust fostered by the sectarian tensions.

"Our mission is not to let them fail catastrophically," one U.S. officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, said of the Iraqi troops.

A few days ago was this:

On his first visit to Fallujah as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Gen. Peter Pace stood before 1,300 troops _ mostly Marines _ and assured them that the American public supports them. And he predicted that Americans would continue to support the war.

...

During his meeting with the troops, the general also took questions.

How much more time, one Marine asked, should the Iraqi government be given to achieve the political unity necessary to stabilize the country?

"I guess they have as long as it takes," Pace replied, quickly adding, "Which is not forever."

Pace argued that setting a deadline by which the United States would withdraw its support would risk pushing the Iraqis into political decisions that are unviable. On the other hand, he said, "You do not want to leave it open ended."

Another Marine wanted to know if U.S. troops would stay in Iraq in the event of an all-out civil war. Pace repeated what he told a Senate committee last week: a civil war is possible, but not expected. He did not say what the United States would do if it actually happened.

Another asked what the United States would do if the Iraqi government did not support extending the U.N. resolution that authorizes the presence of American and other foreign troops in Iraq. Pace said the Iraqis already have said they favor extending the U.S. mandate, which expires in December.

One Marine wound up his question about the pace of U.S. troop deployments to Iraq by asking, "Is the war coming to an end?"

Pace didn't answer directly. He said Pentagon officials and military leaders are trying to keep enough troops in Iraq to achieve the mission of training Iraqi troops to take over the security mission, while avoiding having so many that it creates an Iraqi dependency.

You get press briefings like this:

First, we're about 92 percent complete on the targeted 188,000 MOI forces that we're working to train and equip. If you break that down into its major segments relative to the Iraqi police, we're about 90 percent trained and 83 percent are equipped. And in particular, when you look at the nine key cities that we have been working with, they are also at about 99 percent equipped at this time.

From the standpoint of the National Police, used to be the Special Police, they're 98 percent trained and 92 percent equipped.

And then, finally, from the standpoint of the Department of Border Enforcement, we're about 92 percent trained and 56 percent equipped. And the reason why they're a little lower than everybody else is because we did prioritize the resourcing of our contested areas in particular, so that took away from a more balanced approach towards the DBE first.

So, with regard to Iraqi police and police services, and also the National Police, you can see that they're doing very well right now.

When elsewhere you can read this:

Our old battalion commander is trying to evade his investigation about his skimming money from Iraqi army food contracts and the soldiers themselves.

The brigade general is also involved in the corruption...which is why nothing is happening. Our executive officer returned after 6 months of paid sick leave only to find is dealings in the scam are under investigation, so yesterday he went back on sick leave, all approved by the general

The biggest lesson I have learned over 6 months here is that the Iraqi culture is incapable of sustaining a western style military. The Arabic style military it can function with is distasteful to western soldiers: officers who hit their men, officer and senior enlisted men who regularly steal from their men, using leadership to openly grant yourself more food and standard of living items while your men go without, taking food from civilians while searching their houses, taking food from crops while searching for weapons caches, and all the while professing to be men of God.

Not to mention the Iraqi culture is so absolutely LAZY that nothing gets done unless we force them to do it.

More of our soldiers went AWOL, new food supplies came in yesterday from Ramadi but were grossly insufficient, new soldiers arrived but their initial military training is substandard and you can tell they are really just here for a paycheck. Iraqi army communications gear is insufficient and not encrypted (we actually have had unidentified people calling on the Iraqi frequencies requesting tactical information...and the Iraqis actually give it to them without knowing who it is).

So after 6 months we've:

- taught them techniques for planning operations...they won't do it.
- shown them how to conduct weapons sustainment ranges...they won't do it.
- we've shown them how to conduct convoys...they won't do it.
- we've taught them moral and ethical behavior required of soldiers...they won't do it.
- we've taught them how to manage logistics...they won't do it.
- we've taught them personnel and administrative management...they won't do it.
- we've taught them how to operate tactically...they won't do it.
- we've taught them how to sustain the life support systems on the camp...they won't do it.

Basically we have taught them how to be a self sufficient battalion, but unless the Marines do it for them, they won't do anything. They ALWAYS revert back to the "Iraqi way" when we are not around and that involves DESTROYING and WASTING everything they get their hands on.

But other than all that they say they are "dedicated" to the future of Iraq...should be a bright and wonderful future.

Not to mention this:

More overweight “Soldiers” than you could shake a stick at, lined up at the ice cream/cookie and pie buffet. Seventy-80 percent of the occupants of the chow hall have M9 pistols -- from privates to colonels. Granted. if you are an M1, Bradley or Stryker Crewmember, MP, or something along those lines you could have one, but a private with a V Corps or MNC-I patch on? “Soldiers” putting their weapons on the floor when sitting down to eat, clattering them on the tile like it's more of an inconvenience than a weapon that could save your life. Pressed DCU’s and ACU’s. More SUV’s than back in the states, many driven by sergeant and below alone, or with a group of friends. More MP’s than anywhere else in the Army, it seems. Most of them very large, driving an SUV and giving out speeding tickets. Yes. there are many MP’s outside the wire on a daily basis doing great and dangerous things -- but not these MP’s. Just a whole mentality of “War? What war?” pervades this place.

You can see it in how most here carry themselves, what their uniforms look like, and how when there is something on the news about American deaths, they don't even bat an eye or turn to look.

One of our combat medics got chewed on by an MP when we first arrived. He pulled out a cigarette and lit it literally two steps from the smoking area, when an MP driving by stopped, got out an proceeded to berate him about smoking outside of an authorized smoking area, then told him “Your unit needs to teach you some discipline!” This medic, who had saved lives under fire in our previous AO needs “Discipline”? This from someone who hasn't been off the FOB since he flew here from Kuwait.

The MNC-I command sergeant major sits in the chow hall and kicks people out if their pants aren't bloused "correctly" (in this case, he corrected a Soldier of mine, and the CSM was wrong).

There is a sign at the DFAC with about 40 rules regarding DFAC standards of appearance. I saw an SPC yelling at a civilian worker at Pizza Hut because there wasn't enough pepperoni on his pizza.

All the upper-echelon commanders here have the newest, latest, most up-armored vehicles on the FOB, with all the latest IR lights, bumpers, etc., on them (civilian purchase, of course). And they never drive outside the wire. You can tell -- tires Armor-All'ed, vehicles clean as a whistle, no dust anywhere. Meanwhile, Soldiers who go outside on real missions have crap that is a hand-me-down from a hand-me-down.

This place sucks. If you booted half of these staff and staff support Soldiers, and put them behind the trigger, then we could get out of this God-forsaken country sooner. The tail is so much longer than the tooth here.

Sorry I just sort of started rambling, but this Camp has left such a sour taste in my mouth. Please don't list my name. This could come back on my unit if the powers that be got wind of it.

An assessment back home:

Washington, which in its hubris ignores both its friends and its enemies, refusing to talk to the latter or listen to the former, does not grasp that if the flanks collapse, it is the end of our adventures in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also, in a slightly longer time frame, the end of Israel. No Crusader state survives forever, and in the long term Israel’s existence depends on arriving at some sort of modus vivendi with the region. The replacement of Mubarak, King Abdullah and the House of Saud with the Moslem Brotherhood would make that possibility fade.

To the region, America’s apparently unconditional and unbounded support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq are part of the same picture. For a military historian, the question arises: will history see Iraq as America’s Stalingrad? If we kick the analogy up a couple of levels, to the strategic and grand strategic, there are parallels. Both the German and the American armies were able largely to take, but not hold, the objective. Both had too few troops. Both Berlin and Washington underestimated their enemy’s ability to counter-attack. Both committed resources they needed elsewhere and could not replace to a strategically unimportant objective. Finally, both entrusted their flanks to weak allies—and to luck.

Let us hope that, unlike von Paulus, our commanders know when to get out, regardless of orders from a leader who will not recognize reality.

And it goes on.

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers, who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died in Baghdad, Iraq of injuries sustained on Aug. 12, when an improvised explosive device detonated near their dismounted patrol during combat operations. Both soldiers were assigned to the Army's 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

Killed were:

Staff Sgt. Michael C. Lloyd, 24, of San Antonio, Texas

Staff Sgt. Kevin L. Zeigler, 31, of Overland Park, Kan.

And it goes on.

CLINTON, Mo. -- The Clinton community turned out Monday to welcome one of its own home.

Chris Rutter, 22, lost both of his legs in May when his vehicle was hit by an improvised explosive device in Iraq.

And it goes on.

BAGHDAD, Aug 15 (Reuters) - Following are security incidents in Iraq reported on Tuesday, as of 1015 GMT.

Asterisk denotes a new or updated item.

*MOSUL - A suicide bomber detonated a truck rigged with explosives outside the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the northern city of Mosul, killing nine people and wounding 36, police said. Five Kurdish peshmerga militias were among the dead, police said.

*BAQUBA - One policeman was killed and three people were wounded, including one civilian, when a roadside bomb targeting a police patrol exploded in a bus garage in Baquba, 65 km (40 miles) north of Baghdad, police said.

*HUWAYDER - A roadside bomb targeting a police patrol exploded in Huwayder, north of Baquba, wounding three policemen, a police source said.

*BAQUBA - Gunmen shot dead police lieutenant Fadhil Uthman while he was boarding a car in the town of Baquba, north of Baghdad, police said.

*BAGHDAD - Iraqi security forces detained 48 suspected insurgents in the last 24 hours in different parts of Iraq, Iraq's Defence Ministry said in a statement.

MUQDADIYA - Gunmen killed three bakers supplying bread for the Iraqi army and wounded a passerby in the town of Muqdadiya, 90 km (50 miles) north east of Baghdad, police said.

SAMARRA - Five civilians were wounded when gunmen in a car shot at shoppers in a market in central Samarra, 100 km (62 miles) north of Baghdad, police said.

NEAR DUJAIL - Gunmen shot dead a former Iraqi army officer on Monday night on a highway near Dujail, 90 km (55 miles) north of Baghdad, police said.

SAMARRA - Two roadside bombs targeting police commandos exploded near the spiral minaret of Samarra, north of Baghdad, wounding three police commandos and destroying one vehicle, a joint U.S. and Iraqi policing centre said.

KERBALA - Kerbala authorities imposed a vehicle curfew after gunmen loyal to a hardline anti-American Shi'ite cleric clashed with Iraqi soldiers in central Kerbala, 110 km (68 miles) southwest of Baghdad, police said. Army sources said the clashes began after Iraqi forces stormed the religious school of cleric Mahmoud al-Hasani searching for weapons.

...

And it goes on.

President Bush flatly told Middle East experts at a private meeting this week that a three-way division of Iraq would only worsen sectarian violence in the country and is "really not an option" for solving the country's problems, the analysts said Tuesday.

Rejecting a policy alternative that has been gaining support in the U.S. and abroad, Bush told the experts that dividing the country would be "like pouring oil on fire," recounted Eric M. Davis, a Rutgers University professor and one of the experts who met with Bush Monday at the Pentagon.

The experts, speaking in interviews, said Bush also signaled that he intended to make no policy changes in Iraq -- despite warnings from military leaders and election-year arguments from Democrats that the war is drain on resources and a distraction from the larger war on terrorism.

While the notion of dividing Iraq into Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish sections has been a minority view since the 2003 invasion, the unrelenting pace of sectarian killing and a stalled reconstruction effort have sparked rethinking among many U.S. officials, their allies and Iraqis.

Some Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish leaders recently have expressed support for the idea, as has Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a potential 2008 presidential candidate, and former State Department officials Peter Galbraith and Leslie Gelb. Advocates of the view have argued that the country is being rapidly torn apart by internal pressure.

Davis said that when he began enumerating the reasons why it would be a mistake to divide Iraq, Bush interrupted.

"He was going, "Yes, yes," while I was making that point," Davis said.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a Mideast analyst at American Enterprise Institute, said Bush asserted that the partition idea is "not even a starter," and also made clear that "as long as he's president, we're in Iraq."

Carole O'Leary, an American University research professor and Iraq expert, said Bush "was adamant that, despite any conspiracy theories out there in the Islamic world or anywhere else, the United States is not in there to break up the place."

Oh, and by the way...

ihttp://examinedlife.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/ppt1s.jpg

http://examinedlife.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/ppt1s.jpg

What does this mean? I write on national security, and I have no idea if this is true or false. How do the Democrats have a better plan for the war on terrorism (and I'm a D.)? And how do the Republicans? What's the measurement?

One can argue powerfully that Iraq has been made into a field of adventure where people learn how to become expert in the making of improvised explosives. This is very bad. You can go to Iraq, if you're a jihadist, and learn how to do it from those who know. And you'll get field experience. And the Bush administration created that.

But, it's not clear that it's transferable to anyplace else but Iraq.
Can they bring it to the US? Only if they can come here and, more importantly, have free access to ammunition. The US isn't an uncontrolled ammunition dump. So it's bad the Bush administration directives resulted in making Iraq into a training school for demolition experts. And keeping American troops in place won't lessen their generation. But it's not at all clear they can bring it here.

Half a point to the Democrats.

More on the President's vision:

In addition to pointing out just how insulated from genuine dissent Bush's staff continues to keep him, the meeting also provided more evidence that if you want to know what's really going on inside the White House -- or inside Bush's head -- the last person to ask is a White House official, particularly a spokesman.

By contrast, journalists who interviewed the meeting's participants yesterday gleaned some interesting insights.

For one, Bush is apparently very frustrated at the lack of boosterism for his war not just in this country -- but in Iraq as well.

Shanker and Mazzetti write in the New York Times: "President Bush made clear in a private meeting this week that he was concerned about the lack of progress in Iraq and frustrated that the new Iraqi government -- and the Iraqi people -- had not shown greater public support for the American mission, participants in the meeting said Tuesday. . . .

"[T]he president expressed frustration that Iraqis had not come to appreciate the sacrifices the United States had made in Iraq, and was puzzled as to how a recent anti-American rally in support of Hezbollah in Baghdad could draw such a large crowd. 'I do think he was frustrated about why 10,000 Shiites would go into the streets and demonstrate against the United States,' said [a] person who attended. . . .

"One participant in the lunch, Carole A. O'Leary, a professor at American University who is also doing work in Iraq with a State Department grant, said Mr. Bush expressed the view that 'the Shia-led government needs to clearly and publicly express the same appreciation for United States efforts and sacrifices as they do in private.' "

Does Bush not understand that the American military is seen as an occupying force by many Iraqis? Does he not understand that publicly expressing support for America would be a huge political liability for government officials?

Maybe if some actual dissenters had been present, they might have asked him. Or they might have explained.

And is the fact that the Iraqis aren't grateful for everything he did really his top concern right now?

Meantime, there's a fellow currently angling for control of Central Command that the Soldiers for the Truth bods are somewhat aggreived with:

In short, the shallow veneer covering T. Michael is finally wearing off in the heat of reality and he is exposed for what he truly is. A politician in uniform and a consummate Polyester Pretender. Rather than stand and fight, Moseley attempted to bail out of his brand spanking new Chief of Staff position by seeking the nomination as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. (SACEUR) Fortunately it was denied and given to Army General Bantz Craddock.

So he’s sniffing at Central Command.

Terrific.

34 years of service and no combat experience. His one Air Medal doesn’t count. Neither does standing in a Combined Air Operations Center hundreds of miles deep inside friendly territory. The rebuttal will no doubt be that Moseley ‘commanded’ Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) during the second Gulf War and ‘see how well that turned out?’

Well let’s talk about that.

And talk they do.

The NY Times has a few things to note. Among them:

The number of roadside bombs planted in Iraq rose in July to the highest monthly total of the war, offering more evidence that the anti-American insurgency has continued to strengthen despite the killing of the terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Along with a sharp increase in sectarian attacks, the number of daily strikes against American and Iraqi security forces has doubled since January. The deadliest means of attack, roadside bombs, made up much of that increase. In July, of 2,625 explosive devices, 1,666 exploded and 959 were discovered before they went off. In January, 1,454 bombs exploded or were found.

...

“The insurgency has gotten worse by almost all measures, with insurgent attacks at historically high levels,” said a senior Defense Department official who agreed to discuss the issue only on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak for attribution. “The insurgency has more public support and is demonstrably more capable in numbers of people active and in its ability to direct violence than at any point in time.”

A separate, classified report by the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated Aug. 3, details worsening security conditions inside the country and describes how Iraq risks sliding toward civil war, according to several officials who have read the document or who have received a briefing on its contents.

The nine-page D.I.A. study, titled “Iraq Update,” compiles the most recent empirical data on the number of attacks, bombings, murders and other violent acts, as well as diagrams of the groups carrying out insurgent and sectarian attacks, the officials said.

The report’s contents are being widely discussed among Pentagon officials, military commanders and, in particular, on Capitol Hill, where concern among senior lawmakers of both parties is growing over a troubling dichotomy: even as Iraq takes important steps toward democracy — including the election of a permanent government this spring — the violence has gotten worse.

...

The increased attacks have taken their toll. While the number of Americans killed in action per month has declined slightly — to 38 killed in action in July, from 42 in January, in part reflecting improvements in armor and other defenses — the number of Americans wounded has soared, to 518 in July from 287 in January. Explosive devices accounted for slightly more than half the deaths.

An analysis of the 1,666 bombs that exploded in July shows that 70 percent were directed against the American-led military force, according to a spokesman for the military command in Baghdad. Twenty percent struck Iraqi security forces, up from 9 percent in 2005. And 10 percent of the blasts struck civilians, twice the rate from last year.

...

Yet some outside experts who have recently visited the White House said Bush administration officials were beginning to plan for the possibility that Iraq’s democratically elected government might not survive.

“Senior administration officials have acknowledged to me that they are considering alternatives other than democracy,” said one military affairs expert who received an Iraq briefing at the White House last month and agreed to speak only on condition of anonymity.

“Everybody in the administration is being quite circumspect,” the expert said, “but you can sense their own concern that this is drifting away from democracy.”

This last part, as you might guess, has raised a few eyebrows. Balloon Juice and NRO have differing takes. But if this is starting to bubble up a bit more, then shifts are in the wind.

More can be seen here and then in response, where first Barnett offers this ever-so-thoughtful outlook:

When the neo-cons (like me) said that we would be greeted with garlands of roses in Iraq, we meant it. We couldn’t imagine anyone preferring an 8th century theocracy to freedom and liberty. But subsequent events in Iraq and Palestine have had to give any thinking person pause. The people of Palestine democratically opted for a government that promises non-stop war with a much more powerful enemy. Where the people of Iraq stand remains opaque.

We comfort ourselves with the notion that the Iranian government is wildly unpopular with its people and soon they will rise up. The evidence for this remains flimsy; the evidence for the animus that many people of the region have for America and American institutions remains all too clear.

SO HOW WILL THE WAR END? With lots of dead Jihadists. Just like World War II ended with lots of dead Nazis and imperialist troops of Japan. There were so many dead, the rest lost their will to fight on. Only when they realize their destruction is imminent (and accomplished to a great degree) will there be peace.

With Bainbridge countering, as part of a larger take:

"Let them hate us, so long as they fear us," eh? In the long run, it didn't save Rome. Beside which Barnett fails to acknowledge the difference between fighting Nazis and martyrs. But Barnett's thinking is a classic illustration of what happens when the only tool you have is a hammer.

The comments in response to that one are deeply, thoroughly miserable in some cases (thankfully not all).

Then there's this:

Clashes between rival Shiite Muslim militias erupted Wednesday in Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, when scores of gunmen stormed the governor's office after accusing his supporters of assassinating their tribal leader. Meanwhile, car bombs in Baghdad killed 25 people.

The gunmen in Basra, a predominantly Shiite city, laid siege to the office for two hours, lobbing mortar shells and barricading nearby bridges, before British troops and Iraqi police pushed them back. The fighting left at least four policemen dead, police said. Authorities imposed a curfew on the city.

A story of pain on the ground, meanwhile. And so it grinds on.

Good lord! The absolute last thing any military planner wants is to get into a long war of attrition instead of a strategic war that cuts the enemy off from the resources to continue the fight. Lots of dead Nazis didn't end WWII. Successfully controlling Europe on the ground and blockading Japan from the sea and air ended WWII. Idiot.

See whats meant about creating conditions for the training of bomb-makers? Now Democrats could argue, successfully from a security standpoint, that keeping the American deployment around, does nothing to break the training in the making of explosives. And this is not good for security, there's or ours. In fact, it's very bad.

And that we have to stop being in the business, directly or indirectly, of inspiring practical courses in bomb-making. And that's because it's not productive. It just piles up bodies.

If the Iraqis are going to make bombs, then they should make them without our "involvement," or "inspiration," or whatever you want to call it.

Do they do that? No.

--GlobalSecurity.Org by way of Dick Destiny blog, out.

There's just no answer when everything national debate reduces to the choice of being called someone who runs away or someone who doesn't. I hear the domino theory on O'Reilly every night. It's not called that but if we leave Iraq, then Iran will knock over the Middle East like dominos.

Now if I remember correctly, Iraq and Iran had a very WWI-style war that ended in a stalemate. A couple of Verduns on both sides. It seems to me there'd be a lot of Iraqis ready to jump into action and blow up Iranians if the two were mixed to closely.

Tony Snow on the President 'allegedly' being annoyed that Iraqis aren't saying nice things about him:

The president is somebody who's intensely practical about these things and not somebody who sits around and goes, ' Nnnnyoo! '

Mindboggling. The whole piece is worth reading through.

Meanwhile, Lowry buys into -- er, dispassionately passes on -- word that "no one, repeat no one, here is talking about `alternatives to democracy.'" Very clear.

Finally, RealClearPolitics seeks to alleviate concerns by talking with Secretary of Veterans Affairs Jim Nicholson and reposting comments from Gen. Caldwell. That these conclusions might be slightly biased and removed from the day to day seems to have escaped the interrogator. My favorite bit:

I also asked specifically why Muqtada al-Sadr is allowed to continue operating and whether there is any plan to deal with him directly. Nicholson answered that Sadr "must be dealt with" and that while he "doesn't cooperate well with Americans" and has a large following (including a minister in the cabinet) that is problematic, Sadr is, at least to some degree, participating in the government. In other words, Sadr has to continue to be managed and brought under control through the political process.

The potential responses kinda write themselves.

Baghdad divides.

The boys in Sadr City sell block ice and don't drift far from their corners. The neighborhood, with as many as 2 million people, is a poor, hot place devoted to radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr. It is a mesmerizing grid of wind-swept chadors and echoing gunfire guarded by Sadr's Al Mahdi militia, which runs an intelligence network marked by the incessant static of radios and walkie-talkies.

Mustafa feels safe here. His tennis career is suffering, but his life will lengthen if he doesn't too often slip out of any of the neighborhood's 37 entrances and exits. It is a narrow existence, and sometimes, he'd just like to take his wife to another part of town and smoke a water pipe and stroll until 2 a.m. Then he thinks of an uncle with a shrapnel wound and of three friends — a coach and two tennis players on Iraq's Davis Cup team — who were killed not long ago.

They expected attacks given the pilgrimage and such was the case:

Armed gunmen attacked a group of pilgrims attending one of Shiite Islam's most sacred religious holidays Sunday , killing 16 pilgrims and wounding more than 230 others, authorities said.

The attacks occurred despite a weekend-long ban on vehicle traffic in Baghdad, which the government imposed to prevent violence as millions of expected pilgrims converged on the city.

As many as 200 insurgents carried out the attacks late Saturday night and Sunday morning, said Iraqi Army Brig. Gen. Karim Taha.

Iraqi forces killed seven of the armed men and wounded 11 others, but the remaining gunmen escaped, an Interior Ministry official said.

Meanwhile, the conservative bleedaway at home continues, slowly but surely.

Belgravia is probably on the bleeding edge:

While I believe America owes Iraq much more than such a prospective devastating abdication of responsibility, given not least the massive bloodshed Rumsfeld's chaos has unleashed, at the end of the day I am an American, and I must recommend what I think is in America's best national interest, despite my moral disgust for what could prove our abject failure to deliver to Iraqis what we promised to them.

Meanwhile at the helm:

At a White House news conference, Bush also conceded that the war in Iraq, with daily bombings and U.S. casualties now standing at more than 2,600 was ''straining the psyche of our country.''

''Sometimes I'm frustrated. Rarely surprised. Wars are not a time of joy,'' the president said. ''These are challenging times, and difficult times.''

Deep Thoughts by GWB.

Turning to Iraq, Bush said that if the government there fails, it could turn the country into a ''safe haven for terrorists and extremists'' and give the insurgents revenues from oil sales.

''I hear a lot of talk about civil war. I'm concerned about that, of course, and I've talked to a lot of people about it. And what I've found from my talks are that the Iraqis want a unified country. And that the Iraqi leadership is determined to thwart the efforts of the extremists and the radicals,'' Bush said.

Well *I'm* reassured.

And if the audience all wishes for it really, really hard, Tinkerbelle will revive and fly around the stage.

Man that whole Saddam = 9/11 thing never gets old.

The U.S. Marine Corps will start recalling thousands of inactive service members in the coming months to counter a steady decline in the number of non-active troops volunteering for duty, the service said on Tuesday.

Col. Guy Stratton, head of the Marine Corps' manpower mobilization plans, said the service is short some 1,200 volunteers over the next 18 months to fill roles in the war on terrorism. The total shortfall fluctuates regularly, he said.

To meet critical needs, Stratton said President George W. Bush authorized the Marine Corps to issue involuntary recall orders to members of the Individual Ready Reserve, part of the non-active force. It will be the Marine Corps' first involuntary recall since the ground invasion of Iraq in 2003.

No more than 2,500 Marines may be involuntarily activated at once under the new authorization, Stratton said. About 35,000 Marines are available to be recalled involuntarily.

Now, this said, encouraging numbers here at GatewayPundit. The less dead all around, the better. Whether it's enough is what I doubt.

Meantime:

One investigator asked Laughner if there was anything about the number of civilian victims or the circumstances of the casualties that gave reason to pause and "say jeez."

"Any time you see women and children, sir, I thought that," Laughner said. "But from what the Marines had told me and from what I understood from them, that I can't say I wouldn't have done the same thing in their situation. If I hear somebody racking AK rounds, and I don't know how many guys are there, I'm going to protect me and my guys."

"I said it's time to stop the bleeding," said Hildi Halley, whose husband, Army National Guard Capt. Patrick Damon, died June 15 in Afghanistan. "It's time to swallow our pride and find a solution."

She said Bush responded by saying "there was no point in us having a philosophical discussion about the pros and cons of the war."

http://kennebecjournal.mainetoday.com/news/local/3061299.shtml

Though the U.S. military has not issued a timetable for ending the sweep, officials say that patrolling Baghdad indefinitely would create dependency among Iraq's nascent security forces and tax U.S. resources and manpower.

The U.S. military, with 138,000 troops, is stretched thin in Iraq; many units are on their third deployments. Last week, the Pentagon announced an involuntary recall of as many as 2,500 Marines reservists. The Army has issued recall orders to 10,000 soldiers.

U.S. military leaders say they hope Iraqi police units, paired with American training teams, will be able to maintain security once the troops leave.

Many Baghdad residents, however, think that Iraq's notoriously corrupt and sectarian police forces are part of the problem. U.S. and Iraqi officials acknowledge that Shiite Muslim militiamen, many of whom have infiltrated the police, are responsible for most of Baghdad's slayings, but there is still no plan to disarm paramilitary groups.

An obvious enough conclusion all around. Meantime:

But the news of progress in Baghdad was damped by the flurry of weekend violence throughout Iraq.

Of the 80 deaths reported Sunday, 25 were in Baghdad.

Bombers targeted two media centers in the capital. Nine people were killed when a bomb planted on a commuter bus exploded near the pedestrian entrance of the Palestine Hotel, which houses several media organizations.

Two people died when a bomb exploded in the parking lot of the headquarters of Al Sabah, one of Iraq's largest daily newspapers.

"This is the second attack of its kind against us so far," Falah Mishal, an editor at the paper, told the Iraqiya television station. "This is the price that is being paid to the workers at Al Sabah due to their steadfastness and their patriotism."

Morgue workers at Yarmouk Hospital in Baghdad said they received at least a dozen bodies Sunday, among them torture victims, bystanders hit by gunfire, and a child killed by a mortar round.

Near Khalis, a village 15 miles north of Baghdad, gunmen killed 22 people at a cafe, an Iraqi army official said. The assailants also raided a judge's home, killing his brother. Also in Khalis, a bomb detonated near a market, killing six people.

In nearby Baqubah, two truck drivers were slain in drive-by shootings and gunmen killed an Iraqi army colonel. In addition, two brothers and their cousin were shot to death by unknown attackers. And Iraqi police found two bodies six miles north of Baqubah.

In the northern oil hub of Kirkuk, a car bomber smashed into the home of an Iraqi police colonel, killing nine people. Another car bomb killed one person at the office of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. It was the second time this month that bombers targeted the party's office.

The bombings are "aimed at igniting sectarian divisions between Kirkuk's residents, especially between Arabs and Kurds," said Mohammed Khalel Nsayef, an Arab politician in Kirkuk, a majority Kurdish city with significant Arab and Turkmen populations.

In Duluiya, 50 miles north of Baghdad, three bodyguards for parliament member Abed Jibouri were gunned down.

In the southern city of Basra, Iraqi police officers said gunmen killed a policeman and his sister. Basra authorities also arrested 18 people accused of kidnapping and selling women to foreigners.

U.S. military officials announced the deaths of six American soldiers. Two died in Baghdad, one by small-arms fire and one by a roadside bomb, officials said.

Four more troops died in a roadside bombing north of Baghdad. No location was given, but eyewitnesses in Tarmiya, 35 miles north of the capital, said that a bomb destroyed an American armored vehicle and that no one survived.

And onward, and along.

The death toll mounted in Iraq Monday as clashes between Shiite militiamen and U.S.-backed Iraqi forces in a southern city killed at least 23 and injured 70 while a suicide bombing in the capital killed 15, including 8 policemen.

In Diwaniyah, about 80 miles south of Baghdad, clashes broke out between the Mahdi Army militia of radical, anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and U.S.-backed Iraqi army soldiers following a raid by Iraqi soldiers in three neighborhoods to root out extremists, news wires reported.

Details of the fighing there were difficult to confirm, but it appeared from reports to be a significant battle and one of the first major skirmishes between the regular troops and the militia.

Even the number of casualties varied by source. The Reuters news agency said that a Ministry of Defense spokesman said 50 militia members and 20 soldiers had been killed. An official in Sadr's Baghdad office told Reuters, however, that two militiamen had been killed. The Associated Press quotes Dr. Muhammed Abdul-Muhsen of the city's general hospital who said he had seen 34 bodies--25 soldiers, seven civilians and two militiamen.

U.S. forces, meanwhile, have lost nine soldiers since Saturday, the military said in press releases, making it a lethal weekends for them as well. Eight of the soldiers were killed by roadside bomb attacks and one by gunfire, according to the brief military statements.

Belgravia noted something rich:

And so amidst all of this difficulty, the currency is fairly stable, the schools are open, the hospitals are open, the people are functioning. You'd fly over it -- you've been there -- and you see people out in the fields doing things, and people driving their cars and lining up for gasoline and going about their business. So it's a mixed picture that's difficult, but there are some -- despite all of the difficulties, there are also some good trend lines that are occurring and I think the period ahead is an important period.

Thanks, Secretary Rumsfeld.