Much more interesting was Stratfor's take:
Iraq: The Policy DilemmaBy George Friedman
U.S. President George W. Bush now has made it clear what his policy on Iraq will be for the immediate future, certainly until Election Day: He does not intend to change U.S. policy in any fundamental way. U.S. troops will continue to be deployed in Iraq, they will continue to carry out counterinsurgency operations, and they will continue to train Iraqi troops to eventually take over the operations. It is difficult to imagine that Bush believes there will be any military solution to the situation in Iraq; therefore, we must try to understand his reasoning in maintaining this position. Certainly, it is not simply a political decision. Opinion in the United States has turned against the war, and drawing down U.S. forces and abandoning combat operations would appear to be the politically expedient move. Thus, if it is not politics driving him -- and assuming that the more lurid theories on the Internet concerning Bush's motivations are as silly as they appear -- then we have to figure out what he is doing.
Let's consider the military situation first. Bush has said that there is no civil war in Iraq. This is in large measure a semantic debate. In our view, it would be inaccurate to call what is going on a "civil war" simply because that term implies a degree of coherence that simply does not exist. Calling it a free-for-all would be more accurate. It is not simply a conflict of Shi'i versus Sunni. The Sunnis and Shia are fighting each other, and all of them are fighting American forces. It is not altogether clear what the Americans are supposed to be doing.
Counterinsurgency is unlike other warfare. In other warfare, the goal is to defeat an enemy army, and civilian casualties as a result of military operations are expected and acceptable. With counterinsurgency operations in populated areas, however, the goal is to distinguish the insurgents from civilians and destroy them, with minimal civilian casualties. Counterinsurgency in populated areas is more akin to police operations than to military operations; U.S. troops are simultaneously engaging an enemy force while trying to protect the population from both that force and U.S. operations. Add to this the fact that the population is frequently friendly to the insurgents and hostile to the Americans, and the difficulty of the undertaking becomes clear.
Consider the following numbers. The New York Police Department (excluding transit and park police) counts one policeman for every 216 residents. In Iraq, there is one U.S. soldier (not counting other coalition troops) per about 185 people. Thus, numerically speaking, U.S. forces are in a mildly better position than New York City cops -- but then, except for occasional Saturday nights, New York cops are not facing anything like the U.S. military is facing in Iraq. Given that the United States is facing not one enemy but a series of enemy organizations -- many fighting each other as well as the Americans -- and that the American goal is to defeat these while defending the populace, it is obvious even from these very simplistic numbers that the U.S. force simply isn't there to impose a settlement.
Expectations and a Deal Unwound
A military solution to the U.S. dilemma has not been in the cards for several years. The purpose of military operations was to set the stage for political negotiations. But the Americans had entered Iraq with certain expectations. For one thing, they had believed they would simply be embraced by Iraq's Shiite population. They also had expected the Sunnis to submit to what appeared to be overwhelming political force. What happened was very different. First, the Shia welcomed the fall of Saddam Hussein, but they hardly embraced the Americans -- they sought instead to translate the U.S. victory over Hussein into a Shiite government. Second, the Sunnis, in view of the U.S.-Shiite coalition and the dismemberment of the Sunni-dominated Iraqi Army, saw that they were about to be squeezed out of the political system and potentially crushed by the Shia. They saw an insurgency -- which had been planned by Hussein -- as their only hope of forcing a redefinition of Iraqi politics. The Americans realized that their expectations had not been realistic.
Thus, the Americans went through a series of political cycles. First, they sided with the Shia as they sought to find their balance militarily facing the Sunnis. When they felt they had traction against the Sunnis, following the capture of Hussein -- and fearing Shiite hegemony -- they shifted toward a position between Sunnis and Shia. As military operations were waged in the background, complex repositioning occurred on all sides, with the Americans trying to hold the swing position between Sunnis and Shia.
The process of creating a government for Iraq was encapsulated in this multi-sided maneuvering. By spring 2006, the Sunnis appeared to have committed themselves to the political process. And in June, with the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the announcement that the United States would reduce its force in Iraq by two brigades, the stage seemed to be set for a political resolution that would create a Shiite-dominated coalition that included Sunnis and Kurds. It appeared to be a done deal -- and then the deal completely collapsed.
The first sign of the collapse was a sudden outbreak of fighting among Shia in the Basra region. We assumed that this was political positioning among Shiite factions as they prepared for a political settlement. Then Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), traveled to Tehran, and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army commenced an offensive. Shiite death squads struck out at Sunni populations, and Sunni insurgents struck back. From nearly having a political accommodation, the situation in Iraq fell completely apart.
The key was Iran. The Iranians had always wanted an Iraqi satellite state, as protection against another Iraq-Iran war. That was a basic national security concept for them. In order to have this, the Iranians needed an overwhelmingly Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, and to have overwhelming control of the Shia. It seemed to us that there could be a Shiite-dominated government but not an overwhelmingly Shiite government. In other words, Iraq could be neutral toward, but not a satellite of, Iran. In our view, Iraq's leading Shia -- fearing a civil war and also being wary of domination by Iran -- would accept this settlement.
We may have been correct on the sentiment of leading Shia, but we were wrong about Iran's intentions. Tehran did not see a neutral Iraq as being either in Iran's interests or necessary. Clearly, the Iranians did not trust a neutral Iraq still under American occupation to remain neutral. Second -- and this is the most important -- they saw the Americans as militarily weak and incapable of either containing a civil war in Iraq or of taking significant military action against Iran. In other words, the Iranians didn't like the deal they had been offered, they felt that they could do better, and they felt that the time had come to strike.
A Two-Pronged Offensive
When we look back through Iranian eyes, we can now see what they saw: a golden opportunity to deal the United States a blow, redefine the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and reposition the Shia in the Muslim world. Iran had, for example, been revivifying Hezbollah in Lebanon for several months. We had seen this as a routine response to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. It is now apparent, however, that it was part of a two-pronged offensive.
First, in Iraq, the Iranians encouraged a variety of factions to both resist the newly formed government and to strike out against the Sunnis. This created an uncontainable cycle of violence that rendered the Iraqi government impotent and the Americans irrelevant. The tempo of operations was now in the hands of those Shiite groups among which the Iranians had extensive influence -- and this included some of the leading Shiite parties, such as SCIRI.
Second, in Lebanon, Iran encouraged Hezbollah to launch an offensive. There is debate over whether the Israelis or Hezbollah ignited the conflict in Lebanon. Part of this is ideological gibberish, but part of it concerns intention. It is clear that Hezbollah was fully deployed for combat. Its positions were manned in the south, and its rockets were ready. The capture of two Israeli soldiers was intended to trigger Israeli airstrikes, which were as predictable as sunrise, and Hezbollah was ready to fire on Haifa. Once Haifa was hit, Israel floundered in trying to deploy troops (the Golani and Givati brigades were in the south, near Gaza). This would not have been the case if the Israelis had planned for war with Hezbollah. Now, this discussion has nothing to do with who to blame for what. It has everything to do with the fact that Hezbollah was ready to fight, triggered the fight, and came out ahead because it wasn't defeated.
The end result is that, suddenly, the Iranians held the whip hand in Iraq, had dealt Israel a psychological blow, had repositioned themselves in the Muslim world and had generally redefined the dynamics of the region. Moreover, they had moved to the threshold of redefining the geopolitics to the Persian Gulf.
This was by far their most important achievement.
A New Look at the Region
At this point, except for the United States, Iran has by far the most powerful military force in the Persian Gulf. This has nothing to do with its nuclear capability, which is still years away from realization. Its ground forces are simply more numerous and more capable than all the forces of the Arabian Peninsula combined. There is another aspect to this: The countries of the Arabian Peninsula are governed by Sunnis, but many are home to substantial Shiite populations as well. Between the Iranian military and the possibility of unrest among Shia in the region, the situation in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Peninsula is uneasy, to say the least. The rise of Hezbollah well might psychologically empower the generally quiescent Shia to become more assertive. This is one of the reasons that the Saudis were so angry at Hezbollah, and why they now are so anxious over events in Iraq.
If Iraq were to break into three regions, the southern region would be Shiite -- and the Iranians clearly believe that they could dominate southern Iraq. This not only would give them control of the Basra oil fields, but also would theoretically open the road to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. From a strictly military point of view, and not including the Shiite insurgencies at all, Iran could move far down the western littoral of the Persian Gulf if American forces were absent. Put another way, there would be a possibility that the Iranians could seize control of the bulk of the region's oil reserves. They could do the same thing if Iraq were to be united as an Iranian satellite, but that would be far more difficult to achieve and would require active U.S. cooperation in withdrawing.
We can now see why Bush cannot begin withdrawing forces. If he did that, the entire region would destabilize. The countries of the Arabian Peninsula, seeing the withdrawal, would realize that the Iranians were now the dominant power. Shia in the Gulf region might act, or they might simply wait until the Americans had withdrawn and the Iranians arrived. Israel, shaken to the core by its fight with Hezbollah, would have neither the force nor the inclination to act. Therefore, the United States has little choice, from Bush's perspective, but to remain in Iraq.
The Iranians undoubtedly anticipated this response. They have planned carefully. They are therefore shifting their rhetoric somewhat to be more accommodating. They understand that to get the United States out of Iraq -- and out of Kuwait --they will have to engage in a complex set of negotiations. They will promise anything -- but in the end, they will be the largest military force in the region, and nothing else matters. Ultimately, they are counting on the Americans to be sufficiently exhausted by their experience of Iraq to rationalize their withdrawal -- leaving, as in Vietnam, a graceful interval for what follows.
Options
Iran will do everything it can, of course, to assure that the Americans are as exhausted as possible. The Iranians have no incentive to allow the chaos to wind down, until at least a political settlement with the United States is achieved. The United States cannot permit Iranian hegemony over the Persian Gulf, nor can it sustain its forces in Iraq indefinitely under these circumstances.
The United States has four choices, apart from the status quo:
1. Reach a political accommodation that cedes the status of regional hegemon to Iran, and withdraw from Iraq.
2. Withdraw forces from Iraq and maintain a presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia -- something the Saudis would hate but would have little choice about -- while remembering that an American military presence is highly offensive to many Muslims and was a significant factor in the rise of al Qaeda.
3. Halt counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and redeploy its forces in the south (west of Kuwait), to block any Iranian moves in the region.
4. Assume that Iran relies solely on its psychological pre-eminence to force a regional realignment and, thus, use Sunni proxies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in attempts to outmaneuver Tehran.
None of these are attractive choices. Each cedes much of Iraq to Shiite and Iranian power and represents some degree of a psychological defeat for the United States, or else rests on a risky assumption. While No. 3 might be the most attractive, it would leave U.S. forces in highly exposed, dangerous and difficult-to-sustain postures.
Iran has set a clever trap, and the United States has walked into it. Rather than a functioning government in Iraq, it has chaos and a triumphant Shiite community. The Americans cannot contain the chaos, and they cannot simply withdraw. Therefore, we can understand why Bush insists on holding his position indefinitely. He has been maneuvered in such a manner that he -- or a successor -- has no real alternatives.
There is one counter to this: a massive American buildup, including a major buildup of ground forces that requires a large expansion of the Army, geared for the invasion of Iran and destruction of its military force. The idea that this could readily be done through air power has evaporated, we would think, with the Israeli air force's failure in Lebanon. An invasion of Iran would be enormously expensive, take a very long time and create a problem of occupation that would dwarf the problem faced in Iraq. But it is the other option. It would stabilize the geopolitics of the Arabian Peninsula and drain American military power for a generation.
Sometimes there are no good choices. For the United States, the options are to negotiate a settlement that is acceptable to Iran and live with the consequences, raise a massive army and invade Iran, or live in the current twilight world between Iranian hegemony and war with Iran. Bush appears to be choosing an indecisive twilight. Given the options, it is understandable why.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 03:58 (eighteen years ago)
Under Saddam Hussein, I was a doctor. But I took up journalism in late 2003, when it was clear that the best jobs in post-Hussein Iraq were those in the news media. Building a free press in Iraq was one of America’s greatest achievements. When the American-led coalition installed itself in the Green Zone, it created the Combined International Press Center, where American soldiers issued press passes to Iraqis and Westerners alike.
...
In the last year, however, as successive short-term governments have taken power in Baghdad, American support for the Iraqi news media has waned. In May the United States ambassador announced the transfer of the International Media Center, which has served as a headquarters for the international and local news media, into the hands of the new Iraqi government, which is dominated by militias and regards the news media as akin to the insurgency, something that it must defeat and suppress. In mid-July, the Iraqi prime minister threatened to close any news media outlet that insufficiently supports the Iraqi government in its fight against sectarian violence. I fear that if this government survives, the press in Iraq will become similar to that in Iran, Saudi Arabia or Syria.
The Western news media could not function in Iraq without the dedication of Iraqi journalists. And those Iraqis were first inspired to become journalists because of the United States. Now the United States has turned our fate over to Iraqi politicians. If our government continues to be dominated by militias and to draw closer to the insurgency and the Islamic extremists, then in just a few months, no news will be reported from Iraq at all.
The Iraqi people, however, will continue to suffer. There will be new mass murders, committed or encouraged by the very same people who denounced the killings under Saddam Hussein. And just as back then, there will be no news media to inform the world.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 04:24 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 04:30 (eighteen years ago)
― kingfish prætor (kingfish 2.0), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 05:36 (eighteen years ago)
"the thin, clear voice of truth is difficult if not impossible to ascertain amidst the rumpus raised on today's radio broad-casting stations!"
― Euai Kapaui (tracerhand), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 13:52 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 13:54 (eighteen years ago)
― Euai Kapaui (tracerhand), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 13:58 (eighteen years ago)
It also closely follows the advice put forward in the infamous "letter" supposed to have been written by al-Zarqawi, discovered by US troops, and widely publicized by the Bush administration way back in 2004, in which he outlined the basic strategy for al-Qaeda-in-Iraq. Which strategy is no surprise at all and doesn't even suggest that Iran and al-Qaeda-in-Iraq have ties. ANY DAMN FOOL could have concocted this general strategy, provided their major goal was to defeat the US war aims in Iraq.
Our vulnerability to this strategy all goes back to fucking Donald fucking Rumsfeld and his insistance that this war could be won with half the troops the war planners wanted, and Bush, Cheney and Rove eating this shit out of Rummy's hand, because they all knew that it would be politically expedient to sell this plan to the US public. What those fucking arrogant jerks never counted on was losing the goddamn fucking war through their own fucking incompetance.
― Aimless (Aimless), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 17:35 (eighteen years ago)
but works perfectly with Homer's "Internet, eh?" voice
― kingfish prætor (kingfish 2.0), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 17:45 (eighteen years ago)
Other than oil, that region has very few resources the western economies give a shit about. And Iran would have its hands full trying to dominate that herd of cats. So long as we guzzle oil, disengagement is not an option. Remove oil from the picture and disengagement is a no-brainer.
(I apologize to Ned for once more using his monthly Iraq thread in which to vent my boundless, but futile, frustration with BushCo's towering incompetance.)
― Aimless (Aimless), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 17:53 (eighteen years ago)
the stratfor thing does point up the weakness (or absence) of real alternatives to the bush policy (if you can call what we have a policy). just saying "pull the troops out" is frustratingly inadequate. obviously we're going to continue to have some substantial number of troops there for some substantial number of years. i cannot imagine a scenario in which we don't. so that being the case we need an actual intelligent policy to go along with their presence.
― gypsy mothra (gypsy mothra), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 17:56 (eighteen years ago)
― Fluffy Bear (Fluffy Bear Hearts Rainbows), Wednesday, 6 September 2006 18:16 (eighteen years ago)
But hey, Iraq controls its own army now. Allegedly. Apparently. Suspiciously.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Thursday, 7 September 2006 13:25 (eighteen years ago)
― Earl Nash (earlnash), Friday, 8 September 2006 04:17 (eighteen years ago)
Yesterday Maliki took over operational control of the Iraqi armed forces, the one national security institution that works. He needs to demonstrate the will to use it. The American people will support a cause that is noble and necessary, but not one that is unwinnable. And without a central Iraqi government willing to act in its own self-defense, this war will be unwinnable.
He might even believe it. (He kinda has to, in that if/when this hope falls through, that's that.)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 8 September 2006 05:22 (eighteen years ago)
What's been more interesting is the wavering and silence among usual suspects on an increasing level. At NRO, ever since Lowry started admitting that things weren't happy, there's been a quietly tangible air of grinding frustration or reflexive rah-rahing anytime Bush speaks, just to keep themselves going. But to give you an idea of where the wind really sits, Stratfor's piece up above got some major play there yesterday, while that hoohah I linked about Iraq's government 'taking over' the army apparently didn't even get a mention. Up until now their tendency would have been to play up the two things in a much different fashion, trumpeting the 'handover' and ignoring Stratfor entirely. They also gave some major play to a recent piece from the newly reemergent Gingrich where amid the expected 'Democrats are defeatist' hoohah he did some other specific trashing:
Most government officials constitute the second wing, which argues the system is doing the best it can and that we have to "stay the course"--no matter how unproductive. But, after being exposed in the failed response to Hurricane Katrina, it will become increasingly difficult for this wing to keep explaining the continuing failures of the system.
Just consider the following: Osama bin Laden is still at large. Afghanistan is still insecure. Iraq is still violent. North Korea and Iran are still building nuclear weapons and missiles. Terrorist recruiting is still occurring in the U.S., Canada, Great Britain and across the planet.
To be sure, Mr. Bush understands that we cannot ignore our enemies; they are real. He knows that an enemy who believes in religiously sanctioned suicide-bombing is an enemy who, with a nuclear or biological weapon, is a mortal threat to our survival as a free country. The analysis Mr. Bush offers the nation--before the Joint Session on Sept. 20, 2001, in his 2002 State of the Union, in his 2005 Second Inaugural--is consistently correct. On each occasion, he outlines the threat, the moral nature of the conflict and the absolute requirement for victory.
Unfortunately, the great bureaucracies Mr. Bush presides over (but does not run) have either not read his speeches or do not believe in his analysis. The result has been a national security performance gap that we must confront if we are to succeed in winning this rising World War III.
It's a toadying response, of course -- "Hey, Bush understands, why don't the rest of you fools get it?" But the portrayal of internal fracture and inertia is the key part.
Meantime, I've long since figured that when Instapundit finally snaps then it all goes down amid the true believers -- Glenn Reynolds is an unusual character, and though I'll take him over the likes of Malkin or RedState any day, his insistence that everything is just being badly reported or the like is wearing thin, and even he doesn't know how to react any more. In response to the news about the deaths in Iraq being revised upward, he said this:
Huh. I don't know what could account for this discrepancy.
And seriously, that was it. No questioning, nothing. But it was a terribly inconvenient realization to deal with, it seems. And again, nothing on his site today about the handover.
As for those incorrect numbers, you can hear the lameness in this:
A U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad, Lt. Col. Barry Johnson, said Thursday that the U.S. figures were based on the military's "consolidated reporting with the Iraqi government." Johnson also disclosed that the military's numbers included only "individuals targeted as a result of sectarian-related violence, to include executions," and did not include "other violent acts such as car bombs and mortars."
Johnson said he did not track the morgue's figures and could not account for the substantial gap between the military's count for August killings and the latest figures from Baghdad's morgue.
Meanwhile:
Separately, the Health Ministry confirmed Thursday that it planned to construct two new branch morgues in Baghdad and add doctors and refrigerator units to raise capacity to as many as 250 corpses a day.
Roadside bombs in Iraq rose to record numbers this summer -- to about four times as many as in January 2004 -- as tips from Iraqi citizens warning of the bombs and attacks have dropped sharply amid a flaring of sectarian violence, according to a senior U.S. defense official.
About 1,200 improvised explosive devices (IEDS) -- the leading killer of U.S. troops in Iraq -- were detonated in August as insurgents continue to invent new ways to design and hide the lethal munitions, according to retired Army Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, which is spearheading efforts to curb the bombs.
"We're making slow, grudging progress," Meigs said in a briefing with reporters. "We're not going to bat a thousand." But he predicted his organization -- which has grown from a small Army initiative of 12 people in 2003 to a Pentagon entity with 269 employees and a fiscal 2006 budget of $3.47 billion -- will "do better" over time.
Make no mistake about the seriousness of this issue -- our nation's warriors are being sent into harm's way wearing a body armor substantially inferior to a version that surpasses by a significant margin the Interceptor Body Armor in nearly every category. Key people in Army acquisition know this to be true and are willfully, wantonly exposing our troops unnecessarily to serious and mortal wounds when a substantial proportion of these wounds could be prevented with the better product, Dragon Skin.
Someday, and maybe not too far off, there may be a criminal investigation of how and why this sordid mess has been allowed to develop and to fester.
Insurgents have killed at least 39 Iraqis as a wave of car bombings in the capital marked the day when the embattled Baghdad government began to take command of its own armed forces.
Meanwhile, as lawmakers debated a controversial law which could see the country divided into rival regions, gunmen kidnapped a nephew of parliament's hardline Sunni Arab speaker, who opposes the break-up.
Two more American soldiers also died, the US military said, bringing the week's coalition fatalities to 17.
And on, and on. And on.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 8 September 2006 05:49 (eighteen years ago)
is this the new fallback position? he's not actually in charge? the mighty warrior, waylaid by pencil-pushers?
― gypsy mothra (gypsy mothra), Friday, 8 September 2006 06:09 (eighteen years ago)
― DV (dirtyvicar), Friday, 8 September 2006 08:27 (eighteen years ago)
-- gypsy mothra (meetm...), September 8th, 2006.
Damn that intransigent Democrat minority in Congress! Think of the things he could've done without that bunch of spoilsports gumming up the works!
― Edward III (edward iii), Friday, 8 September 2006 12:51 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 8 September 2006 13:01 (eighteen years ago)
― Euai Kapaui (tracerhand), Friday, 8 September 2006 13:25 (eighteen years ago)
― Edward III (edward iii), Friday, 8 September 2006 14:38 (eighteen years ago)
Any idiot can make a speech that says "We have enemies who wish to destroy our nation. We cannot allow them to succeed." At that motherhood-and-apple-pie level of analysis, Bush is as smart as anyone else in the barber shop down on Main Street. Where Bush runs into trouble is the moment he exercises his judgement.
He often says he knows what leadership looks like and he does. He is The Deciderer, and once he has made up his mind what is right, he is set and determined. This is the look of leadership, all right. But it doesn't matter if you look like Admiral Nimitz, if you navigate like the captain of the Exxon Valdez.
― Aimless (Aimless), Friday, 8 September 2006 15:36 (eighteen years ago)
― stet (stet), Friday, 8 September 2006 16:16 (eighteen years ago)
Those damn commies undermining our best efforts!
The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country's western Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there, said several military officers and intelligence officials familiar with its contents.
Belgravia follows up:
Meantime, on the Shi'a front, SCIRI head Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim has been calling more vigorously for a so-called Shi'a 'super-state' in the south (read: more lebensraum for Iran). In countering Hakim's objectives, it appears we are pinning our hopes on Maliki, probably a losing proposition, though perhaps too Sadr can be deftly used to counter Hakim on this issue (Sadr's firebrand nationalism is, of course, deathly opposed to the US, but on the issue of federalism, his inclination is likely still more oriented towards preservation of a unitary state). No wonder so many bloggers are grasping onto Peter Galbraith's 'send the GIs to Kurdistan' gambit, as the Kurds are friendly to us--not least as they want protection from the Turks--which could create something of a mess going forward. Regardless, as long as US forces don't put real pressure on the Kurds to cease the reverse Arabization underway, and Kurdistan gets its fair share of oil revenues--the amicable relations won't turn sour, at least in the short to mid-term.
Great.
Death death death and all.
Morea about the proposed division:
The main Sunni Arab political bloc boycotted parliament Sunday to protest legislation supported by Shiite Muslims and Kurds that would carve Iraq into a federation of three autonomous states.
The bill would create a predominantly Shiite region in the south of Iraq much like the largely independent zone currently controlled by the Kurds in the north. Sunnis vigorously oppose the plan, which would leave them with the center of the country, a vast desert devoid of the oil reserves of the other regions.
A few other people start thinking, "Hey, maybe that Al-Sadr guy needs watching." You'd think.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Monday, 11 September 2006 17:02 (eighteen years ago)
There is no mystery as to what can make the crucial difference in the battle of Baghdad: American troops. A few thousand U.S. troops have already been transferred to Baghdad from elsewhere in Iraq. Where more U.S. troops have been deployed, the situation has gotten better. Those neighborhoods intensively patrolled by Americans are safer and more secure. But it is by no means clear that overall troop numbers in Baghdad are enough to do the job. And it is clear that stripping troops from other fronts risks progress elsewhere in the country. The bottom line is this: More U.S. troops in Iraq would improve our chances of winning a decisive battle at a decisive moment. This means the ability to succeed in Iraq is, to some significant degree, within our control. The president should therefore order a substantial surge in overall troop levels in Iraq, with the additional forces focused on securing Baghdad.
Watch it not happen. And watch them cry.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 03:58 (eighteen years ago)
...and make excuses, like a beaten wife.
― Aimless (Aimless), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 13:53 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 13:57 (eighteen years ago)
Loyola wrote the most slavish gibberish I've ever read last week after the prez's speech moved him beyond measure.
― Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 14:00 (eighteen years ago)
Our strategy is to build walls and theirs is to undermine them. So far, our walls keep developing gaping holes full of dust and rubble. Loyola wants to point out that some stretches of wall remain standing and all we have to do is rebuild the gaps. He is stupid.
Loyola continues: Bill Kristol and Rich hint that Sadr stands to profit from this violence, but they do not explain how in practice Sadr could leverage that violence to his benefit. Indeed it's not clear to me that he benefits from the violence at all...
Sadr benefits from a power vaccuum for his militia to fill, you idiot. So long as the elected government cannot function as a government, his power is secure and can grow. The ubiquitous violence rewards him for the number of guns and recruits he commands, not the number of votes he can muster. If he had chosen to enter the government, he would have been rendered irrelevant by the Shi'a majority. Instead, the violence renders the government irrelevant, until they can field a stronger army -- which is what Lowry and Kristol are advocating.
Fucking eeedjit.
― Aimless (Aimless), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 14:28 (eighteen years ago)
But then he posts stuff like this and I'm all, "Dude, this isn't the Model United Nations project for your 11th grade class or your speech at the College Republicans meeting."
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 14:34 (eighteen years ago)
In a nation where just under half of the citizens believe Saddam Hussein had something to do with 9/11 -- despite the President recently publicly and repeatedly admitting there was no such connection -- we're past message control. We're into hard-wiring.
― kingfish prætor (kingfish 2.0), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 14:45 (eighteen years ago)
It is lovely that he knows something. But what he obviously doesn't know are the limits of his understanding.
When it comes to this war it is as if he is trying to make a souffle, except he doesn't have any eggs or milk to work with, but he has some nifty free samples of calf brains and corn syrup the Bush administration has been giving out, so he substitutes those in the recipe and serves up the results as souffle.
― Aimless (Aimless), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 14:46 (eighteen years ago)
― kyle (akmonday), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 14:57 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 15:01 (eighteen years ago)
We asked the President repeatedly about the issue of troop levels in Iraq. He noted that a Stryker brigade has been sent to Baghdad from Mosul and there are 147,000 troops in theater. He went on to say that anyone who is 60 years old—like himself—is a product of the Vietnam era, and “it was a mistake then to make tactical decisions out of the Oval Office.” He said he had “confidence and faith” in the military leaders, including Gen. Casey, who are on the ground and not asking for more troops.
Asked what if Gen. Casey is wrong, Bush said, “Then, I picked the wrong general.” Bush emphasized that he’s not a military expert and he’s not in Baghdad, but “I know how to ask the right questions [of the generals].” Again, he said of Casey, “If he’s wrong, I’m wrong.” He said that U.S. generals are saying “we need more troops and we need them to be Iraqis.” He continued: “Gen. Casey is a very capable man, who’s got a depth of understanding of politics [in Iraq] and his role as a military commander.”
Asked if generals might be inhibited in asking for more troops because it might be such a politically unwelcome request, Bush used a dismissive expletive for the notion. He expressed his conviction that his generals know he has what it takes—briefly showing his fluidity in Spanish—to get them the troops they need even if the politics isn’t favorable. To increase Gen. Casey’s comfort level with him, Bush said he had invited Casey and his wife to spend time with him informally.
The last paragraph is of course the entertainment value one.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 18:29 (eighteen years ago)
― Shakey Mo Collier (Shakey Mo Collier), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 18:31 (eighteen years ago)
Someone asked if Iraq would still be experiencing awful difficulties even if we had done everything right, given the state of Iraqi society. Bush said, “The politics of Iraq are going to take a while to settle out.” Bush said the Iraqi government has to convince people that a unified government is in their interest, and emphasized the importance of time—it will take “time for people to learn to trust each other.” He reminded us that Maliki has been in office since only June: “The man’s been there for three months and he’s beginning to make some tough choices.” On the social distrust, Bush said “people still believe Saddam Hussein has the possibility of coming back.” He continued, “It’s the psychology of the country that concerns me most, because he was successful in pitting people against one another.” He also said that the “criminal element” in Iraq is a problem, and that “can and will be cured when law enforcement becomes more effective.”
He appears to believe it all.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 18:46 (eighteen years ago)
Am I the only one who saw the word "Stryker" spelled slightly differently the first time?
― the dow nut industrial average dead joe mama besser (donut), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 19:08 (eighteen years ago)
oh yeah, just what we'd all wanna do, go fishin' with our loudmouth boss
― kingfish prætor (kingfish 2.0), Tuesday, 12 September 2006 21:24 (eighteen years ago)
President Bush has acceded to his father's urging and has made former Secretary of State James Baker a leading adviser on Iraq.
Administration sources said Mr. Baker, head of the congressionally mandated Iraq Study Group, has been discussing with the president recommendations on an exit strategy that could begin after the November elections. They said Mr. Baker's approach to Iraq differs sharply from that of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
The sources said Mr. Baker has maintained an extremely low profile and slips in and out of Baghdad without fanfare. They said that unlike the elder Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Baker has avoided stepping on the toes of such senior officials as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who has been wary of Mr. Baker's access to the president.
"The president has understood that he needs a trusted outsider without any personal stake in U.S. policy on Iraq," an administration source said. "Jim Baker also has a lot of clout and credibility on the Hill."
Over the past two months, Mr. Baker has been shuttling to Baghdad where he has been meeting U.S. diplomats, military commanders as well as Iraqi politicians. The sources said Mr. Baker has also been quietly meeting with leaders in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
The sources said Mr. Baker's increasing access to the president comes amid declining confidence in Mr. Rumsfeld. They said that until June 2006 Mr. Rumsfeld consistently reassured the White House and Congress that the Sunni insurgency war would diminish.
"Those who sought to join Baker and Bush came from the circle around the former president [Bush]," a source said. "But in this case, there was clear support from Republican leaders in the Senate and House."
One such Republican was Rep. Frank Wolf of Virginia. Mr. Wolf said Mr. Baker, who in 2004 was the president's envoy to win debt relief for Iraq, was serving the role of a physician solicited for a second opinion.
"What the United States needs on Iraq is some fresh ideas from people able to speak out, and no one is more qualified to do that than Jim Baker," Mr. Wolf said.
Mr. Baker's role has already resulted in quiet agreement by Congress to support the war in Iraq through 2006. On Sept. 7, the Senate agreed by a 98-0 vote to allocate an additional $63 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But Mr. Baker is not expected to simply draft recommendations. The sources said the president has been quietly using the former secretary of state to convince key Arab allies to support Washington's strategy in Iraq. They said the most important of those allies is Saudi Arabia, which has been highly skeptical of the administration's policy.
Mr. Baker has been in his post since March 2006 and was said to have urged for a clear exit strategy in 2007. At the same time, the former secretary was said to have envisioned a long-term regional and international effort to stabilize Iraq. Last week, the Pentagon reported that 145,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq, the highest level since December 2005.
"It is clear that the president will make his decision based on his own judgment," the source said. "But there are already signs that Baker has become an influence."
Lots of potential hearsay here beyond the comment from Wolf. It is interesting, though.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 16:40 (eighteen years ago)
...some people were afraid, above all in the administration. "Reaction was mixed," Wolf told me. "Initially, there was not a lot of support for the idea." Backed by congressional heavyweights, including Warner, Wolf met privately with Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, and others in the administration. His message? "If you're so confident it's going well, why are you so afraid for someone else to take a look at it?" Wolf, as the chairman of the appropriations subcommittee that funds the State Department, had clear leverage with Rice. Not surprisingly, according to an aide to Wolf, the vice president was the most resistant to the idea. But, reluctantly or not, perhaps unwilling to challenge an idea with strong support from House and Senate Republicans, Bush and Cheney signed off on the idea. "Gradually," Wolf told me, "they came to see the merit of it." In June, President Bush himself met briefly with the task force. "Iraq is a complex situation," Bush told them. "And the fact that you are all willing to lend your expertise to help chart the way forward means a lot."
The president may have had another political motive for giving his blessing to the endeavor. If--and it's a very big if--Baker can forge a consensus plan on what to do about Iraq among the bigwigs on his commission, many of them leading foreign-policy figures in the Democratic Party, then the 2008 Democratic presidential nominee--whoever he (or she) is--will have a hard time dismissing the plan. And if the GOP nominee also embraces the plan, then the Iraq war would largely be off the table as a defining issue of the 2008 race--a potentially huge advantage for Republicans.
Besides Baker, the bipartisan task force is co-chaired by former congressman Lee H. Hamilton, the Indiana Democrat and foreign-policy wise man. Working with a quartet of think tanks--the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy--Baker and Hamilton recruited a star-studded task force, evenly split between Republicans and Democrats. The Republicans include Robert M. Gates, the former CIA director; Sandra Day O'Connor, the retired Justice; Alan Simpson, the former Wyoming senator; and Edwin Meese III, attorney general under President Reagan. The Democrats are William Perry, President Clinton's secretary of defense; Charles Robb, the former Virginia senator; Leon Panetta, Clinton's chief of staff; and Vernon Jordan, the lawyer and Friend of Bill.
Since April, operating almost entirely under the radar, the task force has spawned four working groups, recruiting scores of U.S. experts on Iraq and the Middle East to look at military and security issues, Iraqi politics, reconstruction, and the regional and strategic environment surrounding the war. Among the participants in these working groups are former ambassadors and State Department officials, intelligence officers from the CIA and other parts of the U.S. intelligence community, and think-tank denizens from the RAND Corporation, the Nixon Center, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, the Middle East Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and others, along with a panel of retired military officers: three army generals, an air-force general, and an admiral.
But according to all accounts, the Iraq Study Group is Baker's show, with the assembled cast of characters there to give Baker the bipartisan, protective coloration he needs. "Jim Baker is the gatekeeper," one task-force participant told me, insisting on anonymity. "He's by far the most dynamic, and everyone else is intimidated by him." And Baker is keeping his cards very close to his chest. "He's very secretive, he keeps his distance, and he compartmentalizes everything, which is not a bad way to organize a political conspiracy," says another member of one of the working groups.
I wouldn't be surprised by any of this.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 16:43 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 16:46 (eighteen years ago)
Great Rich, you and Bill say we need more troops. Good idea — you're absolutely right. One question: where the hell are they going to come from? To get to the generally agreed upon level we need (about 250,000), we simply don't have that number right now, and we can't get them.
You and Bill seem to forget that we have an all volunteer force, and that the additional troops will have to be raised. We cannot raise an excess right now — just to get to make our numbers we have had to (1) raise the eligible enlistment age to 42, (2) lower our standards on education level (3) lower our standards on things like visible tatoos (i.e. indicators of behavior that may not be overly positive). We also have had to involuntarily hold people past their scheduled retirement or ETS dates.
The culture has also changed — there was no big rush to enlist after 9/11 as there was after WWII. All this "support the troops" rhetoric is very hollow. Young men just aren't joining up in droves.
Additionally, the type of troops we need is at issue. Right now in Iraq, we have essentially retrained artillery, air defense, and other specialties to do basic infantry missions. Not only do we not have enough troops, we don't have the right mix — we need more engineers, more transportation, and much much more military police. We are making our recruiting number, but we don't need more supply clerks. We need more warriors.
I dislike the "chickenhawk" slur, but this column of yours reflects the complete lack of reality that permeates some people who have never served in the military. Guys are on their 3rd or 4th tours in Iraq. You simply can't say "we need more troops" without reinitiating the draft. That will never happen.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 17:00 (eighteen years ago)
and this sounds like wishful thinking:
And if the GOP nominee also embraces the plan, then the Iraq war would largely be off the table as a defining issue of the 2008 race--a potentially huge advantage for Republicans.
there's no way it'll be "off the table." arguments about short-term strategy might be somewhat ameliorated -- which could work in the democrats' favor too -- but the big picture questions about wtf we were doing in there to start with and overall foreign-policy vision will still be completely front and center.
― gypsy mothra (gypsy mothra), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 17:08 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 17:13 (eighteen years ago)
― Danny Aioli (Rock Hardy), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 17:26 (eighteen years ago)
On Sept. 7, the Senate agreed by a 98-0 vote to allocate an additional $63 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yes. The GOP was right: the Democrats don't care about troops and are in collusion with the enemy.
My God: Lee H. Hamilton, William Perry, Vernon Jordan, Panetta, Gates...and Meese! – all mandarins and hacks.
― Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 17:35 (eighteen years ago)
Well of course, voting with the GOP like that and all.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 17:45 (eighteen years ago)
Which statement is a damning indictment of Bush's Iraq policy.
If this war were genuinely central to the suppression of anti-USA terrorism and the US public clearly understood this, then the draft would be more than politically feasible; it would be a done deal in 48 hours. Americans know this war was Bush's choice and an adventure he could have avoided, and I have been amazed at their patience with it so far.
― Aimless (Aimless), Wednesday, 13 September 2006 18:05 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 15 September 2006 02:54 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 15 September 2006 05:31 (eighteen years ago)
We're on the verge of losing the war in Iraq, and no amount of spin can change the outcome. Yet the administration continues to balk at doing the one thing that could make a difference: namely, putting more U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq to bring a measure of order and security to a nation incurring some 3,000 civilian casualties each month.
It is long past time to quit arguing whether we should have gone into Iraq. And the president should stop trying to win that argument -- most people have made up their minds and can't be persuaded to change them. He would be better off trying to marshal support for increasing troop strength. More American troops in Iraq might mean more American casualties. But we cannot fight wars if we are unwilling to assume the risk of American deaths. The men and women who bravely serve this country understand the sacrifices that may be required of them. What is inexcusable is asking Americans to give their lives for nothing. If Iraq continues to spiral downward into civil war and we leave a country that is worse off than when we entered it, we will have dishonored the more than 2,600 Americans who have already shed their blood in battle. We cannot afford to lose the war in Iraq, and we don't have much time to turn things around. If Baghdad cannot be secured, there is little chance for the rest of Iraq. With an election just around the corner, the president has some tough choices. He can concentrate on winning the battle for Congress, which means more speeches defending his policies and those who supported them. Or he can do what is necessary to win the war, which means sending more troops to Iraq. History will not be kind if he chooses the former.
Meanwhile, over in the New York Times, a striking op-ed from a former Marine officer who served two tours of duty in Iraq:
APPROACHING the city of Karbala last year for a meeting with a local Iraqi Army commander, my convoy of four Army Humvees came across hundreds of bearded men in green camouflage uniforms lining the road. They were directing traffic and searching vehicles for bombs — good things — and they waved us through, just as Iraqi security forces should.
But we don’t issue green uniforms to Iraqi troops.
After the meeting, I sent an e-mail message to my headquarters in Baghdad, asking whether an entire Iraqi battalion, usually 700 to 1,000 soldiers, had been newly authorized for this relatively peaceful province.
Of course, it hadn’t. This was another new militia. And even though the militia had already been approved by Iraqi officials, and recruited, outfitted and deployed in daily operations, no senior American commander in Baghdad knew about it.
Still, it wasn’t hard to explain how this could happen in Karbala, a major city just two hours from Baghdad. There were hardly any Americans there.
So, what should we do? The obvious prescription to stop the rising violence is more troops, but the wrong kinds of soldiers and tactics only alienate the Iraqi people, strengthening the insurgency. On top of that, the Army and Marine Corps don’t have any extra troops to send. President Bush recently sent more American forces back into Baghdad, another place where militias took over after United States troops were withdrawn too quickly. But they too have to come from somewhere, and in turn we should expect those areas to become more violent.
This makes it all the more important to use the troops we have as effectively as possible.
We need more military advisers, including both Special Forces teams and specially trained conventional units. Our precious few Special Forces troops must focus on mentoring Iraqi troops, rather than on the more exciting diversion of unilateral raids. Some of our best Special Forces units were devoted to hunting down the Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, but violence has only increased in the three months since his death. Had that same manpower and money been devoted to training Iraqi troops and stemming the growth of militias, we would have another Iraqi battalion or two ready to take our places.
Yet despite the success of advisers, the Army and Marine Corps still have a habit of sending their least capable troops to fill these positions. Many teams have trouble getting essential supplies like weapons and ammunition, even as the Army finds the resources to man speed traps on its ever-growing bases. Only 1 in 30 Americans deployed to Iraq serves as an embedded adviser. We can’t win this war from the Burger Kings and rec centers of our largest bases, nor can we afford the thousands of non-combat troops needed to support them.
Iraq’s militia problems are likely to get worse before they get better, and only a legitimate Iraqi government can rid the country of them completely. But we must be sure we are fighting the war we say we are. Both problems with our current strategy — not waiting for Iraqi forces to be ready, and consolidating our bases at the expense of classic counterinsurgency tactics like small adviser teams — emanate from the overriding concern for bringing the troops home.
Pushing for withdrawal timelines is not helping the struggle in Iraq; encouraging the military to better fight the insurgency will. After all, winning the war would be the best reason to leave.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 15 September 2006 14:51 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 15 September 2006 15:38 (eighteen years ago)
― Squirrel_Police (Squirrel_Police), Friday, 15 September 2006 17:32 (eighteen years ago)
Finally, the official said that early in the week, Bush will meet with the president of El Salvador, a country that 20 years ago was torn by violence and insurgency. "Flash forward to the last ten or fifteen years," the official said, "and you've had a very successful democratic country where people who were former combatants have managed to re-integrate into a very successful society." Any comparisons to any countries currently torn by violence and insurgency are completely intentional.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 15 September 2006 17:42 (eighteen years ago)
I would not bet more than a nickel on that, personally.
― Danny Aioli (Rock Hardy), Friday, 15 September 2006 17:45 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 00:10 (eighteen years ago)
Filkins, one of the longest-lasting and most-honored reporters in Iraq, said that many situations lately have become even too dangerous for Iraqi reporters to report on. He described the current climate as "anarchy," and, when asked if the country was already involved in a civil war, he said, "Yeah, sure."
Asked what advice he had for a reporter from a small paper going to Iraq now without the kinds of money and backup that the Times was able to afford him (or previous reporting experience in Iraq), Filkins replied: "Don't go."
As a result, the paper increasingly relies on its 70 Iraqi staffers to go out into the streets and do the actual reporting. These Iraqi journalists, both Sunni and Shiite, do "everything" according to Filkins, and are paid handsomely (by local standards) for their efforts. But they live in constant fear of their association with the newspaper being exposed, which could cost them their lives.
"Most of the Iraqis who work for us don't even tell their families that they work for us," said Filkins. "It's terribly terribly dangerous for them."
According to Filkins, the New York Times is burning through money "like jet fuel" simply to securely maintain its operations in the country. In addition to the 70 local reporters and translators, the Times employs 45 full-time Kalashnikov-toting security guards to patrol its two blast-wall-enclosed houses -- and oversee belt-fed machine-guns on the roofs of the buildings. The paper also has three armored cars, and pays a hefty premium each month to insure the five Times reporters working there.
American journalists, he said, spend their days piecing together scraps of information from the Iraqi reporters to construct a picture, albeit incomplete, of what life is like these days in the war-torn country. But he says that the work is slow and difficult, and it is hard in such an atmosphere for reporters to nail down specifics. "Five people doing a run-of-the-mill story takes forever," he said.
Most troubling was Filkins' assessment that the U.S. military may not know much more than the Times does about what life is like on the ground in Iraq. Soldiers barely leave their bases and they don't interact very much with average Iraqis, he said, so it is hard to say who, if anyone, has an accurate picture of the current situation.
"Everyone is kind of groping around in the dark," he said.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 15:12 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 15:24 (eighteen years ago)
Pro-war bloggers have a habit of ignoring the bad news, in the same way that anti-war bloggers ignore the good news. I'll be the first to admit guilt in that courtroom. But that's the wrong path.
We simply must acknowledge our military defeats. We must learn from them, adjust, and rededicate ourselves to accomplishing the mission and winning the war. The news that 62 innocent Iraqis were tortured and beheaded isn't reason to despair or give up hope, it's a call to arms a reminder of the pure evil of that we are fighting. It reaffirms our belief that we are the good guys, they are the bad guys, and that good guys killing bad guys is one of the few cosmic rights in this universe.
Guys like Mike Yon understand that. In an email earlier today, he wrote:
We are going to lose that war if we do not make radical changes. We are not seriously trying to win it.
Yon's got what I call focused pessimissm. When he writes that the ground sit in Iraq or Afghanistan is taking a dive, it's out of a true, apolitical desire to win the war. He understands that selling blood, toil, tears, and sweat didn't go out of style in the mid-40s. People, Americans especially, respond to challenges. This war is a challenge, and it's time we start responding to it.
Half of any fight is how you pull yourself up after you've taken one on the chin. If we can't stand back up, then we stay on the mat. And we lose the war.
It's such poor locker room talk in the end, the more contemptible precisely because it's trying hard to be serious without admitting deeper-seated problems. (Trying to say there's learning from mistakes going on when that self-righteous clod up top won't ever admit it unless cornered is going to be the key stumbling block for this crowd from here until 2009.) Add to that some of the amazing callousness of the comments and it's all so sweetly obvious and useless.
(Mentioning Yon (site temporarily down, it seems) is an interesting case because he was v. much the darling of a lot of the pro-war types for a while with his admittedly detailed, in-depth/embedded reporting in Iraq. But now that he's expressing a slew of doubt and concerns (in these instances about Afghanistan), note how some blame him for not sticking to the script.)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 15:49 (eighteen years ago)
As a frequent guest on Tim Russert's show, Kate also shows a talent for projecting unmitigated smugness.
― Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Saturday, 16 September 2006 16:43 (eighteen years ago)
The story I realize is officially in tomorrow's paper, but is on the site now. I haven't seen where it's being linked from but it's already in the top-five-viewed for the world/politics section, apparently, and that will only spike further. The more I think about it, the more I'm curious to see what either her response or her husband's, if he says anything, is -- a couple of comments in the story are anonymous but there's a slew of on the record stuff and it's not pretty. What's he going to do, say they're all lying?
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 16:51 (eighteen years ago)
― Michael Daddino (epicharmus), Saturday, 16 September 2006 16:57 (eighteen years ago)
― Michael Daddino (epicharmus), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:00 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:01 (eighteen years ago)
Four months after Iraq's new government took office, U.S. officials are growing impatient with leaders in Baghdad and pushing them to move more quickly on the difficult agenda confronting them.
The top U.S. goal in Iraq is to help the regime led by Prime Minister Nouri Maliki to suppress sectarian violence, strengthen the fragile government and economy and move toward national reconciliation, senior officials say. One of those officials, in a recent interview, praised goals Maliki had set in several of those areas, but suggested more could be done.
"The rhetoric has to be matched by concrete action," said the official, who asked to remain unidentified, citing the sensitivity of the subject. The Iraqi government "needs to begin acting, on the ground, on its own behalf."
So contemptible, but it's just growing more obvious. "How come these bastards aren't doing what we told them too!" The 'to hell with them hawks' are in the ascendant and it'll just get bitterer.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:10 (eighteen years ago)
― Michael Daddino (epicharmus), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:11 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:13 (eighteen years ago)
American government officials and their Iraqi counterparts have been frustrated by the reluctance of other countries to help what they see as the weak government of a troubled land.
The first U.S. official said that neighbors "have been very slow to move" to give political support, direct aid or even debt forgiveness. "That needs to change," he said.
You can almost sense the arrogance dripping off that, that idea of 'we say so therefore everyone must follow.' I wonder who this tool is?
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:16 (eighteen years ago)
Thanks for posting the WPost article, Ned. I'm feeling queasy now.
The man selected to oversee the rehabilitation of the Iraqi health care system James K. Haveman "viewed Iraq as Michigan after a huge attack," said George Guszcza, an Army captain who worked on the CPA's health team. "Somehow if you went into the ghettos and projects of Michigan and just extended it out for the entire state --that's what he was coming to save.
Then, of course, Bernard Kerik's exit -- like the fall of Saigon:
Three months after he arrived, Kerik attended a meeting of local police chiefs in Baghdad's Convention Center. When it was his turn to address the group, he stood and bid everyone farewell. Although he had informed Bremer of his decision a few days earlier, Kerik hadn't told most of the people who worked for him. He flew out of Iraq a few hours later.
"I was in my own world," he said later. "I did my own thing."
― Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:27 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:29 (eighteen years ago)
Shiite militiamen and criminals entrenched throughout Iraq’s police and internal security forces are resisting recent efforts by some Iraqi leaders and the American military to root them out and help win the trust of skeptical Sunni Arabs, Iraqi and Western officials say.
The new interior minister, Jawad al-Bolani, who oversees the police, lacks the political support to purge many of the worst offenders, including senior managers who tolerated or encouraged the infiltration of Shiite militias into the police under the previous government, according to interviews with more than a dozen officials who work with the ministry and the police.
The Interior Ministry recently discovered that more than 1,200 policemen and other employees had been convicted years ago of murder, rape and other violent crimes, said a Western diplomat who has close contact with the ministry. Some were even on death row. Few have been fired.
Despite the importance American commanders place on hiring more Sunni Arabs for the overwhelmingly Shiite police force, the ministry still has no way to screen recruits by sect or for militia allegiance. Such loyalties are the root cause of the ministry’s problems.
A senior American commander said that of the 27 paramilitary police battalions, “we think 5 or 6 battalions probably have leaders that have led that part of the organization in a way that is either criminal or sectarian or both.” Death squads in uniforms could be responsible for the recent surge in sectarian violence, with at least 165 bodies found across Baghdad since Wednesday.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:35 (eighteen years ago)
I presume his response will be crafted to protect the GOP's reputation among those who do not read the NYT article, whose numbers shall far exceed those who do read it. SOP.
― Aimless (Aimless), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:49 (eighteen years ago)
― Aimless (Aimless), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:52 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 17:52 (eighteen years ago)
Iraq has one of the world's largest oil reserves, but the Iraqi army can't get enough fuel for its tanks. It also can't get spare parts for its trucks or supply ammunition on its own.
While the U.S. training program has made great progress teaching Iraqi soldiers how to fight, the force still relies on American help for distributing supplies — a dependency that is another obstacle to sending U.S. troops home.
"Just because you stand up all the fighters, all the combat arms organizations, they're not self-sustaining until they have some form of a logistics system," said Brig. Gen. Rebecca Halstead, commander of the 3rd Corps Support Command. "It's not there yet."
As U.S. commanders worked the past three years to build Iraqi security forces, priority went to forming combat units capable of fighting Sunni Arab insurgents.
The task of maintaining those troops was left to U.S.-led coalition forces — who got Iraqis to their missions, gave them ammunition, fed them and, in many cases, even gave them their pay.
Even in areas where Iraqis have taken over security duties, they need help getting supplies from central and regional storage facilities. In volatile Anbar province, a hot bed of insurgents, it has been especially challenging for the Iraqis to keep troops supplied with food and water.
So there is now an emphasis on building an effective Iraqi logistics operation.
Of the roughly 120,000 Iraqi soldiers, about 10 percent to 15 percent are involved in supply-related activities, said Maj. Gerald Ostlund, a coalition spokesman.
By contrast, for every combat soldier in American and other foreign contingents, there are three performing support or logistics roles, U.S. officials say.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 18:07 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 19:39 (eighteen years ago)
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/homepage/hp9-16-06a.jpg
U.S. troops relax in the Green Zone, a walled-off enclave where many CPA workers spent their days. (AP)
I don't begrudge these dudes trying to chill, but I can see how the hacks and dorks working under Bremer thought everything was peachy keen if this is all they saw all day.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 16 September 2006 19:44 (eighteen years ago)
Baker and panel members have been exploring different ideas, such as a greater degree of regional autonomy for Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite regions. But those familiar with the group's work said there is far from a consensus yet on what to do. One well-placed source said panel members came away from their trip sobered, with "a sense that we can't continue to do what we have been doing," adding that Baker was not simply looking to protect the administration.
"I think he basically wants to call it the way he sees it," said this source, a critic of the administration's approach to Iraq. "He's also been frustrated by the mistakes that have been made. In many ways, it has damaged the legacy he established as secretary of state."
The administration's more hawkish supporters, meanwhile, are nervous about Baker's involvement, counting him as one of the "realist" foreign policy proponents they see as having allowed threats against the United States to grow in the '80s and '90s. Gary J. Schmitt of the American Enterprise Institute voiced concern that the Iraq group was not listening to those advocating a more muscular military strategy to defeat the insurgency.
But Schmitt added: "People can worry about what Baker is going to say, but the president has a way of doing what he is going to do. There could be a lot of wishful thinking on the part of the older Bush crowd that the son got into trouble and now he's going to listen to Baker the strategist."
Bitter? Oh, a tad...
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Sunday, 17 September 2006 05:25 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Sunday, 17 September 2006 13:12 (eighteen years ago)
If I were a GOP candidate this year, I would not call the president an idiot (he isn't). But I would spend the next 50 days of the campaign telling conservatives and liberals alike that even though I voted for this war once and this president twice, time has proved that Bush and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld were wrong to think that the nation could win Iraq on the cheap. I would also look them in the eye and say that our president was wrong to believe that the United States could fight a war, cut taxes and increase federal spending, all at once. I would castigate my president for claiming to support homeland security while allowing our borders to remain wide open.
I suspect that voters of all persuasions would like that message. Independence is almost always rewarded at the polls. I learned this by accident while running for Congress in 1994, when the local, state and national Republican machines worked overtime to elect my opponent in the primary. I was considered too young, too inexperienced and too conservative.
― Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Sunday, 17 September 2006 13:46 (eighteen years ago)
Sunnis are opposed to autonomous regions because oil wealth is in the other areas. Would it be possible for them to develop the economy of their region in other ways and within a time frame that would make federalism a reasonable solution?
If the United States supports autonomous regions would that make them a target of Sadr? The article suggests that Sadr's opposition to autonomous regions is political. I wonder if that's the only reason.
― youn (youn), Sunday, 17 September 2006 19:50 (eighteen years ago)
Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s front-pager in yesterday’s Washington Post, about how Jim O’Beirne allegedly hired Bush loyalists over experts to staff the Iraqi occupation, was a hit piece, pure and simple: thinly sourced, fantastic in parts, and propagandistic. Note, for instance, the photo accompanying the story. It shows two “U.S. troops” relaxing in a swimming pool in the Green Zone, where, according to the caption, “many Coalition Provisional Authority officials spent their days.” (In the pool?) This has nothing at all to do with Chandrasekaran’s thesis—O’Beirne, even on the reporter’s account, was in charge of political appointees, not the R&R of troops. But the implication is clear: O’Beirne was sending these political appointees to cushy jobs in Iraq. The article is excerpted from a book titled Imperial Life in the Emerald City.
http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MGFlNGY3NDU0ZWI5YTQzMzJiMTEyMzY3MDIyMzZmNWY=
― Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Monday, 18 September 2006 14:39 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Monday, 18 September 2006 14:41 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Monday, 18 September 2006 14:44 (eighteen years ago)
In a sober assessment, Abizaid, who has overseen the U.S. military strategy in Iraq since July 2003, said he had hoped six months ago for the withdrawal of several thousand U.S. troops from Iraq by now. "We clearly did not achieve the force levels that we had hoped to," he said, citing sectarian unrest, ongoing weaknesses in the capabilities of Iraqi security forces -- in particular the police -- and the five-month political void in the country after the December 2005 national elections.
Asked point-blank whether the United States is winning in Iraq, Abizaid replied: "Given unlimited time and unlimited support, we're winning the war."
Inspiring.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 20 September 2006 05:12 (eighteen years ago)
Goldberg's own judgment: "America could use a lot more Jim O'Beirnes." Ew?
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 20 September 2006 14:15 (eighteen years ago)
But then there's this: while Simone was serving her country, in that same dangerous place, by doing such scut work as making sure officials there got paid, Chandrasekaran was given the awesome responsibility of shaping world opinion against the war. Goodbye.
― Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Wednesday, 20 September 2006 14:25 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 20 September 2006 14:33 (eighteen years ago)
Coyne is still in the Army Reserve and wants to go on at least one more deployment. But she is pessimistic about the military's ability to handle nation-building missions such as the one it faces in Iraq. She likens it to a person who can't swim diving into the water to try to save a drowning man, but instead being able only to stand on the poor man's shoulders.
Even so, she said she thinks the U.S. military probably needs to stay in Iraq: "The troops are resented, but they also may be the last bulwark against a total meltdown."
Baker's Iraq study group talks to the press. An utter fiasco -- read the whole thing, but this part especially:
The only thing the two would say yesterday is that they had met with lots of people, including several Iraqis on a 3 1/2 -day visit to Iraq recently.
"How much were you able to leave the Green Zone while you were in Baghdad?" a woman in the audience asked.
Baker admitted that only one of the 10 members, former senator Charles Robb (D-Va.), left the capital's heavily fortified enclave to see the violence-torn land. "It was recommended to us that it would probably be something that we ought not to do but they were willing for us to do it if we insisted," reasoned Baker. "We didn't insist because we didn't want somebody to write a story that we were cowboyin' down there in Iraq."
And besides, cowboy Hamilton added, "we had a very brief period in Iraq."
Hmm.
More thoughts on the troop numbers:
The Army has been aiming to reorganize its combat forces in such a way as to increase the number of brigades available for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, but thus far it is six brigades short of its goal of 42. That is one reason why the Army was forced in 2004-05 to use more National Guard combat units in Iraq than normal; at one point there were seven Guard combat brigades there, compared with just one now.
But even now, active-duty Army brigades are cycling in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan at a faster pace than the goal of one year deployed for every two years at home. That puts a great deal of stress on the soldiers and their families.
"I don't know how long" that can go on, a senior defense official said in an interview this week. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the problem, which is being discussed behind closed doors.
The official likened the earlier troop-reduction plan for Iraq to the situation facing a soldier traveling down a road with a map that does not match the terrain he's seeing: The soldier has to deal with the terrain as it actually exists.
But hey, you go to war with the army you have and all. Yup.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 20 September 2006 14:52 (eighteen years ago)
― Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Wednesday, 20 September 2006 15:01 (eighteen years ago)
The U.S. Army's top officer withheld a required 2008 budget plan from Pentagon leaders last month after protesting to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that the service could not maintain its current level of activity in Iraq plus its other global commitments without billions in additional funding.
The decision by Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army's chief of staff, is believed to be unprecedented and signals a widespread belief within the Army that in the absence of significant troop withdrawals from Iraq, funding assumptions must be completely reworked, current and former Pentagon officials said.
"This is unusual, but hell, we're in unusual times," said a senior Pentagon official involved in the budget discussions.
Schoomaker failed to submit the budget plan by an Aug. 15 deadline. The protest followed a series of cuts in the service's funding requests by both the White House and Congress over the last four months.
According to a senior Army official involved in budget talks, Schoomaker is now seeking $138.8 billion in 2008, or nearly $25 billion above budget limits originally set by Rumsfeld. The Army's budget this year is $98.2 billion, making Schoomaker's request a 41% increase over current levels.
"It's incredibly huge," said the Army official, who, like others, spoke on condition of anonymity when commenting on internal deliberations. "These are just incredible numbers."
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Monday, 25 September 2006 04:42 (eighteen years ago)
She was talking about her husband, the soldier who died in a far-off war zone. Tears rolled down her face as she mentioned two children left fatherless. His eyes welled up, too. He hugged her, held her face, kissed her cheek. "I am so sorry for your loss," he kept repeating.
So nice that he feels others' pain too.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Monday, 25 September 2006 04:50 (eighteen years ago)
Bush is more open with confidants about his aggravation over events in Iraq. "He's unbelievably candid in person," said another person close to the president. "Of course it frustrates him. You can't not be frustrated by four car bombs a day and that sort of thing. But I think he's confident it's going to work out. I think he also thinks there's not much of an alternative."
Mmf.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Monday, 25 September 2006 04:55 (eighteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 27 September 2006 03:56 (eighteen years ago)
Yet, the US public has apparently ignored this fact despite its being thrust at them repeatedly, each time a new batch of ex-generals issues a statement (there must be over fifty ex-generals by now). It's just baffling to me that this gets so little attention. This is the equivalent of the military screaming in pain at Rumsfeld's strategic incompetance.
― Aimless (Aimless), Wednesday, 27 September 2006 14:25 (eighteen years ago)
So the month ends with a total curfew in Baghdad (or so it is claimed), while Woodward's book is imminent. The Washington Post's featured selection is up.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 30 September 2006 12:59 (eighteen years ago)
This March, Abizaid was in Washington to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He painted a careful but upbeat picture of the situation in Iraq.
Afterward, he went over to see Rep. John P. Murtha in the Rayburn House Office Building. Murtha, a Pennsylvania Democrat, had introduced a resolution in Congress calling for American troops in Iraq to be "redeployed" -- the military term for returning troops overseas to their home bases -- "at the earliest practicable date."
"The war in Iraq is not going as advertised," Murtha had said. "It is a flawed policy wrapped in illusion."
Now, sitting at the round dark-wood table in the congressman's office, Abizaid, the one uniformed military commander who had been intimately involved in Iraq from the beginning and who was still at it, indicated he wanted to speak frankly. According to Murtha, Abizaid raised his hand for emphasis, held his thumb and forefinger a quarter of an inch from each other and said, "We're that far apart."
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 30 September 2006 13:02 (eighteen years ago)
― jergins (jergins), Saturday, 30 September 2006 18:22 (eighteen years ago)