It's January 2007 in Iraq

The 'Surge Strategy': Political Arguments and Military Realities

By George Friedman

U.S. President George W. Bush is preparing a new strategy for Iraq. According to reports being leaked to the media, the primary option being considered is a "surge strategy," in which U.S. troop levels in Iraq would be increased, particularly in the Baghdad region. The numbers of additional troops that would deploy -- or that would not be rotated home -- are unclear, but appear to be in the low tens of thousands. This "surge" strategy is interesting in that it runs counter to general expectations after the midterm elections in November, when it appeared that the president was tied to a phased withdrawal plan. Instead, Bush seems to have decided to attempt to break out of the military gridlock in which the United States finds itself. Therefore, the questions now are why the president is considering this strategy and whether it will work.

As we have discussed previously, the United States appears to have four strategic options in Iraq:

1. Massively increase the number of troops in Iraq, attempting to break the back of both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias and create room for a political settlement.

2. Begin a withdrawal process that allows the Iraqis to shape the politics of the country as they will -- and that leaves a huge opportunity for Iran to fill the vacuum.

3. Abandon attempts to provide security for Iraq but retain forces there, in a redeployed posture, with the goal of blocking any potential Iranian moves toward the Arabian Peninsula.

4. Attempt to reach a political accommodation with Tehran that concedes Iraq to the Iranian sphere of influence, in order to provide guarantees against Iranian expansion southward. This diplomatic option is compatible with all others.

Each of these options has strengths and weakness. The first option, the surge, rests on the assumption that the United States has enough troops available to make a difference on the ground in Iraq; it also would decrease the strategic reserve for dealing with other crises around the world. The phased withdrawal option eliminates the need for Iraqi Shia and Iran to engage in political discussion -- since, given time, U.S. forces would depart from Iraq and the Shia would be the dominant force. The blocking strategy puts the United States in the position of protecting Saudi Arabia (a Sunni kingdom that doesn't want to appear to be seeking such protection) against Iran -- a Shiite state that could, in that situation, choose the time and place for initiating conflict. In other words, this option would put U.S. forces on a strategic defensive in hostile areas. The fourth option, diplomacy, assumes some basis for a U.S.-Iranian understanding and a mechanism for enforcing agreements. In short, there are no good choices -- only a series of bad ones. But, for the United States, doing nothing is also a choice, and the current posture is untenable.

The president appears to have chosen a variation on the troop surge. But it is a variation with an important difference. He has not proposed a surge that would increase the number of troops in Iraq by an order of magnitude. Indeed, he cannot propose that, inasmuch as he does not have several hundred thousand troops standing by -- and to the extent that forces are standing by, he cannot afford to strip the strategic reserve completely. It is a big world, and other crises can emerge suddenly. The surge the president is proposing appears to be on the order of around 10,000 troops -- and certainly no more than 20,000. Even at the upper limit, that is not so much a surge as a modest increase. It is, however, the best that can be done under the circumstances.

The Political Logic

The president's logic appears to be as follows:

While it is impossible to double the size of the force in Iraq -- for reasons of manpower, logistics and politics -- it is possible to massively increase the force available in the key area of Iraq: Baghdad. If this increase were to include a reshuffling of forces already in-country in a way that would double the number deployed to Baghdad, it might be possible to achieve a strategic victory there, thus setting the stage for a political settlement that would favor American interests.

Behind this thinking is a psychological assumption. Over the past year, it has become conventional wisdom that the U.S. strategy in Iraq has failed and that it is simply a matter of time until U.S. forces withdraw. Under these circumstances, the United States has been marginalized in Iraq. No one expects Washington to be able to threaten the interests of various parties, and no one expects meaningful American guarantees. The Iraqis do not see the United States as being a long-term player in Iraq, or as relevant to the current political crisis there. Iran, Iraq's powerful Shiite neighbor, seems much more relevant and important. But the Sunnis, not viewing the Americans as a long-term factor in Iraq, cannot turn to the United States for protection even if they fear the Iranians and the Iraqi Shia. The conventional wisdom is that the United States has failed, knows it has failed and is out of options.

Unless the Americans are prepared to simply walk away, the assumptions of the players in and around Iraq must change. From Bush's standpoint, the United States must demonstrate that it does have options, and that the president's hands are not tied politically in Washington. If he can demonstrate that he can still shape U.S. policy, that the United States has the ability to increase forces in Iraq -- confounding expectations -- and that it can achieve victories, at least on the local level, the psychology in Iraq and Iran will change and the United States will at least be able to participate in shaping Iraq's political future instead of being simply a bystander. If the president can increase the forces in Iraq and not be blocked by the Democrats, then the assumption that the Republicans' political defeat in November cripples Bush's power on the larger stage would be dispelled. Therefore, surge the forces.

The Military Perspective

The plan has come under sharp attack, however -- particularly from the Army and apparently from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The plan is primarily political in nature: It would use U.S. forces as a lever to achieve a psychological shift and create a particular political environment. Viewed from a strictly military standpoint, however, it makes no sense. Now, war is about politics, but from the Joint Chiefs' standpoint, the military weakness of the plan obviates potential political benefits. The generals appear to have made the following criticisms:

The size of the surge cannot achieve any meaningful military result. Even a surge of hundreds of thousands of troops would not guarantee success in a counterinsurgency operation. This surge is too little, too late.

The United States already has surged forces into Baghdad, and the operation was regarded as a failure. Counterinsurgency operations in an urban setting are difficult, and the Americans are dealing with multiple Shiite militias, Sunni insurgents, criminal groups and hostile neighborhoods in the capital. Achieving military success here is unlikely, and the strategy would lead to casualties without victory.

Surging fresh troops into Baghdad would create major command-and-control problems. The entire structure of areas of responsibility, intelligence distribution and tasking, chains of command and so on would have to be shifted in a very short period of time for the president's strategy to work. Transitioning new troops -- who are not familiar with the area for which they would be responsible -- into a counterinsurgency operation in a city of about 5 million would create endless opportunities for confusion, fratricide and failure. A "surge" connotes "fast," and this transition should not be undertaken quickly.

The U.S. Army in particular is stretched to the limit. Failure to massively increase the size of the Army has meant that the force that existed in 2003 has had to carry the load of this war through multiple deployments. The president's strategy necessarily would increase the duration of several deployments for Army and Marine forces. Between concerns about morale and retention, maintaining equipment in the theater and simple effectiveness after long periods of deployment, the United States is at the limits of what it can do. Surging forces in an operation that is unlikely to succeed creates failure throughout the military system. No increase in U.S. forces generally, if committed to now, would impact the system for months or even years.

There is little or no reserve available in practical terms. A 10-division military force, deployed the way it is, means that five divisions are in Iraq at any given time, and the other five are either recovering or preparing to go there. The United States is already vulnerable should other crises crop up in the world, and a surge into Iraq now would simply exacerbate that condition.

What we have here, therefore, is a divergence between political reality and military reality.

The Upshot

Politically, the Americans cannot leave Iraq unless Washington is prepared to allow Iran to assume dominance in Iraq and the region. That is politically unacceptable. A redeployment under the current circumstances would create a hostage force in Iraq, rather than a powerful regional strike force. The United States must redefine the politics of the region before it can redeploy. To do this, it must use the forces available in one last try -- regardless of the condition of the forces or even the improbability of success -- to shift the psychology of the other players. Too much is at stake not to take the risk.

Militarily, even a temporary success in Baghdad is doubtful -- and if it can be achieved, the gains would be temporary. They also would come at substantial cost to the force structure and the American strategic posture. Any political success in Iraq would be vitiated by the military cost. Indeed, the Iraqis and Iranians have a sophisticated understanding of U.S. military capability and will understand that the Americans cannot sustain a "surged" posture (and likely would pursue their own strategies on the basis of that understanding). Thus, the U.S. operation at best would lead to a transitory military improvement; at worst, it would inflict substantial casualties on U.S. forces while actually weakening the U.S. military position overall.

If the military argument wins, then the United States must select from options two through four. Politically, this means that Iraq would become a Shiite state under the heavy influence of Iran. If the political argument wins, it means the United States will continue with military operations that are unlikely to achieve their desired ends. Neither option is palatable. The president now must choose between them.

He appears to have chosen a high-risk military operation in hopes of retrieving the United States' political position. Given what has been risked, this is not an irrational point of view, even if it is a tough position to take. It is possible that the surge would lead to perceptions that the United States is an unpredictable player that retains unexpected options, and that discounting it prematurely is unwise. The strategy could bring some Shia to the table as a hedge, or perhaps even lead to a political solution in Iraq. Even if the probability of this happening is low, the cost is bearable -- and given what has already been invested, from Bush's standpoint, it is a necessary move.

Of course, the problem every gambler has when he is losing is the fear that if he leaves the table, he will lose his chance at recouping his losses. Every gambler, when he is down, faces the temptation of taking his dwindling chips and trying to recoup. He figures that it's worth the risk. And it could be. He could get lucky. But more frequently, he compounds his earlier losses by losing the money for his cab ride home.

We can divine the president's reasoning. Nothing succeeds like success and, indeed, he might pull the winning card. If the strategy fails, the United States will have added to its military weakness somewhat, but not catastrophically. But the question is this: Will the president be in a position to get up from the table if this surge fails, or will he keep pulling chips out of his pocket in the hope that he can recoup?

That is the question this strategy does not answer.

The administration also intends to nominate Navy Adm. William J. Fallon to head the Central Command, replacing Gen. John P. Abizaid as the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East. Some military officials consider Fallon an unusual choice, because he is a naval officer in charge of the Pacific Command with limited experience in the Middle East and would be in charge of two ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

...

The U.S. military is increasingly resigned to the probability that Bush will deploy a relatively small number of additional troops -- between one and five brigades -- in part because he has few other dramatic options available to signal U.S. determination in Iraq, officials said. But the Joint Chiefs have not given up making the case that the potential dangers outweigh the benefits for several reasons, officials said.

There are already signs that a limited U.S. escalation, even when complemented by new political and economic steps, may not satisfy either supporters or critics of a surge. Pentagon officials and military experts say far more troops are needed to make a real difference, but the United States would have to remobilize reserves, extend current tours of duty and accelerate planned deployments just to come up with 20,000 troops, U.S. officials say. And such a surge would strap the military for other potential crises, they add.

Etc. Oh, and how cute this is:

As many as 50,000 Iraqis may be fleeing their homes each month in a bid to escape the violence that's tearing the country apart. But less than one percent would be welcome in the United States under its current quota system.

...

The NYT reporters say the U.S. administration has only recently realised how dangerous Baghdad is for local employees. Iraqis' lives are endangered by association with the superpower, but they are given the cold shoulder when they try to escape rising violence.

An interpreter named only as Amar in the newspaper report, who's missing a finger, an eye and part of his skull after a bomb attack, says he hasn't found any sympathy for his asylum bid. "They said they have nothing for Iraqis... We feel just like stupid trash."

the right wing response to this so far has been really hilarious. anyways, keep posting good stuff from crazies land, i can't get enough of it.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6237607.stm

http://apnews.myway.com/article/20070108/D8MH66Q00.html

Now ask yourself, as all of them are asking themselves, why is this so? For what? For whom? When and where will it end?

Now remember: they can't end this. But we can. Add your pebble to the pile. Email your representative. It won't take many words to say what needs to be said.

your suggestion seemed like a good idea to me, so i went ahead and wrote mine, voiced my objection and asked him to not vote for any potential troop surge.

on his house website, he writes that the iraqis are now in control of their country with saddam gone, and that our elimination of the terrorists in iraq is crucial to our freedom. so i also did my best to correct him on both of these claims.

how likely is a house rep to actually read a letter from a constituent, anyway?

But we'll see.

- You are a constituent. That means you vote in his district. Right there you have gained a lot of traction, since most correspondence to a rep's office is from non-constituents. They do listen to voters in their district.

- You used your own words. That counts for a lot. A huge amount of correspondence is generated by cheap, bulk methods (e.g. "sign this web petition", "forward this pre-written email", "mail this pre-written postcard"). When someone takes the time to really write, it stands out.

- You took the time to address the rep's own stated position and used a reasoned approach. The importance of this is not that you will reason the rep out of his stated position by the astounding force of your intellect, but that you are a well-spoken voter at large in his district who could influence other people who vote.

If your letter is exceptionally persuasive and well-written, the staff member probably will hand it to his rep and urge him to read it, but that is a rare scenario. More likely, the staff member will just weight your letter fairly heavily when reporting the sentiment of the voters.

If someone would be so giving as to c&p this shit onto here, i'd be grateful.

Turns out the gamer guy is a unemployed English grad and metalhead who had to relocate to Syria.

I react almost dully to all the deaths now. And I wish I didn't.

Hang a map of Baghdad on one wall. A map of Iraq on another. Have the president stand between them with a laser pointer. Let him show where the sectarian fighting in the city is occurring, let him detail where US troops are currently deployed. Then he can explain the new plan: Where the extra troops would go, what they would do, where the new checkpoints would be placed, how the city would be cleared, how it would be held

Based on a just-completed White House background briefing, it looks like the President’s new Iraq strategy to be unveiled tonight looks promising.

The Administration recognizes a lot of what has gone wrong, for example, that is was unrealistic to assume that political progress could be made while the security situation remained so ghastly. The new emphasis is on security first. Five new American brigades will be sent to Baghdad to work with new Iraqi brigades securing the capital block by block. Unclear whether this will be sufficient force. Rules of engagement also to change so that there will be no more areas off limits to American forces.

The President also plans to ask for a larger army – a little late and so necessary! It will be interesting to see how the Democrats in Congress handle that one. All that talk of supporting the troops. . .

Possible problem areas: the strategy still depends heavily on Maliki’s bona fides. They believe his heart is the right place but he has suffered from lack of “capabilities.” That’s a gamble. There is also a “regional” component to the new strategy that seems to rely on another push for Israeli/Palestinian cooperation (Rice is traveling to Middle East within the week). That sounds like Baker/Hamilton bunk, but let’s see what she says.

Still, most of it sounds exactly right.

Uh-huh.

Sounds like we're planning to beat whack-a-mole with a slightly bigger hammer. Ye gods. What's that word we weren't supposed to say? Oh, yeah...

QUAQMIRE

Nothing like getting the blood hot & flowing for Grand Drama.

Shiite businesses in detroit are being vandalized.

It's fucking DETROIT, people. Of all the shit you have to worry about on a daily basis, you want to start fucking with other people over all this?

I'm wondering how far out in the suburbs(e.g. Dearborn) this shit goes.

Almost two years ago, at the exact same time some self-anointed experts and opiners like this one proclaimed "We're Winning", I made this post about a childhood friend of mine serving in Iraq who warned of the low troop morale and the "FUBAR clusterfuck" we were in. He was spot-on as it turned out, and an infinitely better source than those dubious "the media isn't showing the schools we've been painting" missives trumpeted by the usual suspects. He's now out of the Army, but stays in touch with friends still serving in Iraq. Recently he told me that troop morale is at rock-bottom now, lower than ever, and dejection is turning ominously into anger.

The mention about the media canard is interesting because Malkin's back from Iraq and is sounding a little, dare I say, sobered -- or at least more obviously clutching at straws:

Yes, there is danger and chaos and unspeakable bloodshed in parts of Baghdad. Sectarian violence--compounded by everyday street crime and tribal conflict--is rampant. Corruption, incompetence, and apathy infect the Iraqi government. You've gotten endless news coverage of all that. But there are also pockets of success and signs of hope amid utter despair. I'll give you more details of our embed unit after we get home. We have much to report and will be publishing a multi-part video and audio series, blog posts, and op-eds on security conditions, media malpractice, and the big picture on the war next week. Having met, watched, and interviewed a broad cross-section of our troops during our brief but fruitful travels, my faith in the U.S. military has never been stronger-- but I will not sugarcoat my skepticism and doubts about decisions being made in Washington.

Ledeen, meanwhile...well, just read it.

i love when people make vietnam comparisons approvingly. because, you know, those cambodia incursions turned out so well.

======

Now DD takes a look at the escalation in force, which includes the dispatching of five brigades to Baghdad.

Does it make sense? Or is it more a dumb penny-packet drib-and-drabs approach, the kind the Fuhrer/OKW might have come up with when it was all downhill in WWII, everything lost.

The brigade as a task force is part of the modern American army's modular approach to war. Take the tools out of the toolbox and put them together in a mix to solve the military problem posed. If the problem is unsolvable, that is not addressed.

The brigade is the smallest US military unit capable of being self-sustaining. There are three or more brigades in the standard division in the US military. The Baghdad escalation takes from five different American divisions, apparently, to achieve Bush's aims.

Normally, if army's wish to preserve the esprit de corps of units and work their organizational unity to the fullest, one dispatches divisions. In the Bush plan one could dispatch one or two divisions to Baghdad and achieve the same thing, instead of pulling apart units from various formations now at home in the United States (or in the case of the tabbed airborne brigade, in Kuwait) and -- perhaps -- playing to the local homefront interests that at least some of a division, based at a city somewhere in the US, will remain behind.

However, the current US military philosophy in Iraq uses brigades as individual task forces, presumably to stiffen the Iraqi "army" and do the block-by-block fighting when even that fails. As it does.
=====

The rest, some window-dressing, is here.

Rhetoric getting ahead of facts... you know what I mean! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_of_evil

To me that seems to be the biggest, most obvious shortcoming of the Cheney doctrine - bully everyone as much as possible and then get all surprised when they react.

What is the Cheney doctrine? Something along the lines of "We're the US, bitch, we do what we please."

(now hearing gangsta rap album recorded from Bush administration's POV)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_Doctrine

Man, I just shake my head every time I read this. It's like Bush and his football buddies are yelling "The best defense is a good offense!" and snapping each other with towels in the White House.

In having destroyed the Iraq we had effectively helped to build up in the first place to counterbalance Iran, we are now forced to remain there in its place.

What I fear is the adminstration's plans to ensure we won't withdraw from the region after they're out of office. At this point that gang is obssessed with their legacy and with getting the Bush Doctrine written into the history books. I know it sounds paranoid, but they're way beyond 75 klicks above the Do Lung bridge...

American officers tried to persuade the Iraqi soldiers to leave the slum area for better cover, but the Iraqis refused to risk crossing a lane that was being raked by machine-gun fire. “It’s their show,” said Lt. David Stroud, adding that the Americans have orders to defer to the Iraqis in cases like this.

In this surreal setting, about 20 American soldiers were forced at one point to pull themselves one by one up a canted tin roof by a dangling rubber hose and then shimmy along a ledge to another hut. The soldiers were stunned when a small child suddenly walked out of a darkened doorway and an old man started wheezing and crying somewhere inside.

Ultimately the group made it back to the high rises and escaped the sniper in the alley by throwing out the smoke bombs and sprinting to safety. Even though two Iraqis were struck by gunfire, many of the rest could not stop shouting and guffawing with amusement as they ran through the smoke.

One Iraqi soldier in the alley pointed his rifle at an American reporter and pulled the trigger. There was only a click: the weapon had no ammunition. The soldier laughed at his joke.

64 US soldiers dead this month so far. Almost 1500 Iraqi deaths.

Meanwhile, al-Maliki threatened a Sunni lawmaker with arrest during a broadcasted session of Parliament.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html?em&ex=1169960400&en=a409cbba07641b13&ei=5087%0A

The lawmakers had their shouting match while sitting beneath a banner with a phrase from the Koran that extols the importance of a civil debate in making good decisions.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070126/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush

Contrary to public statements by the U.S. military, four U.S. soldiers did not die repelling a sneak attack at the governor’s office in the Shiite holy city of Karbala last week. New information obtained by The Associated Press shows they were abducted and found dead or dying as far as 25 miles away.

The brazen assault, 50 miles south of Baghdad on Jan. 20, was conducted by nine to 12 militants posing as an American security team. They traveled in black GMC Suburban vehicles — the type used by U.S. government convoys — had American weapons, wore new U.S. military combat fatigues and spoke English.

In a written statement, the U.S. command reported at the time that five soldiers were killed while “repelling the attack.” Now, two senior U.S. military officials as well as Iraqi officials say four of the five were captured and taken from the governor’s compound alive. Three of them were found dead and one mortally wounded later that evening in locations as far as 25 miles east of the governor’s office.

anyhoo, Fox News is going to be airing the cut footage from the series, specifically about the bullshit Sandy Berger bits conjured out of thin air.

Still, that thing cost $40 million?!

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/middleeast/26cnd-prexy.html?em&ex=1169960400&en=092e3c48d429fe31&ei=5087%0A

The New York Times

January 26, 2007
Bush Backs Force Against Iranians in Iraq
By DAVID STOUT

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 -- American soldiers will do what they must to protect themselves from Iranian agents operating inside Iraq, the White House said today, following a report that President Bush had authorized the killing of Iranian agents.

“If our troops get actionable intelligence that agents are going to cause our troops or Iraqi citizens harm, they’re going to take whatever force protections that are necessary,” said Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman for the National Security Council.

The president himself told reporters today that, “It just makes sense that if somebody is trying to harm our troops or stop us from achieving our goal, or killing innocent citizens in Iraq, that we will stop them.”

He made the comment at a White House appearance with Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, who was confirmed by the Senate today as the new commander in Iraq.

“And so, yeah, we’re going to continue to protect ourselves in Iraq,” Mr. Bush went on, “and at the same time work to solve our problems with Iran diplomatically. And I believe we can succeed.”

The president remarks were in response to an article in The Washington Post today that said the White House had authorized the United States military to kill or capture Iranian operatives in Iraq as part of an aggressive new strategy against Iran.

But Mr. Bush said any notion that the United States wants to widen its military campaign beyond the borders of Iraq “simply is not accurate.” The president and his top aides have said several times in recent weeks that there are no plans to pursue Iranian agents into Iran.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates echoed Mr. Bush’s remarks today. “Our forces are authorized to go after those who are trying to kill them,” Mr. Gates said at a Pentagon briefing. “And if you’re in Iraq and trying to kill our troops, then you should consider yourself a target.”

Two weeks ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that President Bush had issued an order several months before authorizing a broad military offensive against Iranian operatives inside Iraq. She said that Iran had provided components for roadside bombs and training for thousands of Shiite militia fighters, mostly in Iran.

“There has been a decision to go after these networks,” she said in an interview with The New York Times, referring to Iranian operatives working inside Iraq.

The Post article today provided additional details of that effort, reporting that the Bush administration had authorized the American military to kill or capture Iranian operatives inside Iraq as part of a strategy to weaken Tehran’s influence in the Middle East and to give up its nuclear ambitions.

As the day wore on, Bush administration officials tried to dispel the impression that there was anything new in the strategy against Iran. Rather, they said, the use of lethal force against Iranian agents had never been ruled out.

The Post said lethal force against Iranians was not known to have been used to date. But the newspaper did say that dozens of suspected Iranian agents had been detained over the past year for three to four days at a time under a “catch and release” policy intended to avoid escalating tensions with Iran.

Mr. Gates, who took office in December, said he was under the impression that The Post report contained “a number of inaccuracies,” although he was not specific. And when he was asked whether the “kill-or-capture authority” applied to Iranians meddling in Iraq’s political or economic affairs, he replied, “What we’re looking for are people who are trying to kill us.”

In particular, Mr. Gates said, American forces were going after “these networks” that bring deadly homemade bombs, or “improvised explosive devices,” into Iraq “that are causing 70 percent of our casualties.”

Asked whether the administration had embarked on “a much larger” anti-Iran strategy, Mr. Gates replied, “No, I don’t think so.”

Mr. Johndroe of the National Security Council took issue with The Post’s description of the administration’s approach as “catch and release.” President Bush bluntly warned Iran on Jan. 10 to stop meddling in Iraqi affairs. The next day, American troops backed by helicopters and armored vehicles raided an Iranian diplomatic office in Erbil, Iraq, in the middle of the night and detained a half-dozen Iranians working inside. Shortly afterward, an additional American aircraft carrier was deployed off Iran’s coast.

The Iranian government said the raid violated international law. The American military said in a statement that documents and equipment removed from the office “will be examined to determine the extent of the alleged illegal or terrorist activity,” and that “appropriate action” would be taken regarding the detainees.

The White House has long accused Iran of providing weapons and training to Shiite forces in Iraq with the aim of keeping the United States bogged down in the war and teaching Washington a bitter lesson about the perils of regime change and nation-building.

In his 2002 State of the Union address, Mr. Bush described Iran as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iraq and North Korea, and administration officials have said Iran is the single greatest threat in the Middle East.

Asked why he was sticking to his plan to increase the number of troops in Iraq despite flagging Congressional support, Mr. Bush said: “One of the things I’ve found in Congress is that most people recognize that failure would be a disaster for the United States. And in that I’m the decision maker, I had to come up with a way forward that precluded disaster. In other words, I had to think about what’s likely to work.”

As for Iran, Mr. Bush said the Iranian people were not America’s enemy. “Our problem is with the government that takes actions that end up isolating your people, ends up denying the Iranian people their true place in the world,” he said.

Two leading Democratic senators had expressed concerns about the Bush administration’s approach to Iran even before The Post report.

A week ago, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the new chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said that White House efforts to portray Iran as a growing threat are uncomfortably reminiscent of rhetoric about Iraq before the American invasion of 2003.

Mr. Rockefeller said the administration was building a case against Tehran even as American intelligence agencies still know little about either Iran’s internal dynamics or its intentions in the Middle East.

And Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, recently issued a sharp warning to the administration about the raids against Iranians in Iraq. Although the White House has said there are no plans to pursue Iranian agents into their own country, Mr. Biden said any cross-border operations “will generate a constitutional confrontation here in the Senate.”

Next week, the Senate is to debate a resolution endorsed by the Foreign Relations Committee denouncing the president’s plan to send more troops to Baghdad.

Mr. Gates said any such resolution “emboldens the enemy.” He said he was sure that was not the intention of its supporters, “but that’s the effect.”

Senator Reid of Nevada, the Democratic majority leader, said he backed a “kill or capture” policy toward Iranians operating in Iraq.

“We want the American troops protected in Iraq,” he said in a question-answer session at the Capitol. “Whatever it takes to protect them is something we’re certainly interested in. But for the president to escalate this conflict outside Iraq is something he has to come back and ask us permission to do.”

Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Mark Mazzetti contributed.

Meantime, remember the dead.

In 2004, eager to get on with his career and family life, Freeman moved into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), a pool of trained soldiers not assigned to any unit, to serve out the rest of his eight-year mandatory obligation.

He was in California with a civilian job, a 1-year-old son named Gunnar and another baby on the way in the fall of 2005 when a shortage of officers prompted a large call-up by the IRR of West Point graduates from the classes of 1998 and later -- many of whom had only a few months of service left.

"He was an augmentee, who happened to be called up to fill a slot," said Sgt. 1st Class Joseph Edmond, a full-time staff member at the 412th Civil Affairs Battalion in Whitehall, Ohio, which Freeman was called to join. "It's almost to fill a void," he said, commenting on the Army's deepening manpower shortage, especially in the reserve, which requires it to cobble together units with people from across the country.

Charlotte Freeman, Freeman's wife, recalled her husband's shock upon receiving an Army telegram ordering him back to active duty. "He walked into the house and was totally white," she said yesterday. "He had moved on" from the Army.

These monthly threads have tended to reflect political and strategic concerns so I'm interested in what the balance of coverage is, particularly on the TV.

I can understand why there is a difference in coverage. US soldiers are dying daily and this is news that can't really be ignored.

The death toll of American troops and Iraqi civilians is a constant staple of US TV news, both on local and the nationals like CNN. There's the occasional human interest story about how events are affecting the Iraqi population, but US TV news stations don't provide enough coverage to sufficiently communicate how chaotic and desperate life in Iraq is. This is par for the course when it comes to coverage of wartorn countries, whether it's Lebanon, Sudan, or Iraq. National Public Radio generally does a better job with this.

Getting back to our normal strategic and political concerns, this morning on NPR an analyst was talking about Iraq turning into a full-blown proxy war; Iran expands support of Shiite militias, and surrounding Sunni governments continue funnelling arms and funds to the Iraqi Sunnis to offset Iranian influence. One of his points was, in the back of their minds Shiites know the American presence is temporary whereas Iran isn't going anywhere.

One of the outcomes I've been expecting since the US extracted permission to go after Shiite militias from al-Maliki: Shiites offering up some splinter groups (see the Najaf action a few days ago) as a sign of "progress" to the Americans. Such actions aren't going to change the larger Shiite-Sunni conflict. If al-Sadr starts using US troops to go after renegades in his own party, it would only stabilize his power & influence yet forestall any real progress.

The Najaf operation continues the theme in recent coverage of how ineffectual the Iraqi army is, with US forces doing all the heavy lifting.

Still, would that keep them from taking Iran's money and arms? And some have very strong ties to Iran - the Badr Organization is on the Iranian payroll, they even fought on Iran's side during their war with Iraq!

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Quarterly Report

Some highlights:

Early last year, SIGIR identified 2006 as the Year of Transition in Iraq Reconstruction. Throughout 2006, SIGIR tracked progress on a range of issues that challenged the success of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq, including:
• helping the Iraqis fight corruption
• improving security, especially infrastructure
security
• building the governance capacities of the
Iraqi ministries and provincial governments
• ensuring the sustainability of completed
IRRF programs and projects
• increasing the participation of international
donors
• strengthening coordination among U.S.
reconstruction agencies

SIGIR observed limited progress on each of
these issues:

1. Corruption continues to plague Iraq. Anticorruption institutions in Iraq are fragmented, and there does not appear to be an internal Iraqi consensus about how these institutions should interact. SIGIR’s 2006 audit of U.S. support to anticorruption efforts in Iraq presented a series of recommendations, some of which remain unresolved.

2. Infrastructure security remains vulnerable. Electric lines are attacked regularly, and the northern pipelines are largely inoperable because of interdiction. Iraqi repair crews are frequently unable to work because of repeated attacks. SIGIR’s 2006 audit of infrastructure security efforts emphasized the need for greater focus in this area.

3. The capacity of Iraq’s ministries to execute their capital budgets remains weak. Overcoming this weakness is essential to future progress on reconstruction. A recent SIGIR review of ministry capacity development found that much still needs to be done to improve U.S. support for GOI capacity development.

4. The sustainability of completed IRRF projects remains a concern. Although U.S. reconstruction officials have implemented a program to promote project sustainability, a recent SIGIR review indicates weakness in Iraq’s management of this program.

5. Multilateral support for Iraq reconstruction has yet to be realized. The International Compact for Iraq (the Compact) is expected to advance this essential effort, but it has not yet been officially implemented. For the Compact to succeed, the UN, the World Bank, Iraq’s regional neighbors, and the international donor community must engage more aggressively in supporting Iraq’s recovery.

6. Inconsistent coordination among the many U.S. agencies supporting Iraq’s reconstruction has hampered the effective execution of the U.S. reconstruction program. The newly appointed U.S. coordinator for economic transition may help remediate these problems. SIGIR is conducting reviews of the evolving roles and responsibilities of U.S. agencies as internal reorganizations take place. As the reconstruction program in Iraq progresses into 2007, the process of transitioning the management of the program to Iraqi control will accelerate. Ensuring the program’s successful transition hinges on making effective progress on each of the foregoing issues.

ugh. I always get the impression those aren't very representative.

That's good to know, 'cause we're sucking at goal #1. How's #2 going?

http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/01/31/iraq.main/index.html

Isn't this kind of thinking how we GOT into iraq?

oh look, they're hiring!