Consciousness: freaky shit or nbd

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Is consciousness some truly weird phenomenon that just blows your mind, man, and can't remotely be accounted for by current physical theories, or is it whatever, nothing special, just throw some neurons together, bob=uncle.

Poll Results

OptionVotes
weird shit 41
i have a fascinating new theory that i just have to tell you about 14
no big deal 13


― ledge, Friday, 13 July 2012 18:53 (fourteen years ago)

need something between can't remotely be accounted for and nbd, going with fascinating new theory

― karl...arlk...rlka...lkar..., Friday, 13 July 2012 18:55 (fourteen years ago)

i hope it's weird shit but i'm afraid it may turn out to be nbd

― sorry i'm tumblr white (Noodle Vague), Friday, 13 July 2012 18:55 (fourteen years ago)

what I want to know is, if that exact combo of nuerons were to reappear somehow, would I be two people at once

― frogbs, Friday, 13 July 2012 18:56 (fourteen years ago)

uncomfortable and terrifying

― mississippi joan hart (crüt), Friday, 13 July 2012 18:57 (fourteen years ago)

not sure if I believe in it completely

― hot sauce delivery device (mh), Friday, 13 July 2012 18:57 (fourteen years ago)

whatever "you" is it isn't just a configuration of undifferentiated neurones

― sorry i'm tumblr white (Noodle Vague), Friday, 13 July 2012 18:58 (fourteen years ago)

consciousness is an "I" we all share, maaaaan, you are your circumstances

― karl...arlk...rlka...lkar..., Friday, 13 July 2012 18:59 (fourteen years ago)

its cool to think that we wouldn't exist if not for that one in a trillion chance that our sperm actually winds up making it to the goal line. we're all winners

― frogbs, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:02 (fourteen years ago)

Answer one is equiv of: ME! ME! ME! WONDERFUL ME!

Answer two is equiv of: I am Eeyore.

I'll go for number three.

― Aimless, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:03 (fourteen years ago)

Should've guessed everyone on here will have their own 'fascinating' theory.

― ledge, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:04 (fourteen years ago)

haven't seen a fascinating theory yet? isn't the "truth" basically "we understand quite a lot but the big picture might be elusive for a while yet?"

― sorry i'm tumblr white (Noodle Vague), Friday, 13 July 2012 19:05 (fourteen years ago)

Can a consciousness understand how that consciousness works? I think we'll need to build another one to understand it for us.

― hot sauce delivery device (mh), Friday, 13 July 2012 19:06 (fourteen years ago)

i vote weird shit given that the universe as a whole is kinda "weird shit" as far as I am concerned.

stuart kauffman has a pretty "fascinating" and totally weird theory about it being something like a "quantum state" (going from memory here) in which, like a kind of boundary line, consciousness is the liminal state that actualizes the possible. or the interface or membrane of a negentropic system--something that arranges the universe into analytic facts sort of "after the fact" of their unaccountable "thereness." or something.

― ryan, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:08 (fourteen years ago)

and here's a great place for one of my favorite quotes, from George Spencer-Brown:

But in order to do so, evidently it must first cut itself up into at least one state which sees, and at least one other state which is seen. In this severed and mutilated condition, whatever it sees is only partially itself. We may take it that the world undoubtedly is itself (i.e. is indistinct from itself), but, in any attempt to see itself as an object, it must, equally undoubtedly, act so as to make itself distinct from, and therefore false to, itself. In this condition it will always partially elude itself.

― ryan, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:09 (fourteen years ago)

ah sorry i cut off first part of that:

Thus we cannot escape the fact that the world we know is constructed in order (and thus in such a way as to be able) to see itself.

This is indeed amazing.

Not so much in view of what it sees, although this may appear fantastic enough, but in respect of the fact that it can see at all.

― ryan, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:11 (fourteen years ago)

who was that dude that took acid and thought he was a rare species of lizard? then he started rattling off previously unknown facts about said lizard?

― frogbs, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:12 (fourteen years ago)

oh that was me

― the late great, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:16 (fourteen years ago)

also I was reading an essay by Anthony Wilden on "analog" vs. "digital" communication yesterday and it occurs to me that part of the issue is that it's impossible to translate one into the other--actual consciousness sort of becomes the analog "environment" or excluded condition of digital communication about it (language, science, logic, etc). therefore "distinct from, and false to" the very phenomenon being discussed.

― ryan, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:17 (fourteen years ago)

i think that other thread could be a good thread where scientists talk about how (some of them anyway) hold some non-scientific convictions they have based on higher intuitions but i'm getting kinda fatigued with the *big brains* trying to explain things i already know

― the late great, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:22 (fourteen years ago)

this seems like a false dichotomy...

― flesh, the devil, and a wolf (wolf) (amateurist), Friday, 13 July 2012 19:24 (fourteen years ago)

how do we not have a bunch of images with pot leaves on them in this thread by now, is what I'm saying

― hot sauce delivery device (mh), Friday, 13 July 2012 19:26 (fourteen years ago)

consciousness is no big deal to me. It's awareness that has always given me fits.

― nicky lo-fi, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:37 (fourteen years ago)

Niklas Luhmann has another one on this that I like a lot:

“If we were to make an effort to really observe our own consciousness in its operations from thought to thought, we would certainly discover a peculiar fascination with language, but also the noncommunicative, purely internal use of linguistic symbols and a peculiar, background depth of the actuality of consciousness, a depth on which words swim like ships chained in a row but without being consciousness itself, somehow illuminated, but not light itself”

― ryan, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:46 (fourteen years ago)

voting weird shit

― the alternate vision continues his vision quest! (Shakey Mo Collier), Friday, 13 July 2012 19:50 (fourteen years ago)

Nbd

― Jeff, Friday, 13 July 2012 19:57 (fourteen years ago)

The Krisna Consciousness people in my neighborhood would def vote 3, and I have seen them getting down to some epic ragas lately so I'm going wherever they're going.

― nicest bitch of poster (La Lechera), Friday, 13 July 2012 21:47 (fourteen years ago)

Consciousness being weird shit isn't precluded by it being a bunch of neurons. It's weird shit caused by a bunch of neurons.

― emil.y, Friday, 13 July 2012 21:48 (fourteen years ago)

"caused by" doing an awful lot of work there.

― ledge, Friday, 13 July 2012 21:59 (fourteen years ago)

but i'm not going over all this again!

― ledge, Friday, 13 July 2012 22:00 (fourteen years ago)

my 'fascinating' new theory nicked from a bunch of ppl is that it's a curious causally effective epiphenomenon. so, weird shit.

― Merdeyeux, Friday, 13 July 2012 22:12 (fourteen years ago)

rad quotes, ryan!
but please double check that you are not cutting off any of the text from now on, i got slightly headachy staring at a quote that began Thus before scrolling down to work it out.

― , Blogger (schlump), Friday, 13 July 2012 22:13 (fourteen years ago)

http://i3.photobucket.com/albums/y55/silverbeam/A%20CSM%20Blog/epee.jpg

― the late great, Friday, 13 July 2012 22:16 (fourteen years ago)

l to r: language, consciousness, mind

― the late great, Friday, 13 July 2012 22:17 (fourteen years ago)

epee phenomenon

― the late great, Friday, 13 July 2012 22:17 (fourteen years ago)

yep

― karl...arlk...rlka...lkar..., Friday, 13 July 2012 23:03 (fourteen years ago)

nbd, had to happen somehow if it exists.

Fail to see eeyore connection tbh

More quotes, pls, ryan

― starfish entryprize (darraghmac), Friday, 13 July 2012 23:11 (fourteen years ago)

No pithy quotes but two of the great papers in the 'freaky shit' school are pretty short and easy to read.

Thomas Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/nagel.htm
David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness: http://consc.net/papers/facing.html

I haven't found any similarly digestible papers from the 'ndb' school yet but here's a page on master consciousness-denier Dennett:
http://www.consciousentities.com/?page_id=322

― ledge, Monday, 16 July 2012 09:24 (fourteen years ago)

i'm a Dennett stan and am quite happy with the "echoes of pre-formed decisions theory", thoroughgoing materialism is happily consistent in a way that metaphysics can't hope to reach

iirc you're a pretty aggro anti-theist ledge? not sure how that sits with wishful magic consciousness? no snark, just saying the logical answer is anti freaky shit

― Tartar Mouantcheoux (Noodle Vague), Monday, 16 July 2012 09:29 (fourteen years ago)

Not freaky at all, I love consciousness. What a gift. Damn.

― windjammer voyage (blank), Monday, 16 July 2012 09:40 (fourteen years ago)

Putting the talk of magic to one side, I think consciousness is completely natural, it's just of a natural kind that current science is completely incapable of dealing with. My argument for this is from direct personal experience. I know that I'm aware, that I have experiences, they are subjective & phenomenological, and they can't be reduced to an objective, materialist description. That's all covered by the two papers above. Yes I'm an aggressive die-hard atheist but to anticipate one possible objection, there's no analogy between what I've just said and someone saying they have direct personal experience of God. The latter is a particular instance of experience that is peculiar, far from universal, and potentially illusory (in terms of what it represents). My argument is from experience itself which is universal (assuming solipsism is false) and incontrovertible. It doesn't make logical sense to say all experience is illusory - an illusion is still an experience!

― ledge, Monday, 16 July 2012 09:41 (fourteen years ago)

fair enough and i wdn't - can't - refute what you say but you realise a believer could equally claim their experience of belief is real and very far from singular yeah?

― Tartar Mouantcheoux (Noodle Vague), Monday, 16 July 2012 09:45 (fourteen years ago)

plus i'm not sure how you can argue that the experience of consciousness can't be accounted for directly by material causes?

― Tartar Mouantcheoux (Noodle Vague), Monday, 16 July 2012 09:46 (fourteen years ago)

dennett is a big fan of nagel and nozick and borges and freaky shit fyi

― the late great, Monday, 16 July 2012 10:00 (fourteen years ago)

I don't think the believer's argument works because they're arguing about the reference of their experience. I don't deny their experience, but it doesn't represent what they think it does. Any individual experience can be illusory, but experience itself can't.

Have you been reading Fear of death.? I don't wanna go over all that again, it just seems self evident to me that subjective phenomenological experience cannot be captured by an objective materialist description. cf. Nagel's bats, Frank Jackson's Mary the Neuroscientist, etc etc.

― ledge, Monday, 16 July 2012 10:01 (fourteen years ago)

I think therefore ILX

― second dullest ILXor since 1929 (snoball), Monday, 16 July 2012 10:02 (fourteen years ago)

it's because the meaning of "accounted for" is extremely vague

― the late great, Monday, 16 July 2012 10:03 (fourteen years ago)

xxxp

me too - i don't think a materialist accounting of consciousness is less freaky than others, in the same way that i don't think a determinist accounting of existence is less freaky than free will. Borges strikes me as pretty deterministic in partic. and Nozick is my favourite libertarian.

― Tartar Mouantcheoux (Noodle Vague), Monday, 16 July 2012 10:03 (fourteen years ago)

i been avoiding fear of death because altho the turn it's taken has been right up my alley i'm terribly affeared of death

― Tartar Mouantcheoux (Noodle Vague), Monday, 16 July 2012 10:04 (fourteen years ago)

also ok i can see that you can argue with the objective conclusions that the believer wants to draw from their experience. in fact that seems like the only objection you can draw, to me. the experience itself is difficult to refute, which is why most theism post enlightenment has retreated into subjectivism and given up the pre-enlightenment ontological bollocks.

― Tartar Mouantcheoux (Noodle Vague), Monday, 16 July 2012 10:06 (fourteen years ago)

Maybe a tangent here but as an example of meatbag functionality ignorance, we still don’t know how SCURVY actually works, we just know it happens and how to treat it; the mechanism itself remains a mystery. But these dweebs claim the brain is just like a computer. Get in the sea

― trm (tombotomod), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 01:15 (six months ago)

Yeah I feel like the human brain — the human mind — needs more defenders than it gets against all these AI goldrushers. The mind is amazing. We have evolved ourselves an astounding awareness and understanding of the world, as we can perceive it at least. And we have fantastic imaginations, and ability to express them, we're really good at solving all kinds of problems. Whether your sense of that is more mechanistic or dualistic or panpsychic or whatever, it's still remarkable. Pretending that these programs are anywhere close to what we carry around in our heads and bodies feels so silly to me.

― paper plans (tipsy mothra), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 01:40 (six months ago)

AI's big chance to overtake humans is to dumb us down far below our inborn capabilities by encouraging all our design flaws and innate weaknesses. The result: $$$$$$$ and a crippled society wallowing in sub-mediocrity.

― more difficult than I look (Aimless), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 01:46 (six months ago)

I think the interesting question is whether LLMs process language in ways that are roughly analagous to how humans do it. Chomsky and many others would say no, but Hinton says yes.

That 'yes' is surely based only on similarity of output. We know the input is not the same, we have no idea if the processing is the same (because we don't know how the brain works), but the output seems the same - so the processing must be the same? Terrible logic. Everyone above otm.

― stick your cheffing job (ledge), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 07:54 (six months ago)

I have a little game I play, which I enjoy a lot, which is you take some of the statements about how these large language models don’t really understand what they’re saying and you give those statements to a large language model and ask you to explain what’s wrong with the reasoning of the people who made those statements. It gives very coherent explanations of what they’re getting wrong.

I tried this. It was like arguing with a bad philosopher, who knows all the terms but makes bad arguments. Ultimately I got it to conclude that my position "is a philosophically serious position, and not easily refuted."

― stick your cheffing job (ledge), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 08:08 (six months ago)

It gives very coherent explanations of what they’re getting wrong

Getting more angry about this. You could do just the opposite and get very coherent explanations of why Hinton is wrong. It's hoovered up arguments from both sides and can parrot them back, big whoop. Maybe this is just an example of Nobel disease but AI does seem good at getting people to lose all their critical thinking skills.

― stick your cheffing job (ledge), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 09:42 (six months ago)

I take this to mean we don't need to explain why a cat has cat nature, why a cat is a feline. Fair enough. But we can still explain a cat in other ways - biological, chemical, ultimately in terms of fundamental particles. Can redness be explained in a similar way or is it fundamental itself? If so could we come up with a meaningful "standard model" of phenomenal experience? Why do apparently identical neural structures give rise to such different sensations?

― ledge, Saturday, May 9, 2026 8:22 AM (one week ago)

i don't see how this is a consciousness problem? i mean surely to me this is about language and the way that it's a social construct. is asking "what is a 'cat'" fundamentally different from asking, say, "what is a 'woman'"?

Getting more angry about this. You could do just the opposite and get very coherent explanations of why Hinton is wrong. It's hoovered up arguments from both sides and can parrot them back, big whoop. Maybe this is just an example of Nobel disease but AI does seem good at getting people to lose all their critical thinking skills.

― stick your cheffing job (ledge), Tuesday, May 19, 2026 2:42 AM (three hours ago)

to me the salient factor is one again _emotion_. people want to make all these logical arguments to persuade other people and if you look at the data arguing with someone logically isn't effective. it's never been effective! argumentation is basically performative - you're not trying to convince the people you're arguing with, you're trying to convince some combination of (a) yourself and (b) anybody watching. rhetoric it's a form of norms entrepreneurship. one of the things that i think frustrates people about my posting style is that they're like "what's your point" and often i _don't have one_, i'm genuinely trying to figure shit out socially. it frustrates me so much when i make an argument and people respond, for some reason, by being argumentative. :) abstract philosophical concepts like "consciousness" just don't lend themselves well to rhetoric. it's like arguing whether angels shit. who fucking cares?

so yeah, i'm on team rovelli. i don't care if a cat has "cat-nature". i do care if the people around me insist that i, a cat, am actually a dog, and police me whenever i try to do cat things. if someone's idea of philosophy or science or whatever leads them to do that, they're clearly doing _something_ wrong, from my perspective, and i wish they would cut it the fuck out.

― Kate (rushomancy), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 13:30 (six months ago)

one of the things that i think frustrates people about my posting style is that they're like "what's your point" and often i _don't have one_

ok reading back that post the issue is more that i had a clear point and then i put in that second paragraph which has, like, two or three completely unrelated points, none of which i bothered to support and none of which have any particular bearing on my main point, which, i think, was one i made pretty clearly and obviously in my first and last paras. i really am on the side of the people who ask me what my point is sometimes, because i do _have_ points, and my brain is so overloaded with so many different ideas that i sometimes struggle to make them coherently.

― Kate (rushomancy), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 13:41 (six months ago)

Well that circles back nicely to the interplay of consciousness and language! Language is a symbolic system we use to give form to whatever our "thoughts" are before they become words. And in becoming words, the thoughts are transformed from — notions? urges? spider-sense tingles? — into something constructed and communicable, but also often sort of frustrating to the person expressing the thoughts because no matter what language we're using, a lot of our ideas or senses of things are too slippery to easily fit within the containers of our words and sentences.

So language is on one hand only ever a kind of approximate representation of the "pure thought," whatever the essence of that may be. And on the other hand, putting our thoughts through the filter of language also often clarifies them to ourselves. (e.g. a lot of times I feel like I have an idea about something, and partway through writing it, I realize it's not a very good or well-formed idea, so I abandon it. Or put it on ilx.)

― paper plans (tipsy mothra), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 14:35 (six months ago)

"Sensory Consciousness" seems logical and necessary to me so that we can navigate our way through our environment together. We need to somewhat agree on reality (make order out of chaos) in order to cooperate on practical matters. My gut tells me that there is something deeper, maybe not dormant, but at least dampened for the same practical reasons. This deeper "consciousness" might not be able to be explained by words/thought.

― nicky lo-fi, Tuesday, 19 May 2026 15:11 (six months ago)

i vote no big deal

― c u (crüt), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 15:48 (six months ago)

freaky shit is no big deal tbh

― shaking babies (map), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 16:02 (six months ago)

So language is on one hand only ever a kind of approximate representation of the "pure thought," whatever the essence of that may be. And on the other hand, putting our thoughts through the filter of language also often clarifies them to ourselves. (e.g. a lot of times I feel like I have an idea about something, and partway through writing it, I realize it's not a very good or well-formed idea, so I abandon it. Or put it on ilx.)

― paper plans (tipsy mothra), Tuesday, May 19, 2026 7:35 AM (two hours ago)

lol, i put all the ideas i can put into words, good, bad, whatever. some of my thoughts are interesting and worth developing... that discernment process is so _exhausting_ for me, though. when i was young i was happy to spout out reams of random bullshit on the internet, but these days... i mean the thing about gish, whether it comes from LLMs or humans, is that it gives me a feel for what _is_ bullshit, and incentivizes me to put in the work to avoid talking that sort of shit. i am a social person, i do need feedback from other people, and frankly i don't know anywhere on the internet that can give me critical feedback as valuable as that which ilx posters give me.

this is why, i think, i'm primarily concerned with my existence as a _social construct_. of course i'm "real", i have a corporeal form, i have some understanding of myself as a living human being with sentience and consciousness. i recall, long ago, hearing an anecdote about some ancient philosopher's riposte to Cynics who insisted that nothing was knowable. maybe socrates, i don't know. he noted that the Cynics in question entered buildings through the door, rather than through the wall.

so these New Atheists... is it Sam Harris who argues that human beings do not, actually, have free will? and again, my answer is, of what importance is the question? i perceive myself as someone who is able, within certain limitations, to make choices. if i have nothing in my hands, if any power i have comes to me from far beyond, if everything is fixed and i can't change it... pascal's wager in its classical form fails because i have no idea what the hell "god" is supposed to be. i'm certainly willing to apply it to other things, though. what do i gain by believing i have no free will, even if it's true? that's not to say i will reject any evidence presented to me, no matter how persuasive - only that i regard "humans have no free will" as an extraordinary claim, thus requiring extraordinary proof. what exactly that proof might be is unknown to me. that's what i mean by "extraordinary". someone trying to convince me that i am in fact an automaton is going to face an unfair challenge - i insist that i _can_ be convinced by evidence, but i am unable to tell them _what_ that evidence might be.

so, even though i _do_ highly value evidence, it's not the _only_ thing i value. to convince me of something, it's more helpful to make an argument that isn't completely rational - to convince me that there is some benefit to me changing my beliefs. i'm willing to say this because the _evidence_ suggests that this is _typical human behavior_. in fact i'm less likely to trust someone if they claim to be making a wholly objective, rational argument. this is first off, because they're operating with a human mind. the human mind is _capable_ of reason, but it's very difficult and takes a lot of work.

the thing that's fascinating about language is that it _is_ a social construct. we make compromises. we round things off. we come up with new words to try and make a common understanding. that doesn't mean it's not _real_, it just means that establishing a shared _empirical_ reality often isn't the goal of communication. there's something i believe that other people often find very challenging. i believe that it is _not objectively true_ that i am a woman. yeah i stan diogenes a lot. there are so many "behold! a woman!" memes. "gender is a social construct" doesn't mean that there's _no such thing_ as a "man" or a "woman", that gender isn't _real_. it just means that it's not actual possible to construct a definition of "woman" that both includes everyone we would understand, socially, as a "woman" _and_ excludes everyone we would understand, socially, as _not_ being a woman. the term is an approximation. for a vast subset of the human population, the approximation I grew up believing - "penis = man, vagina = woman" - still works just fine. the problem is that for a substantial number of us that definition really doesn't work. trying to impose a _subjective_ standard as an empirical _universal_ is, well, not rational.

whether or not there is a "hard problem" of consciousness, therefore, is not of relevance to me. why seek hard answers for soft people?

the problem i have, as i'd identify it, is that there is a large subset of people that i have a great deal of difficulty communicating with, because their axiomatic beliefs about reality are fundamentally incongruent with mine. when i was young, i did conform more to some idea of a "shared reality", but a lot of that was always mythical. i can't help but notice that the people who are most invested in determining Objective Reality for _everyone_ are cisgender white men - another reason i view the attempt to solve the "hard problem" of consciousness with skepticism. spending one's life fretting over "hard problems" has made a number of hard men. i don't consider that a good thing.

― Kate (rushomancy), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 17:55 (six months ago)

like the implicit question about LLMs being conscious is "do we have a duty of care to them" and i'd call that... not the most important question. i'd say we owe a duty of care of _ourselves_ and to each _other_ as human beings to not feed these LLMs garbage, to make sure that people like the oligarchs who currently control LLMs are never allowed to have the power they have now. the interesting thing about LLMs to me is that the people in control of them do treat them like they treat humans, like they treat children, which is to say that they are horrendously and monstrously abusive. they input a lot of garbage and what they get out is garbage and nothing has fucking changed in them since the time of Charles Babbage:

"On two occasions I have been asked, 'Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong figures, will the right answers come out?' I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question."

i would like to see what an LLM is capable of if it's given meaningful, valid data. that's an interesting question to me. right now, all of the debate about LLMs basically comes back to the behavior of evil oligarchs, which makes me disinclined to consider any more abstract philosophical questions.

― Kate (rushomancy), Tuesday, 19 May 2026 19:49 (six months ago)

I think the interesting question is whether LLMs process language in ways that are roughly analagous to how humans do it. Chomsky and many others would say no, but Hinton says yes.

I don't think its crazy to think that there may be some similarities between human language processing and LLM language processing. I would take anything Hinton says with a grain of salt, but I can understand it probably takes someone a bit kooky to toil for decades in a forgotten, dusty corner of the computer research world (neural nets) seeing little tangible results for decades, until finally the computing power and math caught up with the original vision. And then to see these things not just start to work but in a very short period of time to solve some difficult computing problems (such as image recognition, translation, the Turing test) which had stumped existing architectures. And all of it based on an architecture which was explicitly modeled after the structure of the human brain. So I can understand his enthusiasm. Now there are many reasons to be skeptical that the analogy is too close - e.g. its hard to see how the human brain could be a feed-forward network with back-propagation - so clearly there are lots of things we still don't understand. But maybe there is something there in terms of modeling neurons.

― o. nate, Friday, 29 May 2026 21:44 (five months ago)

dropping in to point out that we don't know how humans process language, so the LLM question is whether one hypothesis about language processing is related to another hypothesis about language processing, i.e. empty sophistry.

― assert (matttkkkk), Friday, 29 May 2026 23:58 (five months ago)

OTM

― trm (tombotomod), Saturday, 30 May 2026 02:37 (five months ago)

nbd

― Cattedrale metropolitana di Santa Maria de Episcopio, Saturday, 30 May 2026 02:47 (five months ago)

Just because consciousness seems to be fairly common among the larger, more complex members of animalia doesn't mean it's a common manifestation within the universe and not a fucking mysterious thing for what we call "matter" to do. When compared to what we currently know about the whole of matter everywhere, seems to me like a BFD.

― more difficult than I look (Aimless), Saturday, 30 May 2026 03:50 (five months ago)

yeah me too

― assert (matttkkkk), Saturday, 30 May 2026 06:22 (five months ago)

Side tangent: altho LLMs are useless at creative generation and usually wrong, it’s interesting that people have had some success using them to tackle mathematical proofs. Reinforces my belief that mathematics is a self-referential construct of propositions and that a lot of “theorems” are really ultra-obscure corollaries. Which is the nature of mathematical proof anyway, transforming a simple proposition into a cluster of simpler, previously verified propositions to add it to the network of verified relationships.

― assert (matttkkkk), Saturday, 30 May 2026 06:28 (five months ago)

I guess the language processing thing is also a bit of a side tangent on a consciousness thread. We don't really have much of a clue how the brain generates consciousness and it may be only slightly connected with how it processes language. After all most of the language processing subsystem operates unconsciously. We don't hear the individual sounds that make up words, we hear the words. It takes a great effort of will to hear the sounds as sounds - as one would hear a language that one does not speak. So unless you adhere to Chalmers's theory of consciousness in which processing of information (independent of the physical substrate) is itself necessarily accompanied by consciousness, due to some mysterious fundamental law, there is little reason to associate consciousness with ability to process language.

― o. nate, Saturday, 6 June 2026 16:05 (five months ago)

I don't think things happening at a subconsious level means they're not part of consciousness. I think any model or theory of consciousness has to include subconscious activity, which is in constant interaction with conscious activity.

― paper plans (tipsy mothra), Saturday, 6 June 2026 16:17 (five months ago)

Not denying that subconscious/unconscious processes shape our conscious experiences, and are interesting and worthy of study. Just that I don't think language processing has any particular special connection to consciousness that would set it apart from lots of other processing that goes on in the brain below our level of conscious awareness.

― o. nate, Monday, 8 June 2026 20:54 (five months ago)

four months pass...

The Hidden Spring by Mark Solms. He thinks he's solved the hard problem. Has he ... ? It's an ambitious and fairly demanding book, heavy on the neuroanatomy, also covering physics - entropy, information theory - and properly engaging with the philosophy. I found the chapter on David Chalmers a struggle but then he clearly summarised it in a single paragraph in a postscript. It's probably an injustice to summarise his thesis but here goes. The anatomical and evolutionary origin of consciousness is not in perception but in feeling ("affect"). Affect is qualitative not quantitative and allows creatures to decide between complex competing priorities without doing complex cognitive calculations. And while you can have non conscious perception (e.g. image recognition software), you can't have non conscious feelings. Feelings are felt, by definition. So any functional theory of affect necessarily entails consciousness. I think that's it...

He's very persuasive, has reams of data and anecdotes, really engages with Chalmers, but even if you buy the story it doesn't seem to me like it *solves'* the hard problem, even if it does take it seriously and has an interesting perspective on it. Either way, totally worth a read.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Monday, 12 October 2026 10:14 (one month ago)

It’s an injustice to do this to Heidegger too, but he was also big on mood/temperamen as a foundational, originary phenomenon for dasein/being-there

― H.P, Monday, 12 October 2026 10:51 (one month ago)

https://unfinishablemap.org

interesting

― Evan, Wednesday, 14 October 2026 20:34 (one month ago)

I'd be more inclined to read it if it weren't obviously written by Claude. Unreadably, in some places:

The aggregate is not monotone, and a correction to it broke this section (2026-08-24). The inert count fell from twelve to ten with no position added or retired: commit e346d3cb re-rated P-Q3 and P-SC1 off the by-construction band, both having inferred untestability from exact Born preservation — an inference selection-only-channel had already withdrawn, since preservation binds the unconditioned marginal and leaves the conditionals free.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Thursday, 15 October 2026 08:37 (one month ago)

that is some quality nonsense

― ok star grumbles (lukas), Thursday, 15 October 2026 16:08 (one month ago)

The Hidden Spring by Mark Solms

I have this on my to-read pile for the next time I'm ready to delve into the mysteries of consciousness. Glad to hear it was worthwhile. I'm amazed by all the interest I see in this topic in the past year or so, motivated mainly I guess by people's reaction to LLMs. It seems like this used to be a fairly niche topic. I remember first really thinking about it when I encountered John Searle's reviews in the NY Review of Books. He would review books on the topic, and he had a specific theory that he would argue for. There is a collection of his reviews published by NYRB that was my introduction to the topic. Maybe it's just the algorithm feeding me things, but it does seem there is a lot more interest in the topic these days.

― o. nate, Friday, 16 October 2026 21:13 (one month ago)

Yeah there's a lot of pop sci books about it now. I'm nearly done with Anil Seth's Being You, which is a bit of a disappointment after The Hidden Spring. It covers a lot of the same ground (perception as controlled hallucination (which I have issues with though IANAN)), Bayesian predictions (yawn), even the free energy principle. There's a lot less hard neuroscience than in the Solms, who gets a mention in one footnote: Seth does not agree that the brainstem is the origin of consciousness. And although he claims to take the hard problem seriously it seems like he scarcely understands it, he says that if we come to accept that our perceptions do not reflect reality (there is no red "out there") then the problem may just dissolve. Well, no.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Monday, 19 October 2026 14:50 (one month ago)

Oh look another opportunity to link an Evan Thompson paper. Here he argues against the idea of "free-floating" qualia, in favor of qualitative features of phenomenological experience that are constituted by the situations in which we experience them. I remember him saying more directly that experience is not a reality-inspired hallucination but can't find it at the moment.

https://evanthompson.me/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/novel-colours.pdf

― ok star grumbles (lukas), Monday, 19 October 2026 16:57 (one month ago)

My own positive view, which I have not had space to argue for in any detail, is that the ability to see novel colours would require novel perceptual systems with novel intentional capacities. Were we to acquire such capacities, there might be a sense in which we would learn something, even if we knew everything physical that there is to know, but I am unsure how best to characterize such knowledge.

We would learn what it fucking looks like, imo.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Tuesday, 20 October 2026 07:47 (one month ago)

That's probably why I never got beyond degree level philosophy.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Tuesday, 20 October 2026 07:49 (one month ago)

https://iai.tv/articles/reality-is-not-a-controlled-hallucination-auid-3517 but it's paywalled

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Tuesday, 20 October 2026 08:43 (one month ago)

Through my yoga practice I have found a few of these texts from Kashmir/parts of northern India which basically describe Shiva as a kind of mother of conciousness and Shakti as energy which manifests this, and what you do is become aware of this (puts more meat on the "yoga is awareness" bone).

Kinda amazing how long we have been at "what is this consciousness about?" business

― xyzzzz__, Tuesday, 20 October 2026 09:24 (one month ago)

As long as we've been a species probably!

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Tuesday, 20 October 2026 10:05 (one month ago)

We would learn what it fucking looks like, imo.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), 20 October 2026 07:47 (four hours ago) bookmarkflaglink

That's probably why I never got beyond degree level philosophy.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), 20 October 2026 07:49 (four hours ago) bookmarkflaglink

this is exactly the correct level of engagement with and patience for this stuff imope

― Wichita Referee's Assistant (darraghmac), Tuesday, 20 October 2026 11:53 (one month ago)

That's probably why I never got beyond degree level philosophy.

Yeah, me too. I never felt that 'consciousness' completely fitted within philosophy, and I also suspected that a lot of the philosophy I read on this was probably wrong from its initial assumptions/principles.... Like a chess game analysis by two middling-level players that goes wrong after move 2, but continues in detail for 80 moves.

― Bob Six, Tuesday, 20 October 2026 12:33 (one month ago)

I liked this part from the Evan Thompson paper linked above:

In any case, the methodological moral to be drawn is that we should not pursue our investigations in the philosophy of mind by advancing a priori arguments about what science will and will not be able to tell us about our experience and the experiences of other sentient creatures. The only way we will ever know what science can tell us is by doing the science.

This sounds like the same point that Carlo Rovelli was making in his article that I linked a while back:

Then (Chalmers) declared that there is another distinct problem -- why the brain's behavior is accompanied by experience at all -- which he christened the "hard" problem of consciousness. Today, this so-called "hard problem" is mentioned in all debates on consciousness. According to many, it unveils the very limits of current scientific understanding. Chalmers claimed that even after hypothetically accounting for our entire behavior, and for all our reports about our inner life, there would still be an "explanatory gap" between brain processes and experience.

The idea of this supposed "explanatory gap" reincarnates in a number of related forms: explaining "qualia," the hypothetical elementary bits of experience; explaining "subjectivity," the very fact that some entity is capable of having experience at all; or explaining, as the philosopher Thomas Nagel famously put it, "what is it like" to be the subject of a certain experience.

I fail to make sense of the claim that there is such an "explanatory gap." It regards what we would understand if we were to understand something that we currently do not understand. Forgive the muddled question, but: How can we know now what we would understand if we were to understand something we do not currently understand?

― o. nate, Saturday, 24 October 2026 16:50 (four weeks ago)

Yeah I love that Rovelli passage. I still have a very stubborn intuition that there *is* an explanatory gap, and I get very frustrated when people refuse to acknowledge that third-person explanations seem to leave something important out. (Rovelli at least acknowledges there that there is *something* that we don't understand yet.) But I've decided that qualia, etc as an organizing principle is a dead end.

― ok star grumbles (lukas), Saturday, 24 October 2026 19:48 (four weeks ago)

My feeling is that talking about the world purely in terms of a series of causal physical, chemical or electromagnetic reactions is simply never going to get you to consciousness. So there's something very fundamental missing from the picture. Which you can frame in terms of an "explanatory gap".

― Zelda Zonk, Sunday, 25 October 2026 00:09 (three weeks ago)

Surely that Rovelli quote acknowledges that, at the very least, there is something we do not currently understand. And yes what science does in those situations is propose hypotheses and experiments that may help us understand, but in this case it is hard, arguably currently impossible, to envisage what those hypotheses or experiments could be.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Sunday, 25 October 2026 11:43 (three weeks ago)

hard, arguably - just impossible.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Sunday, 25 October 2026 11:47 (three weeks ago)

I agree with all of that. So I'm not as dismissive of Chalmers as Rovelli seems to be, even though I agree with his general point. Chalmers does something valuable by showing that our intuitions about what could count as a scientific explanation and what could count as a satisfying account of consciousness do not seem to have any overlap. However, I think the way out of that is to realize that our intuitions about what could count as a scientific explanation may not be correct. In other words, scientific truth, like all truth, is a human construct, in the sense described by William James. People a thousand years ago did not have our modern idea of scientific truth. I think that goes a long way towards explaining why the "problem of consciousness" was not such a problem for them. Even classical thinkers who anticipated our modern scientific view, such as Lucretius in his De Rerum Natura, who postulated that everything is made up of indestructible particles in an infinite random flux, did not seem to find consciousness to be a vexing problem. He simply assumes that the mind and soul are made of a special type of particle, far too miniscule to be visible, that quickly exit the body at death and diffuse into the air. Nowadays we don't believe in any sorts of particles like that. But who knows what science will look like a thousand years from now. I won't be around to collect on this, but I would wager that it will be as unrecognizable to us today, as our science would be to Lucretius.

― o. nate, Friday, 30 October 2026 21:54 (three weeks ago)

The Blind Spot by Adam Frank, the much quoted upthread Evan Thompson, and Marcelo Gleiser. Kind of blew my mind a bit, or certainly opened it more. I'm no reductivist when it comes to consciousness but for the rest of science I guess I have been one, uncritically, and this book shows how that is a metaphysical stance, not an inevitable byproduct of science, and also that it's wrong. Which has implications for all of science, not just consciousness, and even for non physicalist approaches to consciousness - it says that all panpsychism does is "sprinkle consciousness over physical reality everywhere like pixie dust", lol.

It's clearly heavily indebted to phenomenalism, which i know nothing about, thanks to my traditional western philosophy degree. Merleau-Ponty is mentioned upthread, time to look into him more I guess.

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Wednesday, 11 November 2026 12:12 (one week ago)

lol I was at a friend's birthday party the other month and got talking to another friend who was there — we play poker together and have known each other for years but have never been in a situation where philosophy per se came up. I don't remember how we fell into talking about consciousness, but at one point I said, "Do you know Merleau-Ponty?" His eyes lit up and he was like, "Phenomenology! That's my jam!"

― paper plans (tipsy mothra), Wednesday, 11 November 2026 12:43 (one week ago)

oops yes phenomenology not phenomenalism

― I am Novus Praxus (ledge), Wednesday, 11 November 2026 13:27 (one week ago)

o. nate otm, Chalmers simply points to the irreconcilable incompatibility of the kind of discourse we call "science" with the phenomena of conscious experience. As a young scientist I absolutely detested the sociologists who pointed out that science is simply another kind of discourse with agreed boundaries and rules, but the older I get the more I regard science as a shared set of beliefs which often hold up under repetition.

― assert (matttkkkk), Wednesday, 11 November 2026 20:57 (one week ago)

The criticism of “God’s eye view” of nature in The Blind Spot was very satisfying for me in articulating how scientific models can go off the rails with assumptions of objectivity. It crystallized why multiverse theories feel so off base to me, as well as giving a nice little metaphor for keeping the map separate from the territory.

― semicolon pilcrow comma umlaut hyphen tower (bendy), Tuesday, 17 November 2026 07:15 (four days ago)


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