Ask Frank Kogan

: )

Is holding one's chin in a photo a universal 'don't' or are there exceptions?

Anthony

I'd say that in Britain and Europe by 1991 techno was playing a role much like rock had in late '60s-early '70s Anglo-America, which is to say that it was a ubiquitous all-sorts-of-everything music with vaguely "progressive" tendencies, and was being grasped by the squares as well as the hip and by the mainstream college crowd who 20 years earlier would have been blasting Grateful Dead and Blood Sweat & Tears out their dorm windows, but being ubiquitous and all sorts of everything would also have its mellow contingents and its metal contingents (like the kids into Grand Funk and Uriah Heep and Deep Purple)(and remembering that metal was only accidentally crude back then, since its purveyors and perpetrators considered it fine musicianship)... um, basically I'm talking up my butt here, since I back in the old USA was hearing almost none of the music and was sitting around bemoaning the "techno" influence on Europop and Hi-NRG, which I thought was making Europop/Hi-NRG tougher and uglier and dumber. Don't ask me to cite any actual performers or records to back up this contention.

anyhoo, while in denver, i flipped through some radio stations, and i heard (part of) a song that sounded like a florida-style freestyle tune, but the way the vocals (both male and female i thinnk) were recorded made me think it had been produced within the past few years. my dad (i was with my dad) hated it immediately so i turned it, and never knew what it was. but i thought to myself "hey i bet frank kogan is listening to this."

were you?

One of the purposes of the WMS blindfold tests in the mid '90s was to force myself to write about Europop and girlie disco and Boney M. But last year when I was culling from my '90s pieces and choosing what was to go in my book, I ended up selecting the stuff on Sophie B. Hawkins and Skid Row, and passing over the Boney M and Laissez Faire.

Tim's and Scott's followup questions just underline my contention that I don't know what I'm talking about when it comes to techno.

I liked Prodigy, by the way: Liked their techno move, liked their subsequent "rock" move.

Although wait, here's a question. Has the putative romanticism of gothic melodrama in pop music grown more florid with time, or simply more overt?

I mean, no one and nothing gets more florid and melodromatic than Johnny Ray back in the '50s and Gene Pitney in the early '60s, but neither of them was gothic - unless you consider them covertly gothic.

A lot of death, dark, and doom metal aspires to floridity, but most of it seems to lack the fundamentally fluidly florid frontman to pull it off. I.e., most of those dudes don't sing very well. Which leaves it up to the chicks: Evanescence and the Gathering, say, neither of whose melodrama is intense enough for me. But I know as little about contemporary metal as I know about techno. There was a great two-disk dark-metal anthology several years back; called Blessed Is the Night. I haven't listened recently, but my impression was that it was pretty in its darkness rather than going as deeply moodily over-the-top as I suspect your words "gothic melodrama" and "florid" are meant to apply.

Ask Chuck.

(can you tell i like house and techno more than jungle and trance?)

I remember when people would claim that disco simplified the beat (and I remember before that when people would claim that the Velvet Underground simplified the beat), and I would counter by saying, "Well, that's only if you listen to the simple beat and ignore all the other beats that are also there." Is that analogous to what you're saying about techno?

Listening to grime, I get the sense that the counterrhythms are deliberately unnatural sounding, which reminds me of some New York no wave back in the day (some of which was inspired by Miles's On the Corner).

Heehee

I LOVE to Polka!

Jeanne, do you like banda? Cumbia? Ska?

Yup! Except where disco wants to intoxicate you, techno wants to drive you mad.

Lukas, keep going.

No way man, this is your thread.

Well, I can't speak for Jeanne, but I wouldn't be at all surprised if she liked banda, cumbia, and ska, given all the similarities between their rhythms and polka.

(And the similarity is no coincidence, at least for banda, given that there were worldwide polka crazes in the 19th century that hit the New World incl. the Caribbean, and polka was carried to Texas by ethnic middle Europeans in the late 19th century, where it spread to Mexico and was adopted/adapted into the genetic structure of Mexican rural music. And I assume that Mexican urban music of the 19th century wouldn't have been untouched by the previously mentioned worldwide polka phenomenon.)

I am just too too.

When you lived in San Francisco, were you a part of some post-punk accordion scene along with Angel Corpus Christi?

who has worse taste in music: you or chuck?

Well, I guess it does bring about a question. What would you recommend for one relatively new & still a little fearful of the accordion, listening-wise.

(oh, and have to add that I totally agree about the shin guards, but must include steel-toed boots, also. While we were observing the extra action marching band the other night, I thought the guy "dancing" next to me was gonna break my foot. It wasn't Tim. He was on the other side, standing stock-still.)

(and, what isn't?)

Keep up the good work regardless.

I'm not sure I follow you- does your argument looks (roughly) like this?

Premise 1. bad summary of X is nonsense

S(X) = N

AND . . .

Premise 2. X is the same thing as a bad summary of X

S(X) = X

therefore . . . .

Conclusion 3. X itself is nonsense

X = N, where X designates "post-structuralism", and nonsense could mean "incantation", "filibuster", etc.

It follows from your premises, but . . . why should we agree with Premise 2? You seem to leave some space out there for people to actually pursue philosophy- do you think any philosopher, living, dead, or undead, would agree that "my ideas are whatever the off the cuff summaries posted online about them say they are"? If people regard certain thinkers as more portable than they are, and apply them badly in casual ways that you find pretentious or wooly or unsatisfying, fair enough- but I fail to see how this proves anything in particular about the source. I don't see people with an unshakeable faith in the Western scientific method walking me through primary texts by Boyle or Harvey or Newton in a carefully nuanced and textually sensitive manner in casual conversation either, nor would I expect them to; but if someone were to do it in a sloppy or haphazad way would I be justified in triumphantly proclaiming that "AHA! Western science is just rubbish" or "Western science is the art of badly describing experimental methods, and it is usually done through emails or sketches on cocktail napkins"? Or am I missing something?

1. a kind of style in the manner of "abstract expressionism" in painting or "roccoco" in architecture and design- in which case one can be critical of that style or not, can find it ugly or beautiful, progressive or regressive, compelling or dull, etc.

2. a loose name referring to five decades of thinking and writing by a broad cast of characters in linguistics, philosophy, literary study, anthropology, and psychoanalysis who are at each other's throats and who disagree with each other about nearly everything, in which case it is hard to imagine that one could be "for" or "against" the entirety of "post-structuralism", precisely because that's akin to being "for the 1970s" or "against metallurgy", i.e. the term becomes meaninglessly general as soon as it gets reduced enough that one is flagwaving for it *or* denouncing it. Once it is an "it" at all, you're not at a level of speciificity at which you're saying something worth saying.

If you don't care about this sort of thing, and have written it off in terms based upon a level 1 definition, you're going to endlessly bump heads with people who have a level 2 definition of it- and those people don't think about being "for" or "against" it, because caring enough about these issues to learn about them in a meaningful way means worrying about stuff in a far more "micro" manner.

To risk what just looks like name-dropping, you can have a real discussion about whether you prefer Eric Santner's reading of Heidegger's reading of Rilke or Giorgio Agamben's reading of Heidegger's reading of Rilke- but in order to do that you need to read Rilke, and read Heidegger, and read Agamben, and read Santner. And then you can take part in a discussion about them, and their different views, and the conflicting things that they say, which do involve weird neologistic phrases and Heideggerese such as "poverty in world", "the open" and "Dasein". If you read all of this stuff, and get a feeling for what these phrases do and don't designate, then you can understand the claims being made, and their significance- they are meaningful to people who've read in the tradition that they are building upon. But you have to learn to speak this language, and it presumes a great deal of familiarity with the history of philosophy and with the resonances and specifics of multiple languages. You can't expect somebody to sum up in a few sentences "what's the point of all this theory stuff?". It's like asking "what's the point of speaking Chinese?" "Theory" (post-structuralist or otherwise) is a loose phrase designating, in addition to the definitions above, a set of terms and a grammar for using them- and you can always use terms to say interesting, intelligent, contextualized and carefully argued things or stupid, pretentious, cornball things. And like any language, these terms are contested, their definitions are changing over time, they *are* buzzwords precisely because they're being frequently used and with their use their meaning is changing over time. Meaningful words get changed into cliches and dead metaphors all the time- consider the fate of words like "nice" and "buxom", which meant rather different things in the middle ages. I think "interactive" used to mean something and now it's starting to become meaningless; I bring this up because people can have a theoretically specific use of a word in mind and it can, through popularity, gradually get worn away into trendoid meaninglessness (witness the fate of the word "peformativity", which has launched a thousand bad essays, or the difference between Kristeva's sense of the word "abjection" and its watered down sense).

I think "interactive" used to mean something

It used to mean "CD-ROM by Voyager"

Well, Frank, if this is what you want to be doing, you're certainly very good at it. Your pummelling of my attempts to explain Derrida drove me off the boards for about a year because I realised that I couldn't make the kind of presentation of what I thought that you were demanding. (I'm still not sure I can, and I haven't looked at the Derrida thread since, and I haven't read what you've quoted me as saying upthread, and I don't particularly want to restart that conversation.) This wasn't just lack of confidence on my part (though it was partly that), and I wonder if some of it was a disjunction between how I felt I was supposed to appear (teacher, authoritative, knows things) and how I felt (how do I explain this? Why do I think this? how do I get you to see?). Anyway looking BACK, I can see that your criticisms added onto a whole heap of doubts, which I'm still working through.

I think your hunch / theory has some truth to it. (i.e. that 'theory' is effectively a language game in which knowing the rules, and participating in the conversation is central, and the actual names / terms in circulation could be switched for something else -- e.g. football / soccer without much changing, except that 'theory' talkers maybe share some kind of sense that what they're talking about is 'important' in a different way from the way football talk is 'important' [left unexplained here: important TO someone; important to the future of the universe; etc. different conversations will have different answers, clearly, which is why people take part in them, maybe, and could we explore the differences starting from this question?]) I don't think it's the whole truth, but I would have to think a bit before I could put my finger on what my reserveations are...

But my STORY does back up your suspicion, I think, which is why your challenge cut quite deeply. Having written a thesis on Derrida's work, I had had to learn the game -- the promise of doing a PhD I guess being that a) it will get you a job; b) it is somehow a more valuable use of your time than watching TV or whatever. a) is clearly wrong; b) is doubtful, but I guess I might defend it if you pushed me -- but that's another story. What you haven't factored in is the extent to which there is no unified 'theory talk', but that it is very factionalised, e.g. so the Derrida circle have one language, which they use to defend themselves from /set themselves off against Foucault fans (and everyone sets themselves off from those who use terms like post-structuralism (and yet often continue to *teach* those terms to students, a double standard which really angers me)). I realised when I found myself downloading the entire Derrida thread on Boxing Day morning and preparing to spend a lot of time reading through it and replying, that my investment in Derrida was more than an intellectual interest, which is why I couldn't talk about his work in transparent terms -- or be relaxed about it. (My (Not?) very grown-up response: drop it and walk away) I also realised that to undo the (emotional / intellectual) programming I had put myself through (and be able to do what you ask, i.e. explain what I felt was interesting about Derrida to anyone outside the magic circle) would take quite some time. I'm getting there I think -- although it is possibly taking me outside the circle. (e.g. recently having tried to set out my position, I was told it was sounding more like Aristotle than Derrida.)

Funnily enough I then started having to teach 'theory' to literature students, and realised that I was actually rather disenchanted with the whole idea -- which has only increased. I was being expected to push a particular set of beliefs / ideas to the students (and arriving in the dept I had been welcomed in by the group who prided themselves on sharing these beliefs). Not in itself bad, but these beliefs claimed to be 'critical' or 'radical' when they were just another set of ways of looking at the world. And FWIW, in a course on literary theory, I'd much rather discuss Frye than Foucault, but this was not popular with the 'theory' group... So I think I sympathise even more with your criticisms now, and I'm working on finding ways to teach which can bridge some of these gaps.

Anyway, the book I've just finished (mark's read it, he might be able to estimate whether it would pass the kogan challenge) is partly an attempt to come to terms with these things, and actually EXPLAIN why I think (in this case) Adorno is worth reading, or has something to say. (Actually mark's criticism is probably correct: that I am still writing as if I were explaining Adorno [i.e. I already 'know' and tell you what I know] whereas perhaps there are other ways of approaching the task which can acknowledge the way the explainer / reader roles are overdetermined by all sorts of other issues e.g. authority, not least of course when the patrician TONE of Adorno's work is what leads to the accusations of elitism which do not hold up when you process WHAT he writes) I had lined up another book contract which would allow me to go back over the whole 'theory' thing and work out what I felt about it, but since hiring committees aren't looking favourably on books which try to communicate to the outside world, and not the circuits, it's on hold for the moment.

Which I guess is by way of thanks, and an apology for not being able to explain all this to you before... But I also wish I wasn't going to figure as your example every time you want to slam bad writing / thinking / explaining on ilx.

[I was going to post this, then thought I'd email it, but actually my reservations about posting this in public kind of back up your points, so posting it in the open seems a more appreciative response in a way]

2) How'd your folks like the penguin movie?

My parents enjoyed the penguin movie, but we actually ended up conversing about the IMAX Nile movie (lunatics rafted/kayaked down the Blue Nile/Nile from source to Alexandria), which was not as skillfully done but was more conversation-worthy because it was about lunatics rather than penguins.

Drew is misreading me, which means I will clarify at some point. But I'm not down with either Premise 1 or Premise 2, and I don't come to Conclusion 3. My assumption is that the summaries (bad and good), buzz words, phrases, popular convo, etc. are meaningful and are possibly of more importance than the philosophical works of the Celebrated Thinkers (which is not to dismiss those philosophical works but to question their relevance). The point of calling something a "filibuster" is to ask what the filibuster is standing in place of.

I have no idea if Deana Carter is a lesbian and don't assume that she is, so therefore her album is not a coming-out story. To come out you have to, like, come out, not just drop code words or hints. That said, one can read certain lines in her album as code words or hints, and I noticed them too, but that doesn't mean she put them there. I feel uncomfortable saying any more about it, since whatever her sexuality she's the one who should decide whether to declare it, and I don't want to start rumors that would put her in bad with her prime audience, esp. since she made a great album, she's been relegated to an indie, and isn't getting much airplay. But since you've broached the subject on two threads now, I don't suppose what I say will make any difference. I'll reserve further thoughts for the rolling country thread.

I'm the guy who coined the phrase "96 Theses," but that doesn't ensure that I'll be the one to promulgate them.

Did I inspire Alex to tell his story? Or did I do just the opposite?

Susan, I just listened to L'Trimm's "Heaven Sent" and, unfortunately, determined that they were not referring to me.

Finish your book and stop getting distracted by us Internet losers. Also, damn, I was just asking you a question, sheesh. Do you really think an ILM thread will cause country fans to turn on Deana C. like a snarling pack of wolves?

Your friend, Matt.

P.S. Don't answer this, you have more impt. things to do.

M.V., what I hope Derrida said about "uncertainty" and "incompleteness" is that those are local judgments made within particular conversations and that philosophy has nothing general to say about them, and that we're misreading him badly if we consider him some kind of skeptic who's telling us that all interpretations are necessarily incomplete and that one can never be sure that one's interpretation is correct.

The basic argument from, say Wittgenstein and Kuhn and, I assume, the posties as well is that any phenomenon (event, object, statement, calculation, instruction, etc.) can be interpreted in a multiplicity of ways (note that the word "can" does not mean "will") and that philosophy can't come up with a sure-fire procedure or rule to compel everyone to come up with the "correct" interpretation, since any rule itself can also be interpreted in a multiplicity of ways, therefore requiring a second rule to tell you how to apply the first, a third rule to tell you how to apply the second, ad infinitum. Wittgenstein:

A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground—is there only one way of interpreting them? —So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.

Pay attention to those last three sentences. This passage is not a philosophical statement, but an attack upon philosophy. Wittgenstein is saying that though you can always invent some hypothetical doubt, such hypothetical doubts have no bearing whatsoever on whether a rule is complete or not or on whether there's one good interpretation or many, or on whether you doubt or fail to doubt. Again: the lack of an "ultimate" rule that grounds all other rules has nothing whatsoever to do with whether a rule is sufficient or not. A rule is sufficient if it does its job, and insufficient if it doesn't. Somehow, this insight gets fudged or reversed altogether when it makes its way to English departments, which is why Wittgenstein, who's very clear on this point, is not much read by lit theorists. I don't know how complicit Derrida and the continental crew are in the fudging.

To use rogermexico's metaphor: Wittgenstein et al. have nothing to say about whether the ground is shifting under us. We can conclude no more than that the ground beneath a particular signpost - whether steady or unsteady - is not philosophical, and never has been. And, as with rules, so with explanations and interpretations:

Suppose I give this explanation: "I take 'Moses' to mean the man, if there was such a man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, whatever he was called then and whatever he may or may not have done besides."—But similar doubts to those about "Moses" are possible about the words of this explanation (what are you calling "Egypt," whom the "Israelites" etc.?). Nor would these questions come to an end when we get down to words like "red," "dark," "sweet."—"But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if after all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don't understand what he means and never shall!"—As though an explanation as it were hung in the air unless supported by another one. Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another—unless we require it to prevent a misunderstanding. One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a misunderstanding—one, that is, that would occur but for the explanation; not every one that I can imagine.

It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.

The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose.

Of course, there's no law that says that you have to find Wittgenstein's attitude satisfying. But if you don't, you ought to ask yourself what causes your dissatisfaction, since Wittgenstein certainly isn't telling you to retain rules that you feel need to be revised, or to submit to "normal circumstances" that you find oppressive. He's just refusing to give you philosophical support either for retaining or modifying them. "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking."

A function of the filibuster is to shield you from asking yourself what causes your dissatisfaction.

*this* thread came up:

Introduce Yourselves!
I also like Wittgenstein, William Carlos Williams, Thomas Pynchon, ... lil-flip,
nas, tupac, deana carter, garth brooks, outkast, kumbia kings, frankie j, ...
ilx.wh3rd.net/thread.php?msgid=1075296 - 502k

(no, it seems, penguin or lesbian there, tho)

And how is antirockism the PBS of ILX?

although i suspect i already know the answer.

"Wittgenstein is saying that though you can always invent some hypothetical doubt, such hypothetical doubts have no bearing whatsoever on whether a rule is complete or not or on whether there's one good interpretation or many, or on whether you doubt or fail to doubt. Again: the lack of an "ultimate" rule that grounds all other rules has nothing whatsoever to do with whether a rule is sufficient or not."

Do you think that such rules can be sufficient when talking about music?

By studying the first five Rolling Stones albums (in U.S. would be England's Newest Hitmakers through December's Children).

Question confuses me, since I don't know what "such rules" refers to. Which rules? Sufficient for what purposes?

Sorry Frank I wasn't being very clear was I. I guess what I'm asking is how you consider the idea of "the sufficiency of a rule" to work when you're thinking about music - by which I don't mean "are specific rules sufficient" so much as "do you think we should also approach music empirically and anti-philosophically (i.e. the basis upon which we should accept a rule is whether it works, not on whether it can be ultimately grounded).

I expect you'll say "yes". But I'm interested in asking anyway because the problem of the sufficiency of rules seems much closer to the surface in something like music criticism than it does in many other areas of everyday life. There's little practical purpose to me introducing a hypothetical doubt as to the existence of the kettle in your kitchen. On the other hand, if we could agree on which rules were "sufficient" in thinking about music, the business of music criticism would seem somewhat superfluous.

(I can't specify the rule(s) in question here - but I guess rules as to how the music works, why it works etc. The purpose of the rules would be understanding these very things)

Perhaps music criticism is only possible on the basis of a constitutive insufficiency of any rule? Perhaps the purpose of music criticism is to present a rule as being sufficient (and, further, to engage passionately in music criticism you have to believe and act as if your rules are sufficient) despite the fact that it's probably not?

This would place sufficiency within the category of the "impossible but necessary" - on the one hand, the sufficiency of a rule cannot be achieved without closing down the possibility of music criticism; but on the other hand, the need to establish sufficiency can't be abandoned for fear of the same thing happening.

This probably doesn't make sense.

Do you think there is any value in attempting to transfer terminology and paradigms drawn from big-name brand philosophers like Lacan, Derrida, Deleuze, and Wittengenstein to the discussion of music?

Have you ever considered copyediting? I think you'd be good at it. I imagine you leaving 1000 word corrections in Quark notes.

Don, yeah, there are jobs in the world, grading tests or proofing manuscripts or washing dishes, but that's not the point. People like me have to find a way to create a market for our ideas, or we won't accomplish a fraction intellectually of what we're capable of. And I for one don't feel that I can do it alone.

Do you think this National Review article on the "50 greatest conservative rock songs" (and its follow-up) (and this critique) laughable or disturbing?

--Mike

P.S. I finally got Real Punks in what was probably my last-ever purchase at the Greenwich Village Tower Records, huzzah.

What else besides mucho teenpop have you recently listened to and enjoyed?

t''t

Does making any kind of demand on music inevitably PBSify it?

Isn't "seeking ulterior justification in PBS terms" largely identical/similar/the same as "rock criticism" whether we like it or not?

A quick stab at your questions, and if I have a chance to post later maybe I'll do a not-so-quick followup.

(1) I can think of a whole lot of demands that won't lead to PBSification. E.g., I don't think demanding that a singer be "legitimate" (in the way that Celine Dion and Barbra Streisand and Beverly Sills and Cecilia Bartoli are "legitimate singers") leads to "PBS" as I've been using the term.* Nor would the demand that pop music be "escapist." Nor would the demand that gospel music speak to and for God. What these demands lead to might end up just as constricting in their own way, but it won't be PBS.

(2) Rock criticism is hardly a monolith, but I'll say that much of what I like in music is the sort of stuff that can set music on the PBS path. Just read what I say in praise of Ashlee Simpson. Among the things I like about her is that she's intellectually restless and that she's promised to search for "what this shit means." These are good impulses. They enrich her music and they enrich the world. Also, I don't believe it's inevitable that such impulses lead to PBS, but quite often they do. (What I'm afraid is going to happen with Ashlee is that she'll get shunted aside and ignored, so she/we will never find out where her impulses lead or what this shit means.)

*"PBS as I've been using the term." I meant a couple of things by it, which was part of the confusion:

(i) A metaphor. I was saying that the indie-alternative-fanzine network is playing a role in popular music and youth culture similar to the one that the Public Broadcasting Service plays in the broader culture. (Sinker once told me the BBC analog to PBS, but I don't remember it. This is how PBS describes itself: "A trusted community resource, PBS uses the power of noncommercial television, the Internet and other media to enrich the lives of all Americans through quality programs and education services that inform, inspire and delight... It features television's best children's, cultural, educational, history, nature, news, public affairs, science and skills programming.") Not that Flipper and GG Allin (for instance) would have been welcome on the real PBS, but that they were our PBS. "I mean a certain PBS head (attitude), which can include a cult taste for shitty horror movies, pro wrestling, African pop, comic books, Hasil Adkins. All this pseudofun is a covering for a mind set that's ruled by PBS. We're making horror movies safe for PBS. We have met PBS, and it is us. I mean an imaginary PBS of the future, with pro wrestling, splatter films, and leftist analyses of the Capitalist Entertainment Industry (scored by a reformed Gang of 4). All rendered lame in the context of our appreciation."

(ii) A process - "PBSification" - that's culture-wide rather than restricted to indie-alternative. Basically (and vaguely) I was thinking of it as a work-ethic impulse that could be anything from Social Improvement to Subversion to an aesthete's Sophisticated Appreciation Of Trash. None of which I have anything against in principle, but I was seeing that when these things become if-you're-not-part-of-the-solution-you're-part-of-the-problem requirements, then the symbol comes to stand in for the event, at the expense of their being an interesting event. "People learn from experience that a lot of medicine tastes bad, and they come to think that 'tasting bad' is the active ingredient in medicine. So, when their medicine isn't working, they think that by subtracting the sweet stuff they're making it more medicinal." So the problem isn't that the "wrong" stuff gets added to pop, but that good stuff gets eliminated.

http://paperthinwalls.com/singlefile/item?id=450